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ABSTRACT
The objective is to examine, in relation to national housing 
policy, the role of committees of inquiry, both government 
appointed committees, and departmental select committees of 
the House of Commons first established in 1979. The period 
involved in the study is from 1945 to about 1985 with the 
government established inquiries being conducted by statu­
tory advisory committees and departmental/interdepartmental 
committees in the years prior to the mid 1970s, and the 
select committee inquiries by the Environment Committee and 
the Scottish Affairs Committee in the early 1980s.
The main housing policy areas covered are the private rented 
sector of the market, and slum clearance and improvement, 
although inquiries by the departmental select committees 
into council house sales, housing capital allocation, and 
dampness in housing, and, by a statutory housing advisory 
committee into local authority housing allocation practice 
are also reviewed.
In exploring the role of the government appointed committees 
of inquiry, the assumption made at the outset is that they 
were established in the expectation that certain benefits 
would ensue to government. A range of 1potential benefits' 
is suggested, ['independent establishment of the facts', 
'provision of independent expert advice', 'problem solving', 
'consensus building', 'case building' 'legitimisation', and
'education and attitudinal change', plus perhaps 'delay'], 
and it is postulated that government might be inclined to 
establish such committees where one or more of those bene­
fits was perceived to be of significance in relation to an 
issue.
The reports of six government appointed committees of in­
quiry having been reviewed, and consideration given as to 
what benefits within the range identified could have been 
anticipated when the inquiry was established, the extent to 
which the benefits did in the event emerge and the degree 
of their impact is assessed. In some cases, because of 
changed circumstances, benefits other than those anticipated 
are found to have emerged, or anticipated benefits to have 
been rendered less significant. When situations are en­
countered where, on the basis of the argument advanced, 
government might have been expected to establish an inquiry 
but did not do so, explanations are sought.
With regard to the Environment Committee and the Committee 
on Scottish Affairs the objective is to assess how effective 
they have been and are likely to be in examining housing 
policy, and to consider the potential for joint inquiries by 
the two Committees. Two reports by each Committee are re­
viewed [an inquiry by a select committee in 1973, prior the 
establishment of the departmental committees, is also inclu­
ded by way of comparison].
In assessing the 'appropriateness' of the topics for invest­
igation the importance of achieving consensus is considered. 
While achieving consensus reports is regarded by some as 
important, because these are likely to have a greater influ­
ence on government, it is argued here that too much signif­
icance can be attached to this. Areas of housing policy 
can be contentious and to exclude a topic from consideration 
on these grounds may lead to issues going uninvestigated, 
and in any event, even where committee members are unwilling 
to challenge the main thrust of policies they may be pre­
pared to support criticism of departments and of ministers. 
The appropriateness of the topics on other grounds - signif­
icance, putting issues on the policy agenda, increasing 
information, providing opportunity for discussion, raising 
topics and widening the policy community is also considered.
It is concluded that the Environment Committee has been more 
effective than the Scottish Committee in cross-examining 
witnesses, and factors contributing to the latter's weakness 
in this regard and ways of ameliorating it are discussed.
The scope for joint inquiries is assessed and potential 
advantages to both Committees from their establishment 
identified, but it is predicted there could well be opposi­
tion to such a development particularly from the departments 
concerned. Further, prevailing political circumstances are 
judged to be unfavourable.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my appreciation of the advice and support 
I have received from my supervisor Professor James Kellas 
throughout my period of study. I am also grateful for the 
assistance of Professor David Donnison, Honorary Research 
Fellow in the University's Centre for Housing Research, who 
gave me early and invaluable insight into the operation of 
committees of inquiry.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 
SECTION I -
CH. I 
CH. II
SECTION II - 
Introduction 
CH.Ill
CH. IV
CH. V 
CH. VI
SECTION III 
Introduction 
CH.VII
CH.VIII
Statutory Advisory Committees and 
Departmental Select Committees.
The Central Housing Advisory Committee 
and The Scottish Housing Advisory 
Committee.
The Environment Committee and 
The Scottish Affairs Committee - 
Background.
The Private Rented Sector.
The Second Ridley Report to the 1957 
Rent Act.
The Milner Holland Report and the 
1965 Rent Act.
The Francis Report and the 1974 Rent Act.
Inquiry by the Environment Committee 
into the Private Rented Housing Sector 
1981/82 and Subsequent Developments.
Slum Clearance and Improvement Policy.
The Denington and Cullingworth Reports 
and the 1969 Housing Acts.
Inquiry by the Expenditure Committee 
into Housing Improvement Policy 1973 
and the 1974 Housing Acts.
1
11
12
34
43
44
47
84
124
139
156
157
162
208
vi
SECTION IV - Inquiries on Other Housing Issues. 247
CH. IX The Sale of Council Houses, and Housing
Policy in Scotland - Further Inquiries
by the Departmental Select Committees. 248
CH.X Local Authority Housing Allocation
Policies. 274
CONCLUSIONS 292
On Government Appointed Committees of Inquiry. 293
On The Environment Committee and the Committee on 
Scottish Affairs. 308
BIBLIOGRAPHY 321
vii
INTRODUCTION
This study seeks to examine aspects of housing policy during 
the period of 40 years from the end of the second world war 
and to consider the role performed in that connection by 
committees of inquiry including both government appointed 
committees and select committees appointed by the House of 
Commons. During most of the period defined government 
appointed committees of inquiry still remained a convention­
al mechanism in the policy making process, being particular­
ly prevalent in the second half of the 1960s.1 And, in its 
latter part there was increased interest in the development 
of select committees in response to pressure for parliamen­
tary reform.
Three common distinguishing factors can be identified as 
applying to government appointed committees of inquiry:-
1. the production of information and [normally] advice for 
government after the consideration of evidence stemming from 
written submissions and generally hearings, and sometimes 
from commissioned research and from visits of inspection;
2. the inclusion within their membership of individuals 
who are not civil servants or local government officials, 
thus differentiating them from the type of 'committee norm­
ally referred to as a working party;
3. the consideration of general policies and procedures 
rather than circumstances specific to one event.2
1
The Royal Commission is perhaps the best known type of 
government appointed committee of inquiry but a Royal Com­
mission which reported in 1917 on working class housing 
conditions in Scotland has been the only one concerned 
specifically with housing policy this century,3 and its sole 
predecessor was the Royal Commission on the Housing of the 
Working Classes [1884-85]. During the period in question 
government initiated inquiries were conducted either by 
departmental or inter-departmental committees or by statu­
tory standing advisory committees.
Although the Royal Commission may be perceived as having a 
higher status - its members being appointed by the Monarch, 
unlike a departmental committee where this role is performed 
by the relevant minister - it has been claimed that there is 
no co-relation evident between the level of public interest 
and the importance of the topic concerned, and the nature of 
inquiry established.4 Moreover, while it might be supposed 
that the Royal Commission is more powerful in terms of 
requiring disclosure of information and achieving publicity 
for its findings there appears to be little factual basis
for such a conclusion.5
The appointment by the responsible ministers6 of the stand­
ing advisory committees referred to - the Central Housing
Advisory Committee [CHAC} for England and Wales, and the 
Scottish Housing Advisory Committee [SHAC} was required by 
provisions introduced by the Housing Act 1935 and the Hous­
ing [Scotland] Act of the same year. While the Committees'
2
original primary raison d'etre may have been with regard to 
measures to tackle overcrowding with which the two Acts were 
principally concerned, there were also general provisions 
enabling the ministers to seek advice, as the Scottish 
legislation put it - "on any question which might be re­
ferred by him to the Committee with respect to any other 
matter arising in connection with the execution of enact- 
ments relating to housing". Each Committee was also free 
to make recommendations to the minister on any such aspects
p
of its own volition. The Central Housing Advisory Commit­
tee was abolished in 1975 and its Scottish equivalent five 
years later.
Select committees were extensively utilised in the 19th 
century, particularly the earlier part, to inquire into
. . Q . . . . . .social issues. But with the increasing significance of 
party politics the select committee came to be viewed as an 
inappropriate mechanism for such purposes. In more recent 
times, including much of the period since the second world 
war, those select committees which were concerned with 
government activity were limited to monitoring the perfor­
mance of government departments, for example - with backing 
up the audit work of the Comptroller and Auditor General - 
the Public Accounts Committee; and with economy in the 
pursuit of government policies - the Estimates Committee. 
MPs serving on such committees were precluded from raising 
questions on the nature of policy. It was only civil 
servants who were cross examined not ministers, and only 
ministers could deal with policy issues. Although, as
3
Morris observes - "because the Estimates Committee [was] 
empowered to examine any of the estimates presented to the 
House of Commons and to report on how, if at all, the policy 
implied in the estimates could be carried out more economic­
ally, members of the Estimates Committee [were] therefore, 
able to range over the whole field of administrative 
policy".10 In 1970 the Estimates Committee was restyled the 
Expenditure Committee with amended terms of reference. The 
"new Committee, unlike the Estimates Committee, would not be 
barred from considering the policies behind the figures 
[and] there would [therefore] be occasions when it would be 
appropriate for ministers to give evidence before it".11
The Expenditure Committee was abolished in 1979 when the 
House of Commons agreed to establish a system of 
departmental select committees, each committee having the 
remit to 'examine the expenditure, administration and 
policy' of a specific government department and its associa­
ted bodies, the Environment Committee and the Committee on 
Scottish Affairs being in a position to discharge these 
functions with regard to housing.
While viewed against a cyclical model involving policy 
making, policy implementation, and policy review, government 
appointed committees can be seen to have an inquiry role at 
any of the three stages, departmental select committees are 
restricted to the latter two. When established they were 
not envisaged as having a role at the policy making stage, 
and they would not have prelegislative or legislative func­
4
tions. To the extent that they were concerned with the 
nature of policy it was to be with the examination and 
appraisal of existing policy.
The last housing related inquiry carried out by the Environ- 
ment Committee was conducted during 1981/82  ^ and the last
• • i  "iby the Scottish Affairs Committee during 1983/84. J In the 
1987-92 parliament due to lack of co-operation from its own 
backbenchers, the Government failed in its attempt to recon­
stitute the Scottish Affairs Committee.
State intervention in the housing market [as distinct from 
the sanitary aspects of housing], on any significant scale, 
dates from around the time of the first world war, and over 
the succeeding decades a considerable volume of legislation 
relating to housing was produced. Some of the measures 
were preceded by inquiries by government appointed 
committees and this was particularly so with regard to the 
development of the Rent Acts although a consistent pattern 
of inquiry preceding legislation in this field, which was a 
feature of the inter-war years, was not evident after the 
second war when the relationship between inquiry and legis­
lation became fragmented and more complex. There are also 
examples of government appointed committees of inquiry in 
connection with other areas of housing policy such as slum 
clearance and housing improvement, the role of housing 
associations, and [at the implementation level] local au­
thority housing management. On the other hand, signif­
icant, issues which such committees of inquiry have not been
5
asked to address include subsidies to the public, and to the 
private sectors of the housing market.
There clearly have been circumstances where governments have 
found it requisite or expedient to appoint committees of 
inquiry and others where they have not. And, it seems 
logical in attempting to analyse the role which this type of 
committee of inquiry plays to, as Rhodes suggests, view them 
primarily from the point of view of the governments which 
appoint them.
"In order to understand the use of committees it seems 
essential first to try and elucidate how and why 
governments thought it necessary or desirable to ap­
point them in specific cases. The basic assumption 
here is that since the decision whether to appoint a 
committee is in the hands of government, the committees 
must be useful in some way to government whether or not 
they have other uses or consequences1'.14
It is of course possible that governments reluctant to take 
action on an issue may use the appointment of a committee of 
inquiry as a device for implying that something is being 
done or perhaps for postponing the requirement for action, 
with a minimal response the likely eventual outcome. But 
it seems a reasonable presumption that the majority of 
inquiries are established with positive objectives notwith­
standing that in some situations, the resultant delay may be 
seen as having political advantages. Any benefits flowing
6
from delay would however, in such circumstances influence 
the timing of the announcement of the inquiry rather than 
the decision to establish one.
In addition to the possible benefits of delay, what other 
advantages might flow from a committee of inquiry from a 
government's or department's viewpoint? Considering policy 
from the formulation stage, through the legislative process, 
to subsequent implementation, the following suggest them­
selves, although this is not claimed to be an exhaustive 
list.
1. Independently establishing the facts of a situation.
2. Providing impartial expert advice.
3. Solving problems.
4. Case building for negotiating with other departments - 
particularly the Treasury.
5. Consensus building: within the government party;
between the parties; and, with organisations and profes­
sional groups responsible for implementation.
6. Providing legitimisation, for example: for positive
discrimination in resource allocation; for state interven­
tion in property rights; for changes having an adverse 
impact on certain groups; for new 'radical' ideas.
7. Educating and achieving attitudinal change - particu­
larly where professionalisation is not widespread among 
those responsible for implementation.
[Senior civil servants, who may be expected to be influen­
tial in a decision as to whether or not to establish an
7
inquiry, are likely to be particularly concerned as to the 
availability of independent advice especially where there is 
doubt as to the advisability of a particular course of 
action, with support for inter-departmental negotiations, 
and regarding those factors which may influence the longer 
term implementation of the measures.]
These potential benefits having been identified, it can be 
further postulated that governments may be inclined to 
appoint committees of inquiry where such considerations, 
individually or in combination, in connection with a partic­
ular issue can be seen to be of significance. Clearly, 
however, other considerations will weigh in the balance. 
In particular it may be that the consequential delay is 
unacceptable for various reasons. It may also be that
circumstances arise where the desired benefits can be
achieved from another source.
In conducting the study of government appointed committees 
of inquiry evidence will be sought to support this hypoth­
esis and to assess the impact of the identified benefits. 
It may also be that cases will emerge where as the result of 
a change in situation, benefits which were not seen as
significant at the time of the appointment of the committee 
become so and vice versa.
Further, it is hoped, that by exploring situations in the 
same policy area where in some cases legislation was prece­
ded by an inquiry, and others where it was not, to draw
8
useful comparisons.
With regard to select committees of the House of Commons - 
the Environment Committee, and the Committee on Scottish 
Affairs - the objective is to assess how effective they have 
been, and are likely to be, in examining housing policy. 
This will include considering those criteria likely to 
influence the selection of topics, and those which might be 
regarded as applying to an ’appropriate1 topic. It will 
also involve assessing the adequacy of the resources and 
mechanisms available to the Committees, and the attitudes of 
MPs, government, opposition parties, and elements of the 
wider political system to the activities of the Committees. 
The possibility of joint inquiries by the two Committees 
will also be explored.
Because different types of committees have been concerned 
with similar areas of housing policy, it has been judged 
appropriate to structure this review, as far as possible, on 
a policy area basis rather than according to the type of 
committee concerned, and this is the pattern followed in the 
main, although there is a departure from it in the penulti­
mate chapter. As a preliminary, it is considered necessary 
to describe in more detail the background relative to the 
statutory advisory committees, and somewhat more briefly 
the Environment Committee and the Scottish Affairs Commit­
tee, and it is to this that the following two chapters are 
devoted.
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SECTION I
STATUTORY advisory committees 
& DEPARTMENTAL SELECT COMMITTEES
11
CHAPTER I -THE CENTRAL HOUSING ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND 
THE SCOTTISH HOUSING ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The housing legislation passed in 1935 providing for the 
establishment of the Committees1 enabled, in the case of 
CHAC the Minister of Health, and in the case of SHAC the 
Department of Health for Scotland,2 to make orders governing
-l
their constitutions and procedures. The Ministry of
Health Order provided that the number of members of CHAC was 
to be determined by the Minister but was not to exceed 30; 
tenure was for two years from 3 0 September following the 
date of appointment, although members could be re-appointed; 
the Minister was to be chairman and the Parliamentary Secre­
tary vice-chairman. Under the Scottish Order the number of 
members of SHAC was left to the discretion of the Department 
although a minimum of four women were to be included.4 
Tenure was for three years, one-third retiring each year. 
As with CHAC members could be re-appointed, but the maximum 
period of continuous service was limited to seven years. 
The first chairman and vice-chairman were to be nominated by 
the Department, and thereafter their successors by the 
Committee members. In the event, SHAC was chaired by a 
parliamentary under-secretary of state although that prac­
tice was abandoned in 1978 when the chairman of the Scottish 
Special Housing Association was appointed to the role.5
CHAC in the early post-war years, has been described as 
"dominated by people from local authority and housing trust 
backgrounds"6. Over the years the pattern changed and by 
1974, shortly before it was abolished, CHAC had a membership
12
of twenty-three comprising three academics (two with housing 
research backgrounds), three architects, three housing 
managers, and three senior figures from the construction 
industry; two local authority members, and two building 
society officials; the Director of Rowntree Memorial Trust, 
a trustee of the Bournville Trust, an environmental health
. . 7  .officer and one 'representative' each of the Housing Cor­
poration, the National Building Agency, the Central Council 
for the Disabled,8 and the Supplementary Benefits Commis-
9sion.
The membership of SHAC, which in the 1940s was over 
thirty,10 was in 1965 down to sixteen, six of them local 
authority councillors.11 By 1975 when the membership had 
increased to nineteen - the number of local authority coun­
cillors was reduced somewhat to four12 and among the re­
mainder of the Committee, in addition to those from back­
grounds traditionally included such as the environmental 
health and architectural professions, the building society 
movement, and the building industry there were now partici­
pants from three pressure groups - the Scottish Consumer 
Council, Shelter, and the Scottish Federation of Housing 
Associations, and also one from a tenant management co­
operative. 13
The Committees met on two or three monthly cycles, although 
in its latter stages meetings of CHAC were only being called 
as and when required. The general pattern however, was for 
specific inquiries to be carried out by sub-committees which
13
normally included several co-opted members.14 The first
two reports produced by CHAC sub-committees in the 1940s 
were concerned with standards for the post-war housing 
programme - design standards for new housing, and standards 
for determining those existing houses which were unfit for 
human habitation.15 A housing management sub-committee 
produced a series of seven reports in the period up until 
1959, concerned with topics related to: access to, and
allocation of, local authority housing; management problems 
of estates; and housing management in general.16 Other sub­
committees produced a report on aspects of flat dwelling in 
1952,17 and a further report on housing design standards in
i ft1961. Subsequently, under the Labour governments
1965/1970 sub-committees were appointed to inquire into:
. l ftproblems of tackling sub standard housing; the needs of
9 0 . tnew and expanding towns•, and the role, financing, and co­
ordination of housing associations.21 And the report on 
another inquiry on housing management was published in 
1969.22
Sub-committees of SHAC produced seven reports between 1944 
and 1951, on topics which included design standards for the
post-war building programme (parallelling a CHAC report
previously mentioned);23 housing for owner occupation; 
housing management, including allocation; modernising the 
existing private sector stock; and design and construction 
standards in non traditional housing.24
During the period of Conservative government from 1951 until
14
1964 the Scottish Committee was allowed to lapse and was not 
reconstituted until 1965. When in 1967, the publication of 
a SHAC sub-committee report on the older private sector 
housing stock 25 attracted considerable attention this fact 
was highlighted by Labour by way of a parliamentary ques­
tion.
MR BUCHANAN26 - "In view of the tremendous interest shown in 
the work of the Committee, why was it allowed to lapse for a 
period?”
DR DICKSON MABON (Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State) "Our predecessors could answer that question. I am 
informed that the Committee was abolished in 1951 as an 
economy measure, but I suspect that it was not done for 
economy of costs but for economy of ideas'1.27
Between 1965 and 1980, in addition to the report just 
mentioned, a further eight reports were published under the 
auspices of SHAC: six of them following inquiries by sub­
committees or, in one case, a working party; and two on 
academic research commissioned by the Committee. Topics 
covered included: the cost of private house building, and
the demand for private housing in Scotland; local authority 
housing - management, allocation, estate environment; train­
ing for housing management; and assessment of housing 
needs.28
Of the inquiries conducted by SHAC over the period de­
scribed, from the war years until 1980, only one, on assess­
15
ing housing needs, the last topic mentioned was initiated 
(in 1971) under a Conservative Secretary of State, and this
O Q
was conducted by a working party. 37
In March 1971 Julian Amery, Minister of Housing and 
Construction in the Conservative Government, in reply to a 
question as to CHAC's recent activities from A P Costain, a 
backbencher on his own side, reported:- that it had met only 
twice during 1970; that no reports had been published 
during 1970; that no sub-committees were currently sitting; 
and that the Committee's future programme would be discussed 
at a meeting scheduled for the next month.30
[A P Costain Member for Folkestone and Hythe - was chairman 
of Richard Costain Ltd, Building and Civil Engineering 
Contractors, from 1966 to 1969, and associated with the
*1 -Idevelopment of pre-stressed concrete production. He
followed up his question on CHAC with questions relating to 
the failure to achieve targets for the production of indu­
strialised dwellings in the public sector, and on the ade­
quacy of the staffing of the National Building Agency with 
regard to its capacity to assess industrialised house build- 
ing systems. *]
The following May another Conservative backbencher, Geoffrey 
Finsberg, 33 inquired as to the outcome of the discussion 
and suggested that the Committee be asked to report on the 
potential for tenant involvement in local authority housing 
management "thus following the example of the Conservative
16
controlled GLC and the London Borough of Camden”. He was 
advised by Paul Channon - Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State DoE - who replied that it had been agreed "that
future meetings should be called as necessary to deal with 
specific housing matters". A further meeting had been 
arranged for July when the report of the Francis Committee
on the Rent Acts 34 would be discussed. He parried a
question from Reginald Freeson, Opposition spokesman on 
housing, as to whether there would be "a reduction in the 
number of meetings of this very important and helpful com­
mittee" .35
Some two months later, in response to a further question 
from a Conservative backbencher, (Sir) Robin Chichester- 
Clark as to the future programme of the Committee, Julian 
Amery had nothing to add to his earlier statement. In
reply to a further question from the same Member as to how 
many committees of his Department with builders serving on 
them as members had been closed down since the previous 
general election in June 1970, he reported that "the Housing 
Programme Working Party (had) been reconstituted as the NCC 
Standing Consultative Committee on Housing with (himself) as 
chairman.36
(Sir Robin Chichester-Clark - Ulster Unionist Member for 
Londonderry - an industrial consultant was, like Costain, 
associated with the building industry in his capacity as a 
director of Alfred Booth & Co.37]
17
In February 1972 Costain asked the Secretary of State for 
the Environment to list the reports which had been published 
by sub-committees or working parties of CHAC in each of the 
last five years, and what action had been taken to implement 
these reports. ° He followed this up eight days later with 
a further question asking the Secretary of State whether he 
would now make a statement on the future of CHAC, and on 
being told that meetings were held as and when required, 
suggested that the "many eminent men on the Committee - - - 
could be used more profitably if given the task of finding 
more land for house building”. When Reginald Freeson 
intervened to inquire why the Committee only met when re­
quired and not on a regular basis as previously, Amery 
replied that he found "the Committee extremely helpful - - 
as a sounding board and for the discussion of problems such 
as the fair deal on rents and the report of the Francis 
Committee". The suggestion that the Committee might have a 
contribution to make on land availability was one which he
o q
proposed to pursue.
Eleven months later another Conservative backbencher, Sydney 
Chapman, asked the Secretary of State for the Environment: 
to list the reports produced by CHAC during 1972 and 1973; 
what the Committee's programme of work was; and whether he 
would make a statement. Paul Channon who replied, stated 
that no reports had been published and that there was no 
fixed programme.40
[Sydney Chapman - Member for Birmingham, Handsworth was
18
another associated with the building industry, as an archi­
tect and consultant to the House Builders Federation.41
After the general election of February 1974 the recently 
appointed Labour Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Anthony Crosland, was asked by the Conservative spokesman on 
housing, Michael Latham, "how many times CHAC (had) met in 
1973, and to the latest available date in 1974 - what
reports were produced by working parties or sub-committees 
in that period; how many sub-committees (had) been set up 
since 1 March 1974, and what was their future programme of 
work”. Reginald Freeson, by now Minister for Housing and 
Construction, who replied, intimated that the Government was 
considering the future role of the Committee.42
In response to a further question from Latham, shortly after 
another general election in October of the same year, Free­
son indicated that the review was almost complete.43 And, 
again in response to a question from Latham, announced in 
January 1975 that the Secretary of State had decided to 
disband the Committee. In his statement Freeson said - 
"This decision recognises the changes that have taken place 
since the Central Housing Advisory Committee was established 
in 1935, particularly in recent years. A pattern of in­
creasing consultation, both formal and informal, with repre­
sentative interests and persons of special knowledge in the 
housing field outside the Department, especially as regards 
research into housing issues is now clearly established and 
has proved its worth. Given this alternative approach, the
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Committee's value has diminished to a point at which its 
future usefulness as a separate, statutory consultative body 
is doubtful”.44
The following month during the Report stage of the Housing 
Rent and Subsidies Bill in the Lords, a clause was intro­
duced providing for the abolition of the Committee. Baro­
ness Young for the Opposition, while not opposing the amend­
ment, sought an assurance "that there (would) be regular 
consultation with the people involved in housing". She 
pointed out that when the provisions of the Rent Act 1974 
were being debated the previous summer it had been disclosed 
that these had not been discussed with members of the rents 
tribunals. She was raising these points "as extremely 
important matters of public policy" stating "if there is one 
thing we believe in, I think it is consultation; and gov­
ernment can proceed only by a degree of trust and under­
standing" . Baroness Birk for the Government replied that 
there was "consultation between different bodies concerned 
with housing, such as Shelter; and - - - also consultation - 
- - with people who administer certain acts". But she 
rejected a request to provide a list of organisations which 
were consulted by the Government as a matter of course in 
housing matters.45
When the Lords' amendment was considered by the Commons 
later the following month, Michael Latham observed, that 
while he accepted that there were many other ways of 
consulting about housing; "at a stage of housing policy
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when there (were) so many complexities and difficulties, it 
(was) an odd time to abolish a body which (had) done a great 
deal of useful work in furthering the housing discussion”.46
In attempting to identify the factors which conditioned 
Crosland's decision to abolish CHAC it may be useful to 
examine his attitude to the Central Advisory Council for 
Education in England, which he had abolished when Secretary 
of State for Education in the 1960s. In a subsequent
interview he explained that while he recognised that the 
Council had played an important role in documenting "the 
good and the bad of the system, and in particular in legiti­
mising the radical sociology of the 1950s and the 1960s" in 
his view the latter objective had now been achieved. There 
was, he considered, in using committees, a danger of too 
many and too lengthy reports and they might slow up action. 
Although he agreed that there was a need for "independent 
critical intelligences at work on policy issues and that the 
civil service and ministers could not fulfil that function 
themselves - - - (he had) greatly felt the need for indepen­
dent critical advice - - - it wouldn't necessarily come 
from government committees (and he had his) own informal 
group of personal advisors".47
Later, as shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, in 
the early 1970s, Crosland developed links with a variety of 
individuals and groups equipped to provide him with 
information and advice on housing needs and policy. His 
widow has recorded how "Soon after ten in the morning the
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doorbell began ringing, the first of a battery of housing 
specialists - Shelter administrators, economists, people 
from tenants* associations, Labour councillors, Transport 
House advisors - - And, he continued the practice of
consulting outside specialists when he became Secretary of 
State for the Environment as his former Permanent Secretary, 
Sir Idwal Pugh has described. ”1 felt he didn*t look on 
civil servants as his real advisors on fundamentals. He 
had a full life outside the office with advisors he respec­
ted".4 9
Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and Local Government 
in the early years of Labour government in the 1960s, who 
mentions CHAC in his diaries, records no criticism of it, 
and as indicated earlier, several reports by CHAC sub­
committees, the last to be produced, were commissioned by 
Crossman and the colleagues who succeeded him during this
period. [Although Crossman, like Crosland, also made
• • • soextensive use of outside advisors. ]
Lack of enthusiasm for CHAC on the part of the Conservative 
leadership was clearly evident in the early 1960s, the last 
inquiry for a Conservative government having been commis-
c  -i
sioned in 1959, A and may have been related to the increased 
dependence placed by them on private sector housing provi­
sion. Unlike Labour, they showed no inclination to give 
CHAC a wider remit - to deal with topics related to the 
private sector.
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J B Cullingworth who served on both CHAC and SHAC and chaired 
sub-committees of both in the 1960s and 1970s, has suggested 
that a significant factor in the final decision to abolish 
the Committee was that "both political parties had had 
recent experience of it."52 This somewhat cryptic comment 
undoubtably refers to the Cohen Sub-committee on the future 
of housing associations, and also possibly to a sub-commit- 
tee, chaired by Cullingworth himself, which was asked to 
examine housing allocation procedures practised by local 
authorities. The former sub-committee having failed to 
reach a consensus, was relieved of its task, in July 1970, 
by the incoming Conservative Government.53 The latter, in 
an outspoken report published in 196954, the last to be 
produced by a CHAC sub-committee, complained about its 
limited terms of reference and, touching on politically 
sensitive areas, argued that it had been asked - "to look at 
only one patch in a patchwork quilt - - -. We could not 
look at broad issues such as the relationship between coun­
cil housing and owner occupation, or the impact of housing 
finance, subsidies and tax reliefs on the total housing 
situation".55
Certainly by the early 1970s the Conservatives' lack of 
enthusiasm for CHAC seems to have been increasingly shared 
by the Labour leadership. Opposition spokesmen showed no 
inclination to exploit the Conservatives' lack of utilisa­
tion of the Committee, and when they did make remarks calcu­
lated to embarrass their opponents it was in the context of 
issues raised by Conservative backbenchers and smacks of
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reactive posturing. This latter evidence appears to indi­
cate that although Crosland's arrival at the DoE brought the 
final thrust towards the Committee's abolition his selection 
for the post was not necessarily crucial to the eventual 
outcome.
As far as backbenchers were concerned there is little evi­
dence of interest relating to CHAC from the Labour side by 
the 1970s and there was no adverse comment from that quarter 
when the proposed abolition was announced. Those Members 
on the Conservative side who had recently raised questions 
concerning the Committee were clearly, in the main, repre­
sentative of the construction industry lobby and their moves 
to utilise its existence to exert pressures on ministers 
[another contributory factor to its abolition] were probably 
related to the fact that the level of public sector housing 
investment was at that time at the lowest level since 
1948.56
The decision to abolish the Committee having been made, the 
arrangements for doing so suggest inter-party co-operation 
behind the scenes, although obviously Labour delayed the 
announcement until soon after the October 1974 general 
election in order to minimise any possibility of resulting 
political damage. The timing may also have been influenced 
by the desire to have the Committee off the scene at a time 
when a major review of policy on housing finance was about 
to be launched.57
As indicated earlier, when CHAC was abolished in 1975 SHAC
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continued in existence. It is unlikely that there was any 
great pressure from elsewhere in government for the Scottish 
Office to follow suit at that time but several factors may 
have countered any inclination there was to do so. SHAC 
had, as mentioned previously, attracted favourable comment 
in 1967 when its report on the older private sector housing 
stock was published,58 and the Scottish Office minister 
concerned had made something of a play of having reconstitu­
ted a committee which the Conservatives had ignored. Also, 
as the 1967 report had demonstrated, SHAC could be a useful 
vehicle for highlighting the extent and peculiar nature of 
the Scottish housing problem. But the most significant 
consideration was likely to have been the upsurge in support 
being experienced by the SNP which at the October 1974 
election had increased the number of seats which it held 
from seven to eleven.
In November 1976 it was reported that two sub-committees of 
SHAC were in existence, one producing advice for the review 
of housing finance which was being undertaken,59 and another 
conducting an inquiry into training for housing 
management.60 A further sub-committee, the last before
SHAC was abolished, was appointed to inquire into local 
authority housing allocation procedures in October 1978.61 
When announcing the intention to carry out this inquiry the 
Secretary of State said that he "would look to the committee 
for advice on the development of various aspects of housing 
policy following the Green Paper, Cmnd.685262 - - -(and he 
hoped) that before long agreement (could be reached, in
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consultation with the committee, on other tasks that might 
be undertaken”.63
The intention to abolish SHAC was announced by the Secretary 
of State, in the new Conservative Government, George 
Younger, when opening the debate on the Second Reading stage 
of the Tenants' Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Bill in January 
1980. The decision had been reached "reluctantly” - to 
abolish the committee "which had fallen into virtual disuse 
under the previous Government - ".64
The response from Bruce Millan (Shadow Scottish Secretary)
to the announcement was low key. Having pointed out that 
methods of allocation would be considered at the Committee 
stage of the Bill, he observed "many aspects were dealt with 
by the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee in a report a 
number of years ago. It is ironic that the committee is to 
be abolished by the Bill".65
Russell Johnston, responding for the Liberals, considered
that the decision was "perhaps part of a quango bashing 
exercise, (he did) not see any other major justification. 
The committee (had) done a useful job and as (Bruce Millan 
had) indicated, it (had) contributed to the composition of 
good parts of the Bill. However, its disappearance (was) 
not perhaps the end of the world".66
As mentioned earlier Conservative Scottish Secretaries had 
shown very little enthusiasm for SHAC over the years and,
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given the controversial direction that Conservative housing 
policies were about to take, its continued existence would 
be even less attractive. But, as Russell Johnston sug­
gested, the final decision to abolish it was probably sig­
nificantly influenced by the priority which was currently 
being given by government departments to eliminating as many
fi 7 • . . .quangos0' as possible. An added stimulus in this connec­
tion may have been given to the Scottish Office by the 
intention, announced by Michael Heseltine, Secretary of 
State for the Environment, in September 1979, to abolish 
seventeen quangos sponsored by his department. °
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CHAPTER II - THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE AND THE SCOTTISH 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE - BACKGROUND
The establishment of the departmental select committees 
followed a report of the House of Commons Select Committee 
on Procedure published in July 19781 which described the 
existing select committee system as 'unstructured *, 'unplan­
ned*, 'piecemeal', and 'patchy'. There had been pressure 
over a period of time for reforms which would facilitate a 
more effective role for backbench MPs both, from individual 
backbenchers of all parties and, from outside groups and 
individuals - the political parties, academics, etc. But 
it has been suggested that a number of factors combined to 
give this committee's report particular influence: the
committee had a wide remit and it undertook its work thor­
oughly; its membership covered those who took both a 
traditional and, reformist view of the organisation and role 
of the House of Commons; the Conservatives on the committee 
tended to support proposals for reform because they were 
opposed by the Labour Leader of the House [Michael Foote]; 
backbench MPs had found themselves more influential during 
the 'hung' Parliament after 197 6, when the Labour Government 
had been dependent on support from the Liberals; and with a 
general election in prospect both of the principal Parties 
included proposals for reform in their manifestos.2
The Environment Committee
The Environment Committee as originally constituted 
comprised eleven members, six Conservative and five Labour, 
from which a Labour chairman was elected. Although the
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Committee experienced a high turnover in its membership 
during the first four years of its existence, when the two
, 3
inquiries considered here were being conducted, of the 
total of twenty-three members who served on it, nineteen had 
local government experience. A number also came from 
professions associated with housing and local government 
finance including accountancy, law, and surveying.
The Committee*s first chairman was Bruce Douglas-Mann 
[Labour, Mitcham and Morden], a solicitor with considerable 
experience in housing both through involvement in local 
government and with Shelter. He was also an enthusiastic 
supporter of the select committee concept and hoped that the 
committees would be able to achieve a consensus of moderate 
opinion on as many issues as possible.4 [It has generally 
been held that select committees should aim to produce 
consensus reports as these are likely to be more influen­
tial, although this view has not been shared by all MPs, a 
point which will emerge later.] Nicholas Scott [Chelsea], 
the senior Conservative member of the original Committee, 
also had a background in local government and was interested 
in housing policy.5 When Bruce Douglas-Mann resigned from 
the Committee in February 1982 [after he joined the SDP] he 
was replaced by Reginald Freeson who had been Minister for 
Housing and Construction in the previous Labour Government. 
Nicholas Scott was appointed a junior minister at the North­
ern Ireland Office in November 1981 and his role as Conser­
vative leader was taken over by Brian Mawhinney [Peterbor­
ough] who was to take a distinctly adversarial line when
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drafts of the Committee*s report on council house sales were
being discussed.6
Apart from the adversarial line taken by Mawhinney the 
Committee had to cope with criticism of the select committee 
system from within its ranks and from those in influential 
positions outwith. David Winnick [Labour, Walsall North] 
who served on the Committee throughout the first four years 
was one of the twelve MPs voting against the establishment 
of the departmental committees in June 1979. Gerald Kauf­
man was another of those voting against. His opposition 
was to become particularly significant when he succeeded Roy 
Hattersley as Opposition Spokesman on the Environment in 
1980. Kaufman had opposed the establishment of the commit­
tees on the grounds that ’these committees obviously will 
evolve their own policies - - the coalition policies thus 
evolved will carry great weight, because the newspaper 
headline 'all-party committee proposed this or that' is a 
very great and potential pressure on any Government and any 
party - - inevitably these committees - - will buttress
either the Government or Opposition by giving to one side or 
another a bi-partisan seal of approval - - I believe this
is a very great power to put in the hands of nine, ten or
7 • • •eleven Hon. Members. Specialisation would also he argued, 
lead to committee members dominating debates and, to civil 
servants attempting to utilise committees to influence 
ministerial decisions.
Both Kaufman, and Michael Heseltine - Secretary of State for
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the Environment, evinced strongly adversarial styles in 
debates and the potential for consensus was further eroded 
by the controversial nature of the 'right to buy' provisions 
of the 1980 Housing Act and the severe cut-backs in expendi­
ture on public sector housing. When Heseltine was called 
to give evidence to the Committee for the first time in 
April 1980 and asked about the implications of the Govern­
ment's expenditure plans for the supply of public sector 
housing, his response was, that the plans represented the 
Government's estimate of what could be afforded, and he "did 
not think it useful to publish any material" on housing
O
needs.
The Scottish Affairs Committee
In addition to parallelling most of the functions of the 
DoE, the Scottish Office is concerned with such diverse 
topics as agriculture and fisheries, education, social work, 
home affairs, the health service, roads and transport, and 
industrial development. In recognition of its wide remit 
the Scottish Affairs Committee, as originally constituted, 
had thirteen members - seven Conservative and six Labour, 
the largest membership of any committee, from which a Labour 
chairman was elected. The Conservative members of the 
Committee were nominated but the Scottish Labour backben­
chers held a ballot to determine their representatives. 
When the Committee was first established, at the time when 
there were forty-four Scottish Labour MPs, their were nine­
teen candidates for Labour's six places "reflecting a re­
markable level of interest by people of varied seniority
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within the Party”.9
Throughout its existence the Committee's chairmen were all 
Labour. The first was Donald Dewar [Glasgow, Garscadden] 
who, by the time the Committee's inquiries considered here 
were conducted,10 had become Shadow Scottish Secretary and 
had been succeeded by Robert Hughes [Aberdeen North], a 
former under-secretary at the Scottish Office, and subsequ­
ently by David Lambie [Cunninghame South].
Following the 1983 general election, perhaps because they 
were, as one commentator put it - "seeking employment for 
their hordes of backbenchers brought in with Mrs Thatcher's 
landslide"11 the Government whips changed the ratio of Party 
representation and with the exception of the Scottish Com­
mittee, the number of members, so that all the select com­
mittees had thirteen members - eight Conservative, four 
Labour and one representative from the minority parties.
Given that at that general election the Conservatives won 
only twenty-two of the seventy-two Scottish seats not only 
was this development particularly frustrating for the Scot­
tish Labour backbenchers but it also further aggravated a 
problem which had existed since the Scottish Committee was 
established. With, on average, anything up to ten of the 
Scottish Conservative MPs holding some form of office only 
about a dozen were left, not only to staff this Committee 
but to cope with Scottish legislative and other parliamen­
tary work. It also meant of course, that some of the
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Conservative members of the Committee were inexperienced.
The wide range of issues covered by the Scottish Office 
offers little scope for specialisation by Committee members, 
and in fact the Committee did not restrict its 
investigations to that area but examined other topics 
relevant to Scotland but not the direct concern of the 
Scottish Office, such as the future of the steel industry. 
This wide ambit coupled with the load placed on Scottish 
members and the fact that two hour evidence sessions made it 
difficult to give all participants an opportunity to ask 
questions led to requests from the Committee to be given 
powers to appoint sub-committees.12 However, the Govern­
ment resisted this suggestion on the grounds that such 
innovations would place an unacceptable additional load on 
the House, Ministers and civil servants.
In addition to the difficulties just discussed, the Scottish 
Affairs Committee also had characteristics which differen­
tiated it from other select committees. These were asso­
ciated with the existence of the Scottish political system 
comprised, in addition to its parliamentary element, of 
distinct party organisations, local government machinery, 
professional organisations, pressure groups, and the Scot­
tish media. Scottish MPs operate within two environments, 
the parliamentary end of the Scottish political system and 
the Scottish end. The parliamentary environment is differ­
ent from that occupied by other MPs because much of the 
Scottish MP's time is spent focussing on Scottish issues in
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debates, committees and at Scottish Question Time. They 
constitute a comparatively small group well known to each 
other and accustomed to performing adversarial roles. 
These adversarial attitudes do not have the scope for dilu­
tion which the larger House of Commons community provides. 
As a result it is more difficult for them to adjust to a 
situation where reaching a consensus is generally viewed as 
being a desirable objective.13
This in turn may have implications for the selection of 
issues to be examined. While the potential difficulty of 
coping with controversial issues also exists for other 
select committees it is exacerbated in the case of a Scot­
tish Committee and, if achieving consensus is perceived as 
being a primary objective, it would imply that it must at­
tempt to select topics which are significant but do not have 
a high profile in Party terms.
Another factor is, that unlike the other Select Committees 
[with the exception of the Welsh] which, through their 
reports, are primarily concerned with influencing and in­
forming opinion within the House, a Scottish Committee 
requires to project its reports outwards to the 'territor­
ial' end of the Scottish political system. "The [Scottish 
and Welsh] Committees educate public opinion as well as 
reflect it, and they have a higher profile with their coun­
tries' media than enjoyed by other Select Committees".14 
The amount of time which the Committee spent in Scotland 
also suggests that members perceived it as important to keep
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in touch with grass roots opinion.
The position with regard to manning the Scottish Committee 
which for the Conservatives had been difficult since 1983, 
became untenable after the 1987 election with only three 
backbenchers available, two of whom refused to serve.^ 
And, as indicated earlier, no committee was established 
during the 1987 - 92 parliament. With a slight increase in 
available Scottish backbenchers as a result of the April 
1992 general election, and with an injection of MPs from 
English constituencies with 'Scottish connections' the 
Government's intention to re-establish the Committee, first 
signalled shortly after the election, has recently been 
confirmed. It is proposed that it should have a membership 
of eleven - six Conservatives, three Labour [including the 
chairman], one Liberal Democrat, and one SNP.16
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SECTION II
THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR
43
INTRODUCTION
There have been four Committees of Inquiry exclusively or 
principally concerned with policy on the private rented 
sector in the period since the last world war:-
1. The Second Ridley Committee on Rent Control1
reported April 1945;
2. The Milner Holland Committee on Housing in Greater 
London - reported March 1965;
o3. The Francis Committee on the Rent ActsJ - reported 
March 1971;
4. The Select Committee on the Environment - The Private 
Rented Housing Sector4 - reported September 1982.
Major factors with which the inquiries have been concerned 
have been rent levels and security of tenure for tenants. 
Rent control for houses below a prescribed rateable value 
together with security of tenure was introduced in 1915 
against a background of rent strikes on Clydeside, where 
tenants were claiming that landlords were exploiting the 
increase in demand for accommodation resulting from incoming 
armament workers pushing up rents to excessive levels. The 
operation of the rent control provisions was the subject of 
inquiries by the Hunter Committee in 19195 and the Salisbury 
Committee in 1920,6 and although control had been intended 
as a temporary war time measure the prevailing market situa­
tion led to it being continued and extended to include 98% 
of the national housing stock in 1920.
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In 1923 the Conservative Government, acting on the findings 
of the Onslow Committee, 7 which had concluded that control 
was impeding improvement in supply of rented property, 
introduced a system of 'creeping decontrol' whereby proper­
ties were released from control as they became vacant.
Eight years later, the Marley Committee8 reported that the 
decontrol arrangements were having an adverse effect on the 
mobility of lower income groups. The National Government 
in 193 3 reintroduced control for this group, maintained the 
existing arrangements for intermediate range housing and 
abolished control on the highest range.
In 1937 the findings of the First Ridley Committee 9 indica­
ted that although there were geographic variations, the
supply situation had improved, and the following year legis­
lation was passed which lowered the rateable value ceiling 
determining the level at which the Rent Act applied and
discontinued 'creeping decontrol'.
In 1939, on the outbreak of war, control was extended to
include most of the private sector stock.
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CHAPTER 111 - THE SECOND RIDLEY REPORT TO THE 1957 RENT ACT
The Second Ridley Report
The Second Ridley Committee 1 was appointed in November 1943 
by the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for 
Scotland. The terms of reference were "to review the
question of rent control, including the working of the Rent 
Restrictions Acts, and advise whether any, and if so what, 
changes are necessary".2
The experience of the difficulties with the housing market 
after the first world war and the war damage to the existing 
stock in a number of urban areas must have made it obvious 
to the departments concerned that rent control would have to 
be continued into the post-war period. However, a major 
difficulty was perceived in the anomalies which had arisen 
as a result of the legislative developments in the inter-war 
period outlined earlier. Some rents had remained con­
trolled since 1914 with only a 40% increase given in 1920 
[intended in the main to reflect the increased cost of 
repairs]. Other properties had come out of control in the 
inter-war period but had been taken back into control in 
1939. Dwellings built after 1919 had never been controlled 
until 1939. The outcome was widely varying rent levels for 
similar and neighbouring properties. Some politically
acceptable mechanism had to be devised which would bring 
greater consistency.
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The Inter Departmental Committee had a membership of 15. 
The chairman - Viscount Ridley - having chaired the previous 
inquiry in 1937 provided an element of continuity. Clearly 
with a view to achieving a broad political consensus, a high 
proportion - 7 of the 15 - were MPs; four Conservative, two 
Labour and one Liberal; covering constituencies from Glas­
gow - Gorbals to the English shires. The remainder inclu­
ded elected members and officials from local government, and 
representatives of the legal profession.
The Committee, having advertised and invited submissions 
from interested parties both through the press and radio, 
received a Considerable amount’ of written evidence. This 
was augmented in some cases by oral evidence - 51 witnesses 
being heard. Four days were spent in Scotland hearing 
representations from Scottish organisations.
On the future of control the report states - ’’the evidence 
we have received discloses practically unanimous agreement 
that rent control cannot be removed immediately and we are 
satisfied it must continue for some time after the war"3 
It was recommended that legislation should be framed in the 
expectation that it might be necessary to maintain control 
for ten years, although it might be possible to decontrol 
certain sectors more quickly. One point on which the
committee was "emphatic"; and this is interesting in the 
light of subsequent developments; was that decontrol on 
vacant possession should not be re-introduced - "as the 
evidence [showed] that in the past this principle [had] been
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responsible for many of the anomalies and hardships which 
[had] arisen”.4
The Committee recommended that a system of rent tribunals 
should be established to determine 'fair' rents - ”the task 
of determining 'fair' rents should be completed as soon as 
practicable say within three years of the passing of new 
legislation”.5
Obviously anticipating opposition from the legal profession 
it is made clear that "in substance" the tribunals should 
deal only with the determination of 'fair' rents. "We regard 
it of the utmost importance at the present time that in 
general the mutual rights and obligations of parties should 
be decided by the regular and permanent Courts of Law".6
The rent control provisions did not in general apply to 
premises let as furnished accommodation and the Committee 
considered that to extend full security of tenure to this 
category - "would have the unfortunate consequence of drying 
up the supply of domestic lettings".7 It was noted how­
ever, that in Scotland a system of rent tribunals had been 
established; under legislation introduced in 1943;8 with 
powers to determine the rents of furnished lettings in those 
cases referred to them. The evidence, both from the Glas­
gow Rent Tribunal and officials of the Department of Health 
for Scotland, on the operation of the arrangement was fa­
vourable, and it was recommended that the scheme should be 
extended to the rest of Great Britain.9
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Although local authorities in Scotland had powers to order 
the requisitioning of property where a tenant was evicted 
following a reference to a rent tribunal, these powers, 
[under the Defence Regulations] were limited in duration, 
and it was recommended that in future, throughout Great 
Britain there should be provision for limited security of 
tenure to be given where there was application to a tribu­
nal, the tenant being entitled to retain possession for a 
minimum period of three months thereafter.10
The Committee was not prepared to recommend any general 
increase in rent to meet increases in costs of repairs. 
Although costs might have risen during the war they had 
fallen over the inter-war years from 1920; a flat rate 
increase would not be appropriate because of variations in 
rent levels for different properties; and there was "a 
considerable volume of evidence" that the earlier permitted 
increase had not been spent on repairs. Any increase to 
allow for an increase in repair costs should only be consid­
ered once the situation in the building industry had become 
clear, and a technical committee should be appointed to 
report on the question of the cost of repairs.11
While the Committee was in "general agreement" on most of 
its recommendations, and in "full agreement" on the estab­
lishment of rent tribunals, there were three issues on which 
three members of the Committee found themselves unable to 
concur with the majority and, as a result, adding a note of 
reservation. The recommendations they took exception to
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were that:-
1. new dwellings built after the war should not be subject 
to control;
2. rent control provisions should not be extended 
local authority housing;
3. agricultural tied cottages and service houses should 
continue to be excluded from the provisions of the Rent Act.
The three members concerned were Charles Key, the Labour 
Member for Poplar; and two of the Scottish representatives, 
George Buchanan, ILP Member for Glasgow - Gorbals, and 
Councillor H T MacCalman, a member of the Glasgow Rent 
Tribunal.12
The report, having been published in April 1945 shortly 
before the end of the war in Europe and the general election 
in the following July, fell to be considered by the incoming 
Labour Government. Soon after his appointment as Minister 
of Health, Aneurin Bevan received questions from both sides 
of the house of Commons as to what action he intended to 
take to improve the rent control provisions, and as to what 
decisions had been reached on the Ridley recommendations. 
He replied that the matter was under consideration and he 
hoped shortly to be in a position to make a statement.13
In November 1945, Bevan announced that - "To give full
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effect to the recommendations of the Committee would involve 
a complicated measure for which [he was] afraid, Parliamen­
tary time [could not] be found [that] Session. The Govern­
ment however, [had] decided to seek powers to control the 
rents of furnished lettings and of premises let with ser­
vices and a Bill for that purpose [was] being introduced 
[that] day".14
During the second half of 1946 pressures from Labour back­
benchers for extending security of tenure to furnished 
properties, and from the Conservatives for the establishment 
of rent tribunals to fix 'fair' rents to reflect the higher
cost of repairs, were countered by the same type of re- 
15sponse.
At the end of 1948; three years after he had made his 
original statement on the subject; in response to a ques­
tion as to when the Ridley recommendations would be imple­
mented, Bevan replied that there was no early prospect for 
such legislation.16 And, during the following year an act 
was passed extending control to premises let for the first 
time subsequent to 1939. This provision - because it
applied to new premises, - running contrary to one of the
• 1 7recommendations.x
In May 1951, Hugh Dalton, Minister of Local Government and 
Planning,18 announced that amending legislation relating to 
rent control was not likely in that parliament.19 And the 
situation had not changed by the following October, when at
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the general election Labour was defeated.
A number of factors seem likely to have countered any incli­
nation within, or pressure upon, the Labour Government to 
introduce a 'fair' rent system. First - lack of uniformity 
in rents being paid does not appear to have led to any 
significant level of controversy on the part of tenants - 
possibly because of the impact of inflation on the general 
level of rents. There was therefore, no incentive for the 
Government to incur the adverse impact on its electoral 
vote, and the opposition of its own MPs, which any sugges­
tion of higher rents might be expected to evoke at a time of 
acute housing shortage. [And electoral considerations were 
even more significant after the general election of February 
1950 when Labour's overall majority was reduced to five]. 
Second - the adoption of a 'fair' rent system would have 
brought increased pressure from tenants for repairs and 
would have aggravated the problem of restricted resources in 
the building industry. Third - it was anticipated that 
there would be difficulties in achieving consistency in the 
determination of 'fair' rents throughout the country. Pro­
blems experienced in achieving consistency of annual rental 
values for rating purposes supported this view, and was to 
lead to the transfer of the responsibility for the work in 
England and Wales from local authorities to the district 
valuers of the Inland Revenue Valuation Office.20 Fourth - 
there was clearly a degree of truth in Bevan's's claim of 
pressure on parliamentary time; the introduction of legis­
lation on nationalisation, the national health service, town
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planning and so forth, implied a heavy schedule.
While the Labour Government failed to introduce a 'fair' rent 
system for unfurnished tenancies it had, as previously 
indicated extended the powers for controlling rents for 
furnished tenancies, already operating in Scotland, to 
England and Wales - together with the associated rent tribu­
nals. It had, in addition, provided for some limited
security of tenure in the event of a referral to such a 
tribunal. This was all in line with the Committee*s recom­
mendations.
In failing to respond to pleas for security of tenure for 
such lettings on a par with unfurnished tenancies the Gov­
ernment did, of course, tacitly concur with the Committee's 
view. Indeed during the discussion on the provisions of 
the Bill on furnished lettings, in 1946, Bevan was quite 
explicit - "we must not introduce protection in such a way 
as to cause an immediate diminution of the amount of accom­
modation available".21 Again, there was evidence of tacit 
acceptance of the Committee's recommendation in the failure 
to extend the provisions of the rent acts to local authority 
tenancies, and agricultural tenancies.
The Conservative manifesto for the February 1950 general 
election had accepted that rent control must be continued as 
long as there was a housing shortage but stated that a
Conservative government would keep this matter under
22review. ^
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By the time of the October 1951 election and following the 
Conservatives' narrow defeat on the previous occasion, 
reference to any review of rent control had been dropped 
from their manifesto and a commitment adopted to achieve an 
output of 300,000 new houses per annum in England and 
Wales.23
Shortly after the 1951 election, questions were being ad­
dressed to Harold Macmillan, Minister for Housing and Local 
Government24 in the new Conservative Government, by Labour 
MPs, as to whether he would make a statement on a proposal 
he had announced to review the rent restriction acts and, 
give an undertaking to consult all interested parties in­
cluding tenants. Macmillan replied that the Government 
would consider the matter in due course and would consult 
all interested parties.25 By the spring of 1952, he was 
making it clear to backbenchers on his own side that the 
Government was not committed to the introduction of legisla- 
tion, or to a review.
At the beginning of the 1952/53 Session Hugh Dalton, speak­
ing from the Opposition front bench, pointed out that there 
was no mention of legislation on rent control in the Queen's 
Speech.27 And later in the Session questions from backben­
chers were tabled, concern being expressed on the Conserva­
tive side about the rising cost of repairs.28 On the same 
issue in 1951, and subsequently in 1953, the Sanitary In­
spectors' Association published reports describing the 
problem that local authorities were having in pressurising
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landlords to carry out repairing obligations because of the 
adverse effect of rent control.29
In June 1953 Macmillan was still not in a position to make a 
statement on policy.30 however, early in the following 
November the Government published a White P a p e r i n  which 
it was announced that the target output of 300,000 new 
houses per annum for England and Wales was expected to be 
achieved that year, and attention could now be turned to the 
existing stock. A comprehensive plan was required invol­
ving repair, maintenance, improvement, and - where neces­
sary - demolition. In order to protect essentially sound 
houses landlords had to be provided with sufficient finance 
to carry out repairs.
The White Paper contained: a description of how the neces­
sary rent increases would be calculated; a justification 
for the approach adopted; and an explanation of how it was 
intended to ensure that the increases were spent on repairs. 
The Government founded its proposals with regard to the 
level of rent increases on two reports; the first, by the 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, [RICS], published 
in 195132, the second by the Girdwood Committee on building 
costs, published the previous month.
During the debate on the Second Reading of the subsequent 
Bill - the Housing [Repairs and Rents] Bill- Henry Brooke, 
speaking for the Government, quoted from the RICS report - 
which he referred to as an independent and authoritative
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statement - the opinion that - "However enlightened and 
conscientious a landlord [might] be it [was] impossible, in 
present circumstances for him to continue to make ends meet, 
and a great number of houses [were[ increasingly and inevit­
ably falling into disrepair".34
But with regard to the proposals, the most significant 
information contained in the report was that in 1939, when 
control had been extended to most of the private sector 
stock, the average annual expenditure on repairs had been 
equal to the 'statutory deduction' used for adjusting gross 
annual values for rating purposes , to net annual values on 
which liability for rates was calculated.35 This being the 
case, the report suggested that it would be reasonable to 
relate any increase given to reflect the rise in costs of 
repairs to the 'statutory deduction'. The Girdwood Commit­
tee had demonstrated that the cost of repairs had risen by 
three times between 1939 and 1953. The Government there­
fore proposed that landlords should be entitled to a rent 
increase equivalent to twice the statutory deduction. 
However, in order to qualify for the increase a house had to 
be fit for human habitation and be in good repair, and the 
landlord was required to demonstrate that a minimum amount 
had been spent on repairs over the previous three years. 
If the tenant considered that the house was in poor repair, 
application could be made to the local authority for a 
'certificate of disrepair'.
In Scotland, where the approach to be adopted in England and
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Wales, of utilising a multiple of the ‘statutory deduction', 
was not available because of differences in the existing 
rating system, a 40% increase to the 1939 rent was to be 
adopted. This was justified on the grounds that because a 
smaller proportion of the stock had been decontrolled be­
tween the wars, there was less disparity in prevailing 
rents.36
Sir Austin Hudson, a Conservative member, who had served on 
the Ridley Committee, spoke during the Second Reading debate 
pointing out that only four of the original seven MPs in­
volved remained in the House. He outlined the factors 
which had influenced the Committee; described how it was 
envisaged the 'fair' rent system would operate; explained why 
they had not recommended an increase at the time of publica­
tion of the report; and pointed out that the adoption of 
the device of a 'certificate of disrepair' to operate in 
conjunction with the 'fair' rent system had been among the 
recommendations.37 Interest was expressed by some MPs but 
little, if any, awareness of the report's general contents 
was demonstrated.
Labour criticism of the proposals was fairly muted. Bevan, 
as principal spokesman for the Opposition, argued that the 
private rented stock should be municipalised. This would 
obviate the need for profit incentive and enable more of the 
gross rent to be spent on repairs. However, he accepted 
that if properties were maintained in good repair then
, , T Ohigher rents would be justified. °
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The changes introduced by the Bill made no provision for any 
increase by way of higher rents in the return on the capital 
employed by landlords in existing properties. [Although a 
new clause introduced at the Report Stage provided for the 
'exclusion from the Rent Acts of Dwellinghouses erected or 
converted after the commencement of the Act1.]39 It had 
been made clear in the White Paper that the Government 
recognised that there was still a housing shortage, and 
while it continued to prevail decontrol could not be intro­
duced.40 The Government had considered the possibility of 
establishing rent tribunals to determine 'fair' rents through­
out the sector, as recommended by Ridley, but had dismissed 
the proposal because of the scale of the administrative task 
involved and because it would mean establishing a parallel 
mechanism to that created in England and Wales [since Ridley 
had reported] by the Board of Inland Revenue for determining 
valuations for rating purposes.41 It might be possible to 
relate 'fair' rents to rateable values but this could only be 
done when the re-valuation currently projected had been 
completed.42
The previous year the Labour peer, Lord Silkin, had also 
suggested that rents be geared to rateable values but he too 
had recognised that such a system could only operate once 
the re-valuation information was available. Silkin's
assessment of the feasibility of determining 'fair' rents by 
tribunals highlighted the problem of achieving consistency 
between different tribunals. "They would have to work on 
some principle to enable them to carry out their task. If
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you just left it to the tribunals at large, you would get an 
extra-ordinary series of anomalous results”.43
There was obviously sufficient perception within the Conser­
vative party of the political sensitivity of rent regulation 
in the private sector to lead to the amendments in the 1951 
manifesto, and the relatively small Conservative majority in 
October 1951 was unlikely to encourage support for the 
adoption of radical measures. At the same time the empha­
sis placed on the pressing need for a higher output of new 
houses was difficult to reconcile with a policy of increas­
ing rents and, certainly with allowing a free market situa­
tion to operate.
While there was both pressure and support from professional 
groups for measures to tackle the problem of disrepair there 
was delay in responding to this, partly because additional 
information had to be assembled but probably principally, 
because of the continue weakness of the building industry 
and the need to ensure that the manifesto new build commit­
ment was not endangered.
As far as the possible adoption of a 'fair1 rent system was 
concerned, this was clearly unlikely to appeal to a govern­
ment in mid term, as the Conservatives were in late 
1953/early 1954. Macmillan could emphasise the technical 
problems of doing so at this juncture, and point to bi­
partisan support for this view by referring to Lord Silkin's 
speech as he did when the White Paper was under considera-
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tion in the Commons.44 The introduction of a tribunal 
system for establishing 'fair' rents would also of course have 
entailed its abolition, with added potential for political 
embarrassment, in the event of a subsequent reversion to 
market rents. The intention to do so had been clearly 
signalled by the removal from control of newly erected and 
converted properties. This change, because it did not
affect existing tenancies was less likely to lead to contro­
versy but even so it was considered advisable to minimise 
the visibility of the action by introducing the provision 
when the Bill was at the Report Stage.
The 1957 Rent Act
In October 1954 Harold Macmillan was succeeded as Minister 
for Housing and Local Government by Duncan Sandys who conti­
nued in that post after the general election in May 1955. 
By December 1955 Sandys had announced to the House of Com­
mons that the Government had intended to review the provi­
sions on rent control,45 and in November of the following 
year the Bill - which was to become the Rent Act 1957 - 
received its first reading. Unlike all the inter-war
legislative innovations on rent control the drafting and 
introduction of the Bill was not preceded by an inquiry by 
an appointed committee. The associated White Paper46 was 
restricted to statistical information and extended to three 
pages.
The Bill provided for houses having rateable values above
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prescribed levels [£40 in London and in Scotland, and £30 
elsewhere], being decontrolled after a 'standstill' period 
of six months; and for those below the prescribed levels 
being decontrolled as they became vacant.[Creeping decon­
trol ' ]
In England and Wales the rents of houses remaining in con­
trol were to be related to their gross annual values. 
Twice the gross annual value where, as was usual, the land­
lord was responsible for repairs; with a higher multiplier 
two and one third , where the landlord was also responsible 
for internal decoration; and a lower, one and one third, 
where the landlord had no responsibility for the upkeep of 
the property. In Scotland, where rating revaluation had 
not as yet been carried out, landlords of properties in this 
category would be eligible for a higher repairs increase 
than previously or, alternatively, for a smaller increase 
which did not depend, as had been the case before, on the 
landlord demonstrating minimum levels of expenditure on 
repairs in preceding years. A tenant of a house remaining 
in control could, as previously, block a proposed rent 
increase by making a successful application for a 'certifi­
cate of disrepair'.
The rateable value ceiling determining properties remaining 
in control could be lowered by way of ministerial order. 
An order could relate to specific areas or have general 
application. [In the past any extension of decontrol had 
required the amendment of primary legislation.]
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Enoch Powell who, as Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government, opened the Second Reading 
debate for the Government, referred to a study made by 
P.E.P. based on statistics from the 1951 census which, in 
conjunction with current housing statistics, indicated a 
need at the end of 1954 for a further 750,000 houses in 
order to bring overall demand and supply into balance. The 
provision of these additional houses could, he said, be 
predicted to be achieved by the end of 1957 when the Bill 
would come fully into force. And, he pointed out, this 
estimated requirement for new houses was the minimum figure 
on which the Labour Party was basing its policy for new 
hous ing output.4 7
Powell referred to two recent articles in the national 
press. The first - from the 'Manchester Guardian', which 
he described as presenting a useful summary of the evils of 
rent control. It claimed that rent control discouraged 
adequate maintenance, reduced the number of houses for let, 
encouraged the sale of those with vacant possession, encour­
aged under occupation and inhibited mobility of labour. 
The second - from the 'Municipal Journal', which described 
the prevailing situation as quite ridiculous and cited a 
specific example of houses lying empty in a crowded area of 
southwest London because the controlled rent inhibited them 
being let.48
There was, Powell argued, "injustice between tenant and 
tenant occupying identical property rented entirely differ­
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ently for no reason whatever except for the vagaries of rent 
control. There [was] the injustice arising from the fact 
that there [was] no relation between the size of the proper­
ty and its rent. There [was] the injustice arising from 
the landlord being called upon in many cases, toy rent re­
strictions, to subsidise the income of tenants who [were] 
better off than they [were]".49
The Labour Opposition led by Gilbert Hitchison claimed that 
there was an inadequate supply of houses, particularly in 
London and the other big cities,50 and challenged the Con­
servatives' assumption that the effect of new legislation 
would be to; improve the standard of maintenance; increase 
the supply of houses available for letting; and reduce 
under occupation. And, that it would not lead to excessive 
rents.
Despite the extent of the controversy over the Government's 
statistics and assumptions, and its limited ability to 
produce authoritative support for its case as demonstrated 
by the dependence Enoch Powell placed on press articles when 
opening the debate, there was no suggestion, either at this 
stage or during the Third Reading debate, that a committee 
of inquiry should be appointed.51 There was some reference 
to the Second Ridley Report. One Labour Member used it 
during the Second Reading debate to challenge the prediction 
that the new measures would bring about improved levels of 
repair.52 And another, at the Third Reading pointed to the 
fact that Ridley had stated that decontrol should only be
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introduced when there was 'an adequate supply of houses 
throughout the country'. It had not said 'when there was
c o
assumed to be'. There was also some reference to earlier
committees of inquiry on rent control - to the Marley Re­
port,54 and to the First Ridley Report.55 In particular, 
Duncan Sandys cited both when attempting to allay fears 
which had been expressed regarding the impact of the pro­
posed block decontrol of houses with higher rateable values. 
"The best evidence [was] that the Ridley Committee which 
reviewed the whole problem again in 1937" - [following block 
decontrol in 1933 as advocated by Marley] - "recommended 
that a further slice should be decontrolled".56
There was no reference to the Second Ridley Committee having 
been strongly opposed to any re-adoption of 'creeping decon­
trol' in future; and this despite the fact that one of the 
Labour members of the Committee, Charles W Key, spoke during 
the Second Reading debate. Key, like a number of his 
colleagues, concentrated instead on attacking the scale of 
the consequent rent increases.57
In general the Opposition tended to focus its attention on 
what it anticipated as the major problem resulting from the 
Bill - the impact of block decontrol on the higher value 
houses and, as a consequence, to overlook the effect of 
'creeping decontrol' at the lower end of the market.
There was criticism at the Second Reading stage from Tom 
Fraser, leading the Scottish Opposition, of the fact that no
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provisions had been made for separate discussion of the 
specifically Scottish provisions of the Bill. He claimed 
that inadequate recognition had been given of the poor hous­
ing position in Scotland and backed this up with a reference 
to unfavourable comment on the proposals in a Scotsman’ 
leader.58
The same theme was pursued during the Third Reading debate 
by another Scottish Labour Member - James Mclnnes - who 
pointed out that the P.E.P. figures on which the Government 
had founded did not apply to Scotland. The housing market 
in Scotland was, he argued, nowhere near approaching an
egequation between demand and supply. *
[The paucity of statistical information on the position in 
Scotland may help to explain why the higher rateable value 
ceiling for determining the properties remaining in control 
was adopted].
As mentioned earlier, the failure to appoint a committee to 
conduct an inquiry prior to the introduction of the Bill was 
a departure from the practice which had developed with 
regard to rent control legislation in the inter-war period. 
Again, a committee of inquiry had been appointed to address 
the problem which was perceived in the anomalies which had 
arisen in controlled rents of similar properties by the 
early 1940s. And, although the 1954 Bill was not preceded 
by an inquiry of a similar nature, committees60 had carried 
out inquiries into maintenance costs, as recommended by
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Ridley, and the Governments1s proposals for rent increases 
were based on independent professional recommendations.
In short, all governments since the introduction of rent 
control intent on its amendment had deemed it advisable to 
secure independent legitimisation for their proposals.
What factors appear to have contributed to the form and 
timing of the 1957 Act and why was it not preceded by an 
inquiry? First - although no research had been carried out 
into its impact, the 1954 Act was perceived as having been 
unsuccessful. It had not brought about any significant 
increases in rent levels, nor improved levels of mainte­
nance, nor increased levels of improvement because of the 
combined disincentive effects of the prior expenditure 
required to secure higher rents and the potential litigation 
associated with the right of access of tenants to 'certifi­
cates of disrepair'. Second - it was an important element 
of Conservative housing policy that private sector provision 
of rented housing be improved and expanded as soon as pos­
sible. Having achieved their target output of 300,000
houses per annum in England and Wales the Conservatives, in 
the mid 1950s proceeded to cut back on public sector output 
and on general needs building in particular. Local author­
ities 'should be encouraged in future to concentrate on slum
clearance and overspill which only they can tackle effect­
ively'.61 In 1956 the general needs subsidy for local 
authority building in England and Wales was reduced and, 
from the end of the year, withdrawn altogether except for
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6 2the building of one-apartment houses. * [Although the
general needs subsidy was reduced in Scotland it continued 
to be available. However, as in England and Wales it was 
building for slum clearance, overspill and labour mobility 
which was encouraged.]
Third - the results of the rating revaluation in England and 
Wales were now available and provided the basis for deter­
mining the rent levels of properties remaining in control. 
[Rateable values had been calculated at 1939 levels, i.e. on 
the basis of rental levels prevailing prior to the re-intro­
duction of control. The cost of living was reckoned to 
have doubled between 1939 and 1956 - hence the rationale for 
the multiplier of 2.] The adoption of the rateable value 
basis was of course, in line with suggestions which had been 
advanced a few years earlier and had bi-partisan support.63
Fourth - the block decontrol proposed for the higher rented 
houses followed the pattern which had operated successfully 
in the inter-war years.
Fifth - the re-adoption of 'creeping decontrol' [contrary to 
Ridley's recommendation] was apparently justified on the 
grounds that it would bring new tenants of existing proper­
ties into line with tenants of new properties. [New pro­
perties of course, having been excluded from the provisions 
of the rent acts since 1954], and also on the grounds that 
it "was least painful - since it did not, or so it was 
thought, lead to evictions".64
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Sixth - research capacity within the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government was limited and fragmented and there was a 
negative attitude towards research at the top of the Depart­
ment. Information on the true state and likely response of 
the market, which might have conditioned a different re­
sponse on the part of ministers and civil servants was 
therefore unforthcoming. Although on this last point it 
should be added that there appears to have been a disincli­
nation to take account of information which was available, 
and in particular, to take advantage of new techniques 
available for predicting household formation rates.65
Seventh - early introduction of the legislation was also 
perceived as important for political reasons. That in­
creased rents were still regarded by the Conservatives as a 
sensitive issue is indicated by the fact that the intention 
to introduce further decontrol was not announced until after 
the 1955 general election. Clearly the earlier in its
legislative programme the Government could introduce the 
proposed bill the less any adverse effect was likely to be 
at the next election.
This last point, together with the second mentioned, helps 
to explain why a committee of inquiry; which, given ade­
quate terms of reference and a suitable membership might 
have helped to compensate for the lack of other research 
information available, and at the same time have facilitated 
a more informed debate; was not appointed. Such an in­
quiry was likely to take at least eighteen months. This
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period, added to a six months 'standstill' initially pro­
posed before the block decontrol became operative, would 
have taken the implementation of the resulting rent in­
creases well into the last year of a five year parliament, 
and to the eve of a possible election in the autumn of 1959. 
[In the event, implementation was delayed due to an amend­
ment forced on the government by its own backbenchers which 
extended the standstill period to 15 months.]66 In addi­
tion to the time scale considerations it was also possible 
of course, that such an inquiry would reach conclusions 
contrary to the government's intentions.
Labour's failure to raise the issue of a pre-legislative 
inquiry can perhaps in part be explained by its prevailing 
policy orientation on the private rented sector, which had
been adopted in its manifesto for the 1955 general
7 .election. This was that the sector should, in the main,
be progressively municipalised. Decontrol in a private
market was for Labour not an option; and therefore, a
committee of inquiry with terms of reference so related was
an irrelevance. Undoubtedly too it was content to rest
with its traditional perceptions of the shortcomings of the
sector.
The 1957 Act contained no provisions for security of tenure 
and this, as described in the next chapter, was to be a 
serious flaw. By contrast, legislation which had been 
introduced only three years previously - the Landlord and 
Tenant Act, 1954 - had [in Part 1] provided for security of
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tenure for occupying lessees where long domestic ground 
leases [i.e. over 21 years] expired; and [in Part 11] for 
security of tenure for tenants of business premises. These 
provisions being accompanied in both cases by arrangements 
for mediation on a market rent.
While the Milner Holland Committee was to draw attention to
. 68this 'anomaly' when reporting in 1965, Barnett has noted
that the same point was made by "two of the RICS's most
fiQ •senior members"03 m  a letter to the 'Manchester Guardian'
in April 1957. They expressed "surprise that this aspect
of the Bill [had] received scant if any attention". And
suggested it merited "serious discussion before the Bill
7 0[became] an Act" . Barnett has also noted that, on the
other hand, the RICS in its official memorandum to the
minister on the Bill made no mention of security of tenure. 
And, he comments: 'A very cautious professional organisa­
tion confined itself to issuing - - - memoranda which evaded 
main issues however vital to the success of the Bill - - - 
their political sensitivities preventing comment on key
71clauses'. [Although he does concede that the RICS would
have recognised that such criticisms on key clauses were 
likely to be futile anyway after the Bill had been pub­
lished. ]72
The question which suggests itself is whether representa­
tives of professional bodies would have felt as inhibited if 
they had been giving evidence to a pre-legislative committee 
of inquiry, and whether, presented in such a form, such a
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point could have been so readily discounted. The answer on 
both counts must surely be 'no'.
Again, had the legislation been preceded by such an inquiry 
announced before the Conservatives' policy on the public 
sector had become entrenched, and had the terms of reference 
assumed a degree of security of tenure coupled with some 
mechanism for arbitrating on rent; then it might be argued 
some common ground could have been found with the Opposi­
tion. Indeed, it seems surprising, albeit with the advant­
age of hindsight, that there appears to have been little or 
no appreciation that, other considerations apart, a reason­
able degree of political consensus would be essential to 
market confidence. Although there was undoubted hostility 
to the private rented sector within the Labour Party, might 
it not have been possible to build on the consensus on 'fair' 
rents achieved by Ridley ten years before?
If rents were to be regulated below market levels and if at 
the same time supply was to be stimulated, then subsidies 
would be required. There was some precedent for Labour 
having accepted arrangements for the payment of subsidies to 
the private rented sector - subsidies introduced by a Con­
servative government in 1923, at a time of high construction 
costs, to encourage the building of private houses for rent 
having been continued, and indeed increased, under the 
succeeding Labour government.73 Clearly it would be wrong 
to pursue that argument too far as the building industry in
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the mid 1950s was in better condition than in the mid 1920s. 
However, while Labour in government would have been unlikely 
both on ideological and political grounds to reintroduce 
financial support for the sector they would not necessarily 
have felt obliged to abolish such a measure introduced by 
the Conservatives, particularly if it could be presented as 
bringing benefits to tenants. For example, Labour did not 
abolish the means tested rebates and allowances introduced 
by the Conservatives in 1972 although the legislation con­
cerned - the Housing Finance Act - had been the subject of 
much controversy.
The subsidy available to the private rented sector in the 
mid 192 0s had been parallelled by a similar one available to 
local authorities for general needs building and, precedent 
apart, undoubtedly any acceptance by Labour of assistance to 
the private sector would have been conditional upon the 
retention of the existing general needs subsidy, and the 
Conservatives would have had to accept a consequential 
increase in the size of that section of the public sector 
stock. [The Conservatives would in any event have doubt­
less recognised that some demonstration of equity of treat­
ment between the sectors was necessary for political rea­
sons. ]
More fundamentally, the Conservatives of course would have 
had to recognise that universal subsidies continued to be 
necessary; or, perhaps more likely and more credibly, such 
subsidies in conjunction with means tested subsidies. And,
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what is more, that under the prevailing arrangements, subsi­
dies were not only being enjoyed by local authority tenants, 
but were also being paid to owner occupiers in the form of 
mortgage interest tax relief. Such recognition would have 
involved a modification of the prevailing perception illu­
strated by the following extract from their 1953 White 
Paper.
'Any increase in private enterprise house-building, whether 
for letting or for sale, would in some measure lighten the 
ever growing burden of housing subsidies which in the inter­
est of the general body of tax-payers cannot continue inde­
finitely at the present rate.'74
Another contentious issue which would inevitably have arisen 
was that of rent levels in the public sector, with the 
Conservatives probably pushing for the extension of 'fair' 
rents to include it.
For there to be any prospect of the adjustment in views 
necessary to approach a consensus a committee of inquiry 
would have had to look not only at the private rented sector 
but also at the relationship between the sectors, and at the 
whole question of housing economics. [And this assumes a 
committee with sufficient initiative and of adequate qual­
ity.] This would require the adoption of a broader ap­
proach than had been previously expected from such inquir­
ies, but an approach that was to be adopted by the Milner 
Holland Committee some ten years later.
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This analysis might be criticised for concentrating on 
attitudinal change and for taking little or no account of 
more immediate political considerations. And given subse­
quent events; the refusal of Labour in 1965 to make subsi­
dies available to the private rented sector, as Milner 
Holland had implied should be done [as an accompaniment to 
rent regulation];75 and Labour's abolition on gaining power, 
of the provisions introduced by the Conservatives in 1972 
for extending 'fair' rents to the public sector, it might be 
thought that, had such an inquiry been conducted in the mid 
1950s, the outcome would have been little different.
However, had there been a more widespread understanding of 
the nature of the housing market and of housing economics at 
that time it might well have led to a less radical approach 
by the Conservatives to their housing policies. These
policies were, in the main, to prove inadequate, but not 
before they had polarised attitudes to positions from which 
both parties would find it difficult to return.
At the same time, an examination of subsidy provisions 
before a combination of the expansion in owner occupation 
after the mid 1950s and rising interest rates made tax 
relief more significant, both economically and politically, 
might have led to arrangements which produced greater equity 
between the sectors and avoided a situation from which both 
parties have subsequently found it impossible to disengage, 
and which has inhibited the development of new policies.
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Within a year of the 1957 Act having received the Royal 
Assent there were clear indications of mounting concern 
within Conservative circles at its adverse political conse­
quences, evidenced by the introduction of the Landlord and 
Tenant [Temporary Provisions] Act 1958. Designed to cush­
ion the full impact of the 1957 Act, it provided that, for a 
period of three years [i.e. until 1961] landlords could only 
obtain possession of decontrolled dwellings by court order, 
the granting of which a tenant could expect to successfully 
resist provided certain criteria were satisfied - including 
lack of availability of suitable alternative accommodation, 
and hardship resulting from dispossession. The following 
year the Conservatives' manifesto for the general election 
contained a commitment, that if returned to power, a Conser­
vative government would not utilise the powers within the 
1957 Act to release more houses from control.76 At the
same time the Labour Party in its manifesto was committed to
77the Act's repeal.
In July 1969 an interim report on the results of research
into the impact of the new Rent Act in England, commissioned
78by the Rowntree Trust was published.
The report was based on the results of national sample 
surveys; one carried out in the summer of 1958, and a 
second in the autumn of 1959. The report concluded that 
the Ministry had considerably over-estimated the extent of 
decontrol arising in the case of properties above the 
prescribed rateable value levels and under-estimated the 
extent of decontrol arising as the result of the creation of
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new tenancies below the prescribed levels; and that the 
latter category had become quantitatively more significant. 
While higher rents might have influenced landlords to spend 
more on repairs, insufficient was being done when account 
was taken of the backlog of disrepair, and of the average 
age of the properties concerned. The number of houses 
which had been improved by landlords was insignificant. 
There was no evidence that the provisions of the Act had 
had any effect on under occupation. Increases in rents did 
not conform to the pattern provided for by the Act; some 
rents remained at 1939 levels while those of some controlled 
properties were above the legal maximum. And, at the same 
time, the size of the private rented sector was declining 
rapidly as a result of slum clearance, acquisition by local 
authorities, and transfer into the owner occupier sector.
By the time the Rowntree Trust findings were published a 
White Paper entitled 'Rent Act 1957. Report of an Inquiry1 
had appeared.79 And, to the extent that comparisons of the 
two reports was possible, there was a considerable degree of
O 0
commonality of conclusion.
The findings presented in the White Paper were based on a 
survey carried out by the Social Survey which had a poor 
relationship with the Ministry of Housing and Local Govern­
ment and the White Paper was only published after the find­
ings of the survey had been leaked to the Opposition, lead­
ing in turn to an embarrassing parliamentary attack.81
71
NOTES AND REFERENCES - CHAPTER III
1. Ministry of Health, Report of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Rent Control. Cmnd. 6621, H.M.S.O., 1945
2. Ibid. p. 2
3 . Ibid. para.17
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. para.44
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. para.151
8. Rents of Furnished Houses Control [Scotland]
9. Cmnd. 6621 pp. cit. paras.145 - 148
10. Ibid. para.151
11. Ibid. para.80
12. Ibid. p.p. 52 - 54
13. 413 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.830
414 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.2181
14. 415 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.598
The legislation referred to was The Furnished Houses 
[Rent Control] Act 1946. The Act provided for the 
establishment of rent tribunals in designated areas of 
England and Wales to determine reasonable rents for 
furnished properties. The areas were to be designated 
by the Minister after consultation with, or considera­
tion of representations from, the local authorities 
concerned.
15. 424 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.2307 - 8
428 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.138
16. 457 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.196 - 7
17. The Landlord and Tenant [Rent Control] Act 1949. The
Act also extended the provisions of The Furnished 
Houses [Rent Control] Act 1946 to the whole of England 
and Wales. Previously it had only applied in areas 
designated by the Minister. [See Note 14 above]. The 
tribunals established to deal with furnished premises 
were also to determine reasonable rents for the unfur­
nished premises now brought into control where there 
was an application by either landlord or tenant.
78
18. The Ministry had been created in January 1951 by mer­
ging the Ministry of Planning and the local government
functions [including housing] of the Ministry of
Health.
19. 487 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.992
20. The transfer was made in 1948
21. 418 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Cols.39 & 59
22. Craig, F.W.S. [Ed], British General Election Manifestos
1900 - 74., Macmillan, London, 1975. p. 147
23. Ibid. p.172
[300,000 per annum was to be the target output for
England and Wales, Scottish output was to be addition­
al.]
24. The new title for the Ministry of Local Government and 
Planning adopted by the Conservatives to emphasise 
their commitment to the housing programme. [See 493
H.C. Deb. 5 S. 1Col.643]
25. 493 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.46
494 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.206
26. 497 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.190
498 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.105
27. 507 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col. 159
28. 508 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col. 137
511 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.1913
29. Sanitary Inspectors' Association; The Effect of Rent
Restrictions on the Repair of Dwelling Houses. 1951;
and An Enquiry into the Repair of Dwelling Houses, 1953
30. 516 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.49
31. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Houses: the
Next Step. Cmnd. 8996, H.M.S.O., 1953
[A parallel White Paper was produced by the Department 
of Health for Scotland - Housing Policy. Scotland. 
Cmnd. 8997, H.M.S.O., Edinburgh, 1953
32. Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, A Memorandum 
on Rent Restrictions and the Repair Problem. 1951
33. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry on the Cost of House Maintenance. 
H.M.S.O., 1953
[A parallel report for Scotland was produced by a 
committee chaired by Lockhart W Hutson - Department of 
Health for Scotland, Increase in the Cost of Maintain­
ing Houses; Report by a Sub-committee of the Scottish 
Building Costs Committee. H.M.S.O., Edinburgh, 1953.]
79
34. 520 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.246
35. The difference between 'gross' and 'net' annual values 
reflecting the landlord's estimated expenditure on 
repairs, insurance and management.
36. 521 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.821
37. Ibid. Col.831
38. Ibid. Col.826
39. 525 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.2121.
40. Cmnd. 8996 pp. cit. para.27
41. Ibid. para.30
42. Ibid. para.31
43. 179 H.L. Deb. 5 S. Col.927
44. 520 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.181
45. 546 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.258
46. Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Scot­
tish Office, Rent Control - Statistical Information. 
Cmnd. 17, H.M.S.O., 1956
47. 560 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Cols.1759 - 60
48. Ibid. Cols. 1761 - 62
49. Ibid. Col.1763
50. Ibid. Cols.1770, 1780 - 81, 2937 - 38
In particular there is reference made here to the 
shortage of houses in London.
51. Ibid. Cols.1759 - 2062 and 567 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Cols.1362 
- 1478
52. 560 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.1993
53. 567 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.1404
54. Ministry of Health, Report of the Inter-Departmental
Committee on the Rent Restriction Acts, Cmnd. 3911,
H.M.S.O., 1931
55. Ministry of Health, Report of the Inter-Departmental
Committee on the Rent Restriction Acts, Cmnd. 5621,
H.M.S.O., 1937
56. 560 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.2059
57. Ibid. Col.1804
80
58. Ibid. Cols.1964 - 65 - 66
59. 567 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.1383
60. See note 33 above
61. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Report for 
the Year 1955. H.M.S.O., 1956 p.3
62. Duncan Sandys had announced the intention to abolish 
the subsidy in November 1955. [546 H.C. Deb. 5 S.
Col.795]
Although it had not been continuously available and had 
varied in form over the years, a general needs subsidy 
had been first introduced immediately after the first 
world war. Local authorities had possessed powers 
since 1890, under the provisions of the Housing of the 
Working Classes Acts, to build houses to rent for the 
general needs of that section of the community, but it 
was not until 1919, with the passing of the Housing, 
Town Planning, Etc. Act [and parallel Scottish legisla­
tion] that Exchequer subsidies became available 
which encouraged local authorities to begin to make a 
significant contribution towards meeting those housing 
needs. The Acts provided for the Exchequer meeting 
all losses incurred in providing the houses apart from 
a small pre-determined contribution from the rates.
A number of factors appear to have influenced the 
Coalition Government in its decision to introduce the 
legislation. First - there was an acute shortage of 
houses and given the extremely high construction costs 
prevailing and the anticipation that costs would fall, 
the private sector could not be expected to build. 
Second - promises of improved housing conditions had 
been made to sustain the war effort in 1917. Third - 
there was a fear in the immediate post war period of 
civil disorder among unemployed elements of the recent­
ly demobilised army. The houses built under the
provisions of the Acts were designed to standards 
recommended in the Tudor-Walters Report and were mark­
edly better than much of the prevailing working class 
housing. However, in 1921, against a background of 
very high tender prices and of national economic diffi­
culty, the subsidy arrangements were discontinued. 
[See Swenarton, M. , Homes Fit for Heroes. Heinemann, 
London, 1981, for an excellent account of the factors 
influencing housing policy developments at this time].
In 1923 the Conservative Government which had succeeded 
the Coalition when it collapsed in October 1922, intro­
duced a flat rate subsidy for general needs housing for 
the working classes. This was payable through the 
private sector for building for renting and owner 
occupation and, to local authorities. The latter were 
only eligible however, if they could demonstrate that 
the private sector could not adequately meet the needs
81
of their area. The subsidy was only available for 
houses built within two years of the passing of the
associated legislation - The Housing Act 1923.
The Labour Government which came to power in 1923 did 
not abolish these subsidies but, extended the period 
for which they were available to fifteen years; intro­
duced a new higher level subsidy - but only for 
building for rent; and removed the restrictions on
local authorities. Although in order to qualify for
the higher subsidy local authorities had now to make a 
mandatory contribution from the rates [Housing [Finan­
cial Provisions] Act 1924 and parallel Scottish legis­
lation. ]
In the late 1920s construction costs and interest rates 
were falling and the Conservative Government which had 
replaced Labour, began to reduce the level of the 
subsidies. The 1923 Act subsidy was withdrawn in 1929 
and a further reduction in the 1924 Act subsidy was 
only arrested by the return of Labour to power in the 
same year.
In the following year the Labour Government introduced 
a new subsidy for slum clearance. [A slum clearance 
subsidy available under the 1923 Act had been little 
utilised, local authorities preferring to concentrate 
on expanding the existing stock rather than demolishing 
houses.] Labour made no further changes to the
general needs subsidy but it was subsequently withdrawn 
in England and Wales in 1933 [and in Scotland some 2 
years later] by the succeeding National Government. 
The Government also introduced a further 'specific 
subsidy' - for building for the relief of overcrowding 
- in 1935.
In 1944 a general needs subsidy was re-introduced by 
the Coalition Government but only for a 2 year period. 
However in 194 6 it was made available on an indefinite 
basis by the Labour Government, and 3 years later 
[under the same Government] the term 'working classes' 
was deleted from the housing acts, removing all re­
strictions on local authority provision for housing 
needs.
When the Conservatives came to .power in 1951 with 
their commitment to an output of 300,000 houses per 
annum [in England and Wales] they increased the general 
needs subsidy to take account of rising construction 
costs.
63. 520 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col.181
64. Barnett J.B., The Politics of Legislation - The Rent 
Act 1957. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1969 p.84
65. Donnison, D.V., The Government of Housing. Penguin, 
London, 1967 p.353
82
66. H.C.S.C. Deb. 1956 - 57 Vol.I Col.791
67. Craig, F.W.S. , [Ed] pp. cit. p.205
'Labour will therefore ask local authorities to submit 
schemes for gradually taking over and modernising rent- 
controlled property subject to fair compensation'.
The inclusion of the word 'gradually' is significant. 
There was clearly concern regarding the financial
implications of the proposal.
68. Cmnd. 2605 pp. cit. p.p.186 - 87
69. One of them, [Sir] Dennis Pilcher was to become a
member of the Milner Holland Committee and be credited
by Richard Crossman with subsequently making a signif­
icant contribution to the development of the concept of 
'fair' rents and the mechanism for establishing them.
70. Barnett, J.B. op. cit. p.135
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid. p.136
73. See note 62 above
74. Cmnd. 8996 pp. cit. p.17 para.91
75. See next chapter
76. Craig, F.W.S. [Ed] pp. cit. p.218
77. Ibid. p.225
Labour also promised to introduce 'fair' rents with 
right of appeal to rent tribunals. Houses taken over 
by local authorities would be repaired and modernised, 
and subsequently let at fair rents. But this was a
'big job' which would 'take time'.
78. Donnison, D.V., Cockburn, C. and Corlett, T., Housing
Since the Rent Act, interim report from the Rowntree
Trust Housing Study. Occasional Papers on Social Admin­
istration, No.3, Codicote Press, Welwyn, July 1961.
79. Cmnd. 1246, H.M.S.O., December 1960
80. Donnison, D.V., et a_l pp. cit. p. 101
81. Barnett, J.B. pp. cit. P.54
83
CHAPTER IV - THE MILNER HOLLAND REPORT AND THE 1965 RENT ACT 
The Milner Holland Report
The Milner Holland Committee was appointed in 1963 by the 
then Minister of Housing and Local Government, Sir Keith 
Joseph; its terms of reference being: 'to survey the hous­
ing situation in London with particular reference to the 
use, maintenance and management of rented accommodation, 
whether privately or publicly owned, and to the relations 
between the occupiers of rented accommodation and private 
landlords. ' 1
There has been evidence of increasing stress in the housing 
situation in London in the early 1960s. A press report in 
August 1960 referred to 'agitation and anxiety' which had
parisen over London rents and Donnison and Ungerson refer to 
television coverage of, and a general increase of media 
interest m  homelessness m  London in 1961.
The intention to appoint a committee of inquiry was first 
intimated in a White Paper entitled 'London - Employment: 
Housing: Land',4 published in February 1963 from which the
following is an extract.
"Survey of Existing Housing - What can be done to help those 
families living in bad and over-crowded conditions while new 
houses and improvements are being pushed ahead? In the
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short term, this is a problem of letting policies and prior­
ities - making the best possible use of existing housing in 
conditions of scarcity. Three-fifths of the houses in 
London are either privately rented or owned by local author­
ities, but very little information is available on the way 
in which this accommodation is being used and managed. 
Complaints are made of unfair pressure on the tenants of 
some private houses; but to what extent this is happening 
is not known. It may be that more could be done to relieve 
some of the hardship experienced by a section of Londoners 
by a better use of existing housing. Some of the local 
authority houses are occupied by tenants who could, perhaps, 
fend for themselves and should be encouraged to do so, and 
thus make way for families who have to look to the local 
authorities.
The Government propose accordingly to arrange for a survey 
of housing to be carried out in London; and they think it 
would be most satisfactory if this survey were to be conduc­
ted by an independent committee, asked to report on the 
state of housing in London and in particular whether, given 
the scarcity, rented housing is being used and managed to 
its best advantage".5
Some five months later, on 22 July 1963, against a back­
ground of considerable media coverage of allegations of 
malpractice by landlords in the London area and the associa­
tion of the name of Perec Rachman with the Profumo scandal, 
a debate took place in the House of Commons in response to
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the motion put down by the Leader of the Opposition, Harold 
Wilson - "That this House deplores the intolerable extor­
tion, evictions and property profiteering which has resulted 
from the Rent Act 1957, and demands that Her Majesty's 
Government takes immediate and drastic steps to restore 
security for threatened tenants".6
During the debate Sir Keith Joseph informed the House that, 
the previous autumn his department had initiated enquiries 
to try to establish the extent of the pressure to which 
tenants were being subjected but the results had been incon­
clusive, and it was because of this that the intention to 
appoint an independent committee of inquiry had been intima­
ted in the White Paper published the previous February. "I 
hope that the House will consider that it is worth waiting 
the extra few weeks, because I am now in a position to 
announce that Sir Milner Holland, QC, has undertaken to 
chair this committee. I think the House will agree that 
that is a guarantee that the survey which will be made will 
be impartial and thorough. - - I do not think that we have 
lost any time, because over the last months my Department 
has been doing a lot of preparatory work which I hope Sir 
Milner Holland and his committee will find will help them 
forward".7
The Committee had a membership of twelve. Sir Milner Hol­
land was a barrister and a former member of the Council on 
Tribunals. Its other members included: Sir Arthur Rucker, 
a former civil servant who acted as vice-chairman, and who 
had been principal private secretary to several Ministers of
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Health in the inter-war years and, Depute Secretary at the 
Ministry of Health from 1943 to 1948 when that Department 
was still responsible for housing; two academics - David 
Donnison, Professor of Social Administration at the London 
School of Economics and later Director of the Centre for 
Environmental Studies, who had been involved in research on 
the impact of the 1957 Rent Act carried out as part of the 
Rowntree Trust housing Study mentioned in the previous 
chapter and [Sir] Claus Moser, Professor of Social Statis­
tics at the LSE and later head of The Government Statisti­
cal Service; Reginald Allerton who had recently retired 
from the post of Director of Housing for the London County 
Council; [Sir] Dennis Pilcher, President of the RICS and 
later appointed Chairman of the Commission on New Towns; 
and Lewis Waddilove, Director of the Joseph Rowntree Memor­
ial Trust.
The Committee was serviced by a research unit headed by 
Barbara Adams, a senior research officer seconded from the 
Ministry. Research was also undertaken on behalf of the 
Committee by the Social Survey - Central Office of Informa­
tion. Three academics also provided a considerable degree 
of assistance - Adela Nevitt was closely involved in the 
preparation of a chapter of the Report concerned with the 
housing economics; and Christine Cockburn and John Greve, 
[both associated with Donnison and Waddilove through the 
Rowntree Housing Trust Study], investigated the policies 
pursued towards the private rented sector and the contribu­
tion made by it in large urban areas in several western
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European countries and in the USA. John Greve also parti­
cipated in research undertaken to assess the consequences of 
housing redevelopment and improvement activities.
During the summer of 1964, and prior to the general election 
in October of that year, questions were tabled by Labour MPs 
as to the progress being made by the Committee. In May the 
Minister was reported as not wishing to rush the Committee 
but anxious to have its findings as soon as possible.8 At 
the end of June the Report was expected by the end of the
q . . .  ,year. In mid July the Minister rejected suggestions that 
the Committee should produce an interim report prior to the 
general election because it considered it couldn't usefully 
do so.10
Sir Keith Joseph is on record as having - "at the first
meeting of the Committee on 16 September 1963 - - - pressed
for the production of a Report at the earliest possible
moment."11 That the Committee was in the event put under
much pressure by the Conservative Government seems doubtful,
but there is no doubt that the pressure increased when the
1 oLabour Government came into power. In November 1964,
Richard Crossman, by then Minister of Housing and Local 
Government, told the House of Commons that the Report was 
expected early in the new year.13 By early December how­
ever, Crossman was disturbed to learn that it was not expec­
ted to be published in January or February and would as a 
result be too late for the introduction of his new rent 
bill.14 Crossman was annoyed by the fact that publication
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appeared to be being delayed as the result of Sir Milner 
Holland insisting on attempting to write the report 
himself.15 It seems more likely in fact that the chairman 
concentrated on the drafting and re-drafting of the politic­
ally sensitive parts of the document.16
Describing events during the period prior to the publication 
of the Rent Bill, Crossman recorded in March 1965 - "Direct­
ly I became Minister I made contact with Milner Holland and 
got to know the individual members of his Committee, parti­
cularly David Donnison and Pilcher. I also took their 
advice at length, not only about the Bill in general but 
about the 'fair'-rent clause in particular, and as a result 
I was able to persuade them to change their publication 
plans. Instead of waiting till summer to publish their 
Report they agreed to get it out as matter of urgency before 
my Bill even though this meant printing each chapter as it 
was finished. Everybody now realises that the Milner
Holland Report and the Crossman Bill are parts of a single 
operation".17
The Report was published on 11 March 1967 and in time for
the Second Reading stage of the Bill. In its preparation
the Committee had aimed to produce a document of readable
length which would at the same time provide an adequate
description of a complex situation. The Report, excluding 
appendices containing details of the research and background 
information, extends to thirteen chapters. What the Com­
mittee describes as the 'factual heart' of the Report is
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concerned with the housing situation in London; the inci­
dence of housing stress and shortage; the condition of the 
stock; the characteristics of landlords in the public and 
private sectors, their management practices, attitudes and 
intentions, and the tenants' perceptions of their landlords; 
the incidence and nature of abuses practised by landlords; 
the implications of insecurity of tenure; and conditions and 
practices specific to coloured tenants and coloured land­
lords .
The remainder of the Report contains sections dealing with: 
the economic, social, environmental and legislative factors 
impinging on the housing market in the London area in the 
period since the second world war; the impact of redevelop­
ment and improvement activity on the housing opportunities 
of various groups; evidence from international comparables; 
'some popular hypotheses' as to the cause of the housing 
shortage in the London area; and a development of the 
Committee's conclusions.
The findings are based on: research carried out by - the
Social Survey, the research unit attached to the Committee, 
and by Cockburn and Greve; information from the 1961 census 
and from local authorities - particularly London County 
Council; written evidence both solicited and unsolicited; 
oral evidence; and field visits. The Social Survey under­
took a tenant survey and a landlord survey; the properties 
involved in both cases being the same as those covered in an 
earlier survey carried out by the organisation in I960.18
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And the research unit attached to the Committee, in addition 
to processing the information from other sources, undertook 
a survey to assess the extent of abuse.
As previously mentioned Cockburn and Greve conducted the re­
search overseas and the latter, in conjunction with the 
research unit, investigated the impact of redevelopment and 
improvement activity.
Emphasis is placed on ensuring the integrity of the research 
and other evidence - - - "we have tried to rest our Report 
wholly on factual material, to select only the most reliable 
sources, and ignore guesswork and unsupported opinions. 
Where we have had to form a judgment on a balance of proba­
bilities, the grounds of the judgment are so far as possible 
stated and explained".19
Where opinions are expressed they are carefully balanced eg.
- "insecurity of tenure constitutes a widespread source of 
hardship and anxiety. On the other hand nothing in the 
evidence leads us to the conclusion, and we do not intend to 
convey the impression, that the generality of landlords in 
London are behaving unreasonably or callously. Any such 
inference from our material would be both unfair and untrue.
- - We have been told of many cases where landlords have 
themselves provided alternative accommodation or gone to a 
great deal of trouble to assist tenants to find new homes 
where tenancies have been brought to an end, even though 
they had no legal obligation to do so".20
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The Committee's terms of reference required it to carry out 
a fact finding exercise and it was not required to make 
recommendations - a point that had been underlined by a 
Conservative minister in answer to a parliamentary question 
in May 1964.21 As it transpired however, and as is made 
clear in the introduction to the Report this narrow task 
definition was to be effectively ignored - "We were neither 
required nor authorised to make recommendations; and poli­
cies for the solution of London's housing problems must be 
the responsibility of Government. Nevertheless, some facts 
as we see them point irresistibly in particular directions; 
and if directly or indirectly, we seem to have exceeded our 
terms of reference, we offer no apology".22
The economic factors affecting organisations and individuals 
contributing to the several sectors providing the rented 
housing stock within the capital - local authorities, hous­
ing associations, and private landlords, are examined.
Local authority tenants it is noted benefited from exchequer
subsidies, and also in most areas, from a further subsidy 
from rate fund income. But, because exchequer subsidies
were related to investment by authorities in housing provi­
sion at varying points in time since immediately after the 
first world war, and because rental incomes had risen as a 
result of inflation, the current level of subsidies received 
by individual authorities did not necessarily reflect the 
balance between current commitments and resources.
Housing associations operated under restrictions which could
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make it difficult if not impossible for them to pool their 
rental incomes from different estates and so operate a 
uniform rental policy. And, the tax provisions applying to 
housing associations, and their conseguences for their 
tenants were less favourable than those applying to owner 
occupiers.
With regard to the private rented sector the Report observes 
- "In the post war period the tendency for companies to move 
out of residential property and into commercial property has 
been greatly accelerated by the continued existence of rent 
controls and the political controversy which has surrounded 
housing".23 As with housing associations, private land­
lords were in a relatively disadvantaged position when 
national taxation provisions were considered. They were 
required to pay tax on funds allocated to the amortisation 
of loans, and to provision for depreciation. This latter 
point being particularly significant when short life impro­
vements were considered. And, unlike local authority
tenants and owner occupiers who both benefited from assis­
tance with housing costs, the former by way of specific 
subsidies and the latter by way of tax concessions on mort­
gage interest payments, tenants of private landlords re­
ceived no support. While the existence of tax concessions 
made it cheaper to buy a house than to rent it, increasingly 
the tenants of private landlords were drawn from those 
sections of the community on average or below average in­
comes. Moreover, stimulating the expansion of owner occu­
pation could aggravate the problems of those unable to gain
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access to that sector by accelerating the transfer of stock 
from the privately rented sector.
The information stemming from the research carried out 
overseas24 showed that all the urban areas considered had 
larger proportions of privately rented housing than did 
London. And, while in London that proportion was shrink­
ing, in the other areas it was generally growing or holding 
its own. The governments in most of the other countries 
involved gave greater encouragement to the private rented 
sector. Nearly all provided loans or subsidies to private 
landlords and in most cases tax exemption was available for 
depreciation funds. At the same time, most of these gov­
ernments were more interventionist in the sector - in regu­
lating and reviewing rents, providing for security of te­
nure, and controlling the distribution of privately rented 
housing; and had established associated tribunal mechan­
isms .
The populations in and around large industrial cities of 
industrialised countries were growing as employment opportu­
nities increased, and those attracted were predominately in 
age groups which would contribute to natural population 
increase. There was a growing incidence of service indu­
stries in central areas which were labour intensive across a 
large range of income groups and there was acute competition 
for the available residential accommodation in such loca­
tions, predominately privately rented, between households of 
varying sizes, age groups, and income levels. In London
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the position was particularly problematic because family 
households found difficulty in moving further out to more 
suitable accommodation and, because of the rapidly declining
o c
number of dwellings in the privately rented sector.
The following is an outline of the Committee's principal 
conclusions, and recommendations - explicit or implicit.
1. For the reasons described above there was an acute 
shortage of rented housing in the capital and the supply of 
privately rented housing had diminished and was continuing 
to diminish although there was no shortage of accommodation 
at rents above £400 per annum.
2. While there was under-occupation among tenants of con­
trolled properties, as there was among owner occupiers, the 
lack of alternative accommodation of suitable size contribu­
ted to this situation as much as rent control. There was 
far less surplus space in public sector housing then there 
was in the private sector.
3. Local authority tenants were heavily concentrated in the 
income groups around and below the average for wage earners 
in London. Very few local authority tenants would be able 
to afford access to owner occupation in the London area.
4. Although abuse by private sector landlords was exper­
ienced by only a small proportion of tenants such cases were 
by no means isolated, and appropriate legislation should be 
introduced to eliminate such practices.
5. Hardship and anxiety were caused by lack of security of
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tenure in the privately rented sector and it was a more 
serious factor than abuse by landlords. "It is perhaps 
anomalous that while other forms of tenancy - business, 
agricultural and almost any tenancy other than residential - 
have long enjoyed the protection of security of tenure in 
some form, accompanied by a proper system for ascertaining 
the current rent, no analogous security is given to private 
residential tenancies except in the limited and diminishing 
field remaining in control. The matter of granting it an 
whether it should apply to the whole field of private tenan­
cies or only that part in which there is a shortage would be
O £
matters to be considered".
6. If security of tenure was to be introduced then it must 
be accompanied by provisions for rent regulation and review. 
"Nearly fifty years of rent controls originally imposed as a 
short term remedy have masked the true cost of housing and 
the cost of maintaining it. Neither a policy of rigid rent 
restriction without any mitigation of its adverse effects on 
the provision and maintenance of rented housing; nor a 
policy of piecemeal and haphazard decontrol unaccompanied by 
any provision for security of tenure, have led to any real 
relief of the stresses on London housing".27
7. The national taxation system was a disincentive to the 
provision of rented accommodation by private landlords, and 
had an adverse effect on tenants, particularly in low income 
categories. The mechanism for allocating exchequer subsi­
dies to local housing authorities should be reviewed, as 
should the legal and financial arrangements applying to 
housing associations.
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8. Policy which was likely to have the greatest hope of 
success in tackling the housing problem in London would aim 
to harness the potential of the privately rented sector in 
parallel with that of other sectors.
9. If the private rented sector was to be revived all 
hazards of political uncertainty surrounding it must be 
removed; owners allowed an economic return; and financial 
and fiscal policy revised.
10. "Success [depended upon] a comprehensive grasp of the 
whole housing situation and the part that each sector of the 
market [played] within it, based on appropriate and up-to- 
date information; an objective appraisal of [the] situa­
tion purged of irrelevant prejudices against landlords, 
tenants or other groups in the population; a recognition 
that the housing problems confronting great cities [would] 
not be resolved by market forces or by the provision of more 
houses alone, but [were] of a long term if not permanent 
character - - - ”.28
11. Careful consideration should be given to a sugges 
tion which had been made, and which the Committee favoured, 
to designate 'areas of special control' where bad housing 
conditions were concentrated, and to establish ad hoc au­
thorities in such areas with powers to control sales and 
lettings, carry out redevelopment or achieve improvements 
using where appropriate compulsory powers and/or higher 
levels of grant.
12. If measures to tackle the London housing problem were 
to be successful then they would have to be designed and 
applied on a 'Londonwide' basis.
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13. Strong and capably manned intelligence units should be 
maintained at both central and local levels with an ability 
to collect and collate information on housing from all 
aspects. Once an appropriate capability had been estab­
lished the situation should be continuously monitored. "It 
would then be unnecessary to call into existence a fact­
finding committee such as ours with all the difficulties 
inherent in a rapidly assembled ad hoc enquiry of the nature
0 Qwe have undertaken". *
Reaction to The Report, and the Labour Government's Legisla­
tive Proposals
Richard Crossman on receipt of the Report considered it - 
"extremely good"30 and on the day of publication in response 
to a parliamentary question described it as - "a document of 
great social importance. - By setting a penetrating and 
deeply moving account against the background of an analysis 
of a mass of statistical and other material, the Committee 
[had] made a major contribution to the better understanding 
of the effects of the housing shortage upon the 
Metropolis".31
John Boyd-Carpenter for the Opposition, after pointing out 
that it was a Conservative government which had appointed 
the Committee, observed that it had - "done a very important 
job of work as was apparent from even a superficial reading 
of the very massive Report". And he intimated that the 
Conservatives would welcome an opportunity to discuss it in 
due course.
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Late in February Crossman had discussed the progress and 
presentation of the Rent Bill with the Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson, and the former had indicated he thought it 
unlikely that the Conservatives would vote against the 
Second Reading of the Bill; contrary to what Wilson had 
hoped. Given the small size of the Labour majority33 
Wilson anticipated that it would be necessary to hold an­
other general election before long but was anxious to delay 
it, possibly until May of the following year. And in the 
meantime, he wished to present the Opposition in as poor a 
light as possible. He therefore proposed to Crossman that 
in preparing his White Paper34 he (Crossman) should draft a 
document which forced the Conservatives to vote against the 
Bill "by describing the inequities of the Tory Rent Act and 
the need to repeal it".35
When Crossman subsequently received the Milner Holland 
Report he considered "that [he] could look forward to the 
publication of something which would bluff the Tories and 
force them to vote against the Second Reading of [his] 
Bill”.36 The White Paper, in the preparation of which 
Crossman took "tremendous trouble", and which provided an 
exposition of the Bill which he considered "both intelli­
gible and highly political",37 includes a section on the 
Milner Holland Report. The final paragraph reads - "The 
Report fully confirms the Government's view that in the 
conditions of shortage found in Greater London and in other 
main centres of population - though information about condi­
tions outside Greater London is less specific - legislation
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is urgently required to restore security of tenure and to
o 0regulate rents". 0
Crossman suggested to the Prime Minister, on the recommenda­
tion of his private secretary, that Milner Holland should 
hold his own press conference on the publication of the 
Report; that the Report should be debated in the Commons a 
week later; and the Second Reading debate should follow ten 
days after that. "That gives us two bites at the
*1 Q  ,
cherry". The pattern of events which emerged was on those 
general lines. The Report, having been published on 11 
March 1965, was debated in the Commons on the 22nd of the 
month, and the following day Crossman held a press confer­
ence to explain the details of the White Paper and of the 
Rent Bill.
The Bill provided for returning security of tenure to pro­
perties decontrolled by the provisions of the 1957 Act, and 
for freezing the rents of such properties until 'fair rents' 
could be determined by a new two tier regulation mechanism, 
involving rent officers at the lower level and right of 
appeal to rent assessment committees at the higher level. 
Those properties which had not been decontrolled in the 
past, because they were below the prescribed rateable value 
ceiling, would be decontrolled, but not until a later date 
so as not to overload the regulation mechanism. In the 
meantime, individual properties in that category would 
become subject to regulation if vacated by the tenant.
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Also, on the lines recommended in the Milner Holland Report, 
the Bill made it an offence to intimidate tenants who were 
legally entitled to occupy the properties in question. As 
mentioned previously, Crossman had consulted individual 
members of the Milner Holland Committee over details of the 
Rent Bill. And Donnison had participated on one of two 
advisory groups of outside experts which Crossman had estab­
lished to assist with the preparation of the Bill.40. 
Subsequently Crossman disclosed that - "The 'fair-rent' clause 
and the machinery of rent officers and rent assessment 
committees was almost entirely the invention of Pilcher and 
Arnold Goodman and his friend Denis Lloyd".41
The day after the press conference Crossman presented his 
proposals to a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party. 
Recording the event he commented - "fifty or sixty turned up 
to hear me particularly on Clause 22". [The 'fair-rent' rent 
clause] - "It was obvious from the morning's discussion that 
this 'fair-rent' idea was regarded as highly dubious and I 
shall have a very rough time in Committee, fighting for it 
against my own back-benchers".42
The Conservatives elected to devote a Supply Day to debate 
what John Boyd-Carpenter, opening for the Opposition de­
scribed "as this extremely important and most interesting 
Report".43 He was "immensely impressed with the care, 
skill and attention which the very distinguished team ap­
pointed two years ago by [Sir Keith Joseph] [had] given the 
subject". "Impressed and grateful at the speed with which
101
they had conducted so thorough and detailed a review”; and 
"impressed by the admirable language of the Report”.44
There were two points Boyd-Carpenter wished to make clear at 
the outset. First - it was not the case, as the Prime 
Minister had claimed in a recent speech, that the appoint­
ment of the Committee was the result of the debate on Rach- 
manism in July 1963 which Labour had 'forced on' the Conser­
vative government. The appointment of the Committee, he 
pointed out had been foreshadowed in the White Paper "laid 
in February 1963, four months before the Rachman debate".45 
Conservative policy on the issue had been consistent - "an 
effective expert and highly intelligent committee" had been 
appointed and the Conservatives had been committed in their 
election manifesto to providing additional safeguards for 
London tenants if the Report showed this to be necessary.46
Second - the Report related to Greater London, and to Great­
er London only, and as made clear at the outset of the 
Report - "any attempt to draw inferences from it as to the 
situation outside the London area would be wholly unjusti­
fied, since conclusions drawn by such a method would be 
unsupported by any evidence".47 It followed, Boyd-Carpen- 
ter argued, that Crossman could not utilise the Committee's 
findings to justify the imposition of rent control outwith 
London.
Further, the Report gave no support to doctrinaire views at 
either extreme. The problems could not be solved solely by
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dependence on the market or by the application of controls. 
Abuses, high rents and malpractices all arose from one 
fundamental cause, the shortage of houses. "London's
housing problem, like coronary thrombosis [was] a disease of 
prosperity".48 [And the prosperity was by implication a 
by-product of thirteen years of Conservative government.] 
The only remedy in the long term was the provision of more 
dwellings. He suggested that residential densities in 
central areas would have to be increased and more high rise 
building encouraged and the possibility of redeveloping 
sites currently in other uses considered.
If in the present situation, as the Committee evidently 
felt, some additional security of tenure was required, then 
measures must be taken to counter the adverse effects. 
There could not be security of tenure without rent control 
but the level at which rents were fixed would critically 
influence the willingness of landlords to provide accommoda­
tion. What he had in mind was a - "level which [gave] a 
fair return to the landlord for the money invested in the 
property, without involving any element of exploitation or 
scarcity"H
It was also important that the adverse effects of control 
should be compensated for by the measures which the Commit­
tee had suggested - changing the fiscal arrangements apply­
ing to landlords and making other "financial adjustments" 
such as were made in other countries.
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He drew particular attention to the Committee's emphasis on 
the need to harness the potential contribution from both 
public and private sector providers of housing to rent. 
"Though no one who [had] served in the Treasury [breathed] 
the word 'subsidy' without a certain shudder, it [might] 
well be that if further restriction [were] thought right to 
be imposed on landlords in London, and, if the House [accep­
ted] the Committee's view that it [was] only by keeping the 
private sector in operation that the problem [would] be
solved, the least expensive course in the end [might] well
51be to consider some help in that way". A
In response to laughter from Labour Members he pointed out 
that such was the practice "of a number of our European 
friends, by no means all of them under Right-wing Govern­
ments".52 If one accepted the Committee's reasoning then 
one was faced with accepting something of that nature was 
also necessary to restore confidence among investors. For 
the Government to respond in such a way would demonstrate 
that it had abandoned the old attitude of the Labour Party 
under which all landlords were viewed as pariahs. He 
quoted from the Report in reference to the Committee's 
appeal "for a common approach to the problem and for a fully 
considered development of policy based on an understanding 
of the whole housing situation and purged of irrelevant 
prejudice against landlords, tenants and any other groups of 
the population".53 He knew that both sides had prejudices 
on the issue which were sometimes rationalised into princi­
ples but the problem would not be resolved if there was an
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insistence on stirring and reviving old controversies. If 
the Minister was prepared to adopt an unprejudiced approach 
as advocated by the Committee then the Opposition would be 
prepared to co-operate.
Richard Crossman in reply, accused the Opposition of devot­
ing a Supply Day, and utilising it in such a way, because 
they were anxious to minimise the deep embarrassment to 
which they would otherwise be exposed when the Report was 
considered.
While he accepted what the Committee said about its Report 
only being relevant for London; and he recognised that the 
housing situation varied between areas, and that local 
authorities had adopted varying approaches to meeting hous­
ing needs - "It [was] also true that people who were thir­
teen years in government and left us without any knowledge 
of a reliable sort about the subject such as [was got] from 
the Milner Holland Committee [had] no right to demand that, 
because the information [had] been denied for years, the 
evil [had] to continue until six more investigations [took] 
place".54 This was not at all what the Government intended 
in dealing with the problem.
The endorsement of the Committee's "plea for a policy purged 
of irrelevant prejudice" by Boyd-Carpenter [a view which he 
had already expressed at the Conservative Local Government 
Conference the previous week]; and a similar endorsement by 
the editor of 'The Times' filled Crossman with the "gravest
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suspicion."55
Boyd-Carpenter1s call for a consensus approach was motivated 
by the fact "that in terms of party politics the investiga­
tions of this Committee and a study of its Report [could] be 
nothing but a devastating disaster to the Opposition".56 
Here [was a] sober, impartial and annihilating analysis of 
how the tenants in London's privately rented properties 
[had] fared under thirteen years of Tory rule, seven of them 
after the Rent Act came into effect".57
Boyd-Carpenter had criticised the tax system as it impinged 
on private landlords but had not taken the opportunity when 
Chief Secretary of the Treasury to make appropriate amend­
ments.
He, Crossman, had a natural prejudice against landlords. A 
prejudice shared with many Members on the same side of the 
House. This prejudice, which was also prevalent in the 
community was so strong "that many Labour supporters jumped 
to the conclusion that the Rachman story was typical of the 
behaviour of the big landlords and that they were the vil­
lains of the piece".58 Milner Holland, however, had demon­
strated and he accepted this "without qualification" that 
not only were large numbers of landlords not involved in 
"sensational forms of persecution and exploitation" but, 
that as far as could be seen, big landlords were the least 
guilty m  this regard. *
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The fact remained, however, that there was something ser­
iously wrong with the privately rented sector and the under­
lying cause must be sought. The explanation lay in the 
fact that the "service which the landlords [provided], cheap 
rented housing, [was] at once unprofitable and in short 
supply". The provision of working class housing had, in 
the last forty years become "extremely unprofitable".60
There was, as a result, a temptation to scamp on repairs 
and, in the case of a minority of landlords, a "willingness 
to exploit and to persecute". Those who weren't prepared 
to resort to such measures were determined to sell up and in 
some cases turned the tenants "into reluctant owner occup­
iers saddled with a decaying liability".61
The majority of the little landlords were, according to the 
Report, "perfectly decent people - - desperate because they 
[couldn't] get any return on the money they invested or the 
houses they inherited".62 Conservative administrations
over the last thirteen years must accept responsibility for 
the fact that no action had been taken to alleviate the 
situation during that period.
He also pointed out how the Report had disproved "four 
popular hypotheses" which the Conservatives had utilised in 
support of their policies and, demonstrated that the housing 
shortage could not be solved by getting "rid of the rich 
council house tenants with their Jaguar cars", and was not 
caused by immigration from the Commonwealth.63
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The Report had shown "how every prediction made by those who 
promoted that infamous measure [the Rent Act 1957] [had] 
been falsified by the facts".64 It had drawn "attention to 
the appalling inadequacy of the data available". [A situa­
tion which he had already been tackling prior to receipt of 
the Report}.65 And, had highlighted the anomaly that 
tenants of residential subjects were virtually alone in not 
enjoying some form of security of tenure together with a 
mechanism for determining the correct rent.66
Crossman agreed with the Committee that if new housing of an 
adequate quality was to be provided for lower income house­
holds then substantial subsidisation would be required. 
The provision of new housing for such groups must be regar­
ded as a social service. But because it should be so 
regarded he doubted "whether the Committee [was] right in 
suggesting that in this task private should be yoked to 
public enterprise",67 and he was convinced that "there 
[would] be no advantage in extending subsidies outside the 
public sector. Subsidies should go to the local authori­
ties, to housing associations, and not into the begging bowl 
of private enterprise".68
However, that did not preclude a role for private landlords 
who had "an enormous role to play in the repair and improve­
ment of the great grey areas of private property which 
[were] falling into dilapidation or being demolished and 
replaced with expensive accommodation". He was "hopeful 
that the flexible rent regulations [which had been] evolved
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[would] not only restore security of tenure - - [but] - - 
encourage the landlord to prolong the life of his property
• • fiQby repairs and improvements".
He concurred with the Committee's view that measures to 
tackle the problem should be applied and directed to London 
as a whole and hoped The Greater London Council's powers in 
this regard would be adequate to provide the strategic 
direction required.70
He did not think that the Committee's suggestion for the 
establishment of 'areas of special control' administered by 
ad hoc authorities was appropriate at a time when London was 
undergoing a difficult period of local government re-organi- 
sation.71
Commenting later on his speech Crossman recorded - "I had 
thought over my tactics very carefully indeed and I decided 
to launch an all-out attack on the Tory record and put the 
whole blame on them for the rent crises we inherited. For 
weeks now, George Wigg and I have been discussing our fail­
ure to pin the responsibility on the Tories for the troubles 
we are coping with. Here is a case where we really could 
do so, and so the speech was a ruthless party political 
attack on the Conservatives, with my own side roaring enthu­
siastically behind me. Probably in the long run it was 
marred by a remark I made about my natural prejudice against 
landlords. I had put it into the text at the last moment 
to make sure I would carry my own backbenchers with me".72
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The 1965 Rent Act
In his speech on the Second Reading debate Crossman focussed 
on the 'fair-rent' provisions of the Bill and made extensive 
reference to Milner Holland and quoted at the outset what he 
perceived as the 'key sentence' in the concluding chapter of 
the Report. "Neither a policy of rigid rent restrictions, 
without any mitigation of its adverse effects on the provi­
sion and maintenance of rented housing, nor a policy of 
piecemeal and haphazard decontrol unaccompanied by any 
provision for security of tenure, have led to any real 
relief of the stresses of London housing".73
The provisions of the Bill he argued followed "as closely as 
possible the precepts of the Milner Holland Committee, - - 
- because the aim of the Bill [was] to end decontrol without 
reverting to pre-1957 rigidities and to provide to the good 
tenant real security in his home, while bringing him and the 
landlord together in a new climate of reconciliation".74
He dismissed the suggestion that rental values should be 
based on gross annual values determined for rating purposes 
[an approach favoured by some of the backbenchers on his own 
side], arguing that these were drawn with too broad a brush. 
"We would have mathematical rigidity without mathematical 
justice. [And this] was the conclusion of the Milner
Holland Committee - -”.75 To adopt capital values as a 
basis as favoured by some Conservative Members would be to 
reflect the impact of scarcity.76
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That the determination of 'fair-rent's, ignoring the impact of 
scarcity created by special conditions, was possible, was 
indicated by the "findings [which were] quite unambiguous - 
[that] not only [was] harassment and exploitation of 
scarcity - limited to a small minority of landlords - - 
[but] that a quite remarkable number of tenants [had] no 
grudge against their landlords, and would be quite prepared 
to make a further contribution towards the cost of repairs 
and improvements they desired, if they were sure they could 
get them - - a 'fair-rent' unaffected by local scarcity values 
[was] not an abstraction or a rarity, but something which a
considerable number of landlords and tenants [had] already
7 7 .agreed together". Further the Committee's findings
supported the view that a £400 rateable value was an ap­
propriate ceiling to which regulation should operate.78
As to doubts as to whether the rent regulations system was 
workable Crossman had taken "the trouble to consult experts, 
including members of the Milner Holland Committee, a number 
of whom [had] unusual knowledge of housing management and 
valuation".79 And, the advice supported his proposals. 
However, his advisers had also agreed that the system could 
only operate effectively if the right membership was recrui­
ted for the proposed assessment committees.80 As favoured 
by Milner Holland those selected would be laymen rather than
p  -Ilawyers. A
John Boyd-Carpenter, replying for the Conservatives, argued
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that what Crossman was proposing did not offer any solution 
to the real problem - the shortage of accommodation to rent. 
While Crossman claimed that he was following as closely as 
possible the recommendations of the Milner Holland Committee 
he was in fact not doing so. The recommendations, which 
were specifically and explicitly confined to London, were 
for "an extension of control balanced by the alleviation of 
the financial consequences to landlords of that control - 
intended as spelt out in that Report time and again, to 
prevent the drying up of the supply of rented accommodation 
which [would] follow from [an] extension of control not
, p o ,
balanced by compensating measures". * While control had 
been applied to the privately rented sector in Continental 
countries where the Committee had carried out research, it 
had been balanced as the Report spelt out, "by way of fiscal 
and other methods by which the drying up effect of control 
[could] be mitigated".83 By his opposition to subsidies 
for the private rented sector: which he had indicated in
the earlier debate on the Report, and as was now confirmed 
by the provisions of the Bill; Crossman was effectively 
rejecting "essential parts of the Committee's Report".84
Crossman intervened to point out that he had not indicated 
an attitude to the fiscal problem - that was a matter for
p c
the Chancellor. He acknowledged, however, that contrary
to the Committee's recommendation, he did not intend to 
place any reliance on the private sector for the provision
• ft £of new accommodation to rent.
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Frank Allaum, a Labour backbencher, [Salford, East] made a 
"plea to the Minister not [to] be too tender to the owners - 
- . Whichever method or formula [reached] the aim must be
07 , ,absolutely clear - - to keep rents down".0 The criteria 
for determining a 'fair-rent' were in his view too vague. A 
skillful lawyer could 'drive a coach' through the clause and 
if landlords could obtain a few favourable decisions from
. Q Qtribunals then these could create a precedent. He hoped
that Labour Members would support the Bill in principle and 
do everything possible to tighten the 'fair-rent' clause.89
The Conservatives did not oppose the Second Reading motion 
although they did move an unsuccessful motion to have the 
Bill committed to a committee of the whole House.
As anticipated, Crossman did meet opposition from Labour 
backbenchers during the Committee stage; and not only on 
the 'fair-rent' clause but also on Clause 15, which provided 
for decontrolling houses in the lower range of rateable 
values; although none of them voted against the
q n
proposals. w Before the Bill had reached the Report Stage, 
however, Crossman had made concessions on the phasing of
q 1rent increases.*A
The provisions of the Bill did not extend to furnished 
accommodation in the private rented sector. Crossman
recorded the following explanation for this and comment on 
the outcome.
"The exclusion of furnished dwellings from the Bill proved
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to be the fatal flaw and did untold damage. It was urged 
on me by the officials for purely administrative reasons. 
They said they couldn't get the Bill done in time. I 
should have been tough and insisted on including them on 
Milner Holland's perfectly correct advice".92
Other Issues, and Discussion
There were in addition of course, a number of other recom­
mendations of the Report which the Government did not fol­
low. In some cases this was made explicit by Crossman in 
his speeches during the debates on the Milner Holland 
Report, and on the Second Reading of the Rent Bill: no
reliance would be placed on the private rented sector to 
provide new dwellings; no subsidy would be made available 
to landlords; and there would be no 'areas of special 
control'. Although Crossman did not dismiss the possibil­
ity of fiscal changes relating to the sector, saying that 
this was a matter for the Chancellor, no such changes in the 
event were made.
The recommendations regarding a review of the subsidy arran­
gements for local authority housing were not pursued either. 
A White Paper published in November 1965 gave details of the 
Government's proposed housing programme93 and outlined 
proposals for a new subsidy arrangement intended to stimu­
late an expansion in public sector output to 250,000 houses 
per annum - 50% of the planned total of 500,000 from both
* . Q Apublic and private sectors. H [These figures excluded
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Scottish output]. As with all subsidies for public sector 
housing since the first were introduced in 1919, they were 
to be related to specific capital projects, and were de­
signed in particular to overcome the inhibiting effect of 
high interest rates. The Exchequer would meet excess costs 
arising from interest rates above a ceiling of 4%; and high 
costs arising from expensive sites, multi-storey building, 
and technical and architectural factors would qualify for 
additional subsidy. The associated bill was lost when the 
general election was called in February 1966, but legisla­
tion was passed by the new parliament.
Crossman's Department had, prior to his arrival at the 
Ministry, drawn up proposals which would have brought more 
equity to the distribution of subsidies between local au­
thorities [and also involved increasing rents to nearer an 
economic level] . Crossman records - "I had to tell the 
Secretary quite early on that this was not our Labour Party 
policy; we were firmly committed to a new subsidy which 
brought the burden of interest paid by local authorities on 
new houses down to 4%.95
As to the recommendation for a Londonwide approach, while 
Crossman hoped that the creation of the Greater London 
Council would provide more effective arrangements for tack­
ling the housing problem on such a basis, in fact, the 
middle class suburban boroughs effectively employed tactics 
designed to exclude public sector housing for residents from 
inner-core authorities from their areas.96
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The Committee had also of course recommended that the tax 
position of housing associations should be reviewed and, in 
June 1965, a clause was introduced to the Finance [No.2] 
Bill as a result of that recommendation. Although intended 
to bring financial benefit to such organisations these were 
not however, to come in the form of exemption from tax but 
by way of discretionary powers given to housing ministers 
[in England the Minister of Housing and Local Government, 
and in Scotland and in Wales the respective Secretaries of 
State] to repay tax by way of grant. The following extract 
from the speech made by Robert Mellish [Joint Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government] when the clause was under consideration in the 
Commons explains the reason for the arrangement, but is also 
illuminating in that it demonstrates the cautious approach 
[extending in this case to a policy of disassociation], and 
the power of the Treasury in connection with tax conces­
sions .
"the main point is that, on taxation principles, there is no 
case for exempting housing associations. Although they are 
referred to as non-profit making, they do in fact make a 
profit in the tax sense. In our view, there is a special 
case here on social grounds for assisting the non-profit 
making housing associations to play a proper part in the 
provision of houses to let, and the Chancellor has taken the 
view that the right way to do it is by way of grant. It 
falls to the Housing Ministries to make this grant".97
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Looking beyond the policy and legislative response of the 
Labour Government to the Report - what wider impact did it 
have? What influence in particular did it have on the 
traditional attitudes of the two principal Parties. At
• • Q O  ,least one commentator, Duclaud - Williams ° has pointed to 
the influence on Conservative perceptions demonstrated by 
the fact that they did not oppose the Bill at its Second 
Reading, although he suggests such influence would have been 
of even more significance had a Conservative, rather than a 
Labour government, been elected in 1964 because such a 
government would in all probability have been persuaded as a 
result to introduce amendments to the 1957 Act. Longer 
term influence on Conservative attitudes is, he argues, 
evident in the lack of inclination of Conservative govern­
ments in the 1970s to dilute the provisions of the 1965 Act 
and, in a more positive way, in the Conservatives extension 
of the 'fair-rent' concept to the public sector in 1972.
The influence on Labour in Duclaud - William's opinion was 
less important because Labour was already committed to the 
repeal of the 1957 Act. He also suggests that Labour's 
continuing 'hostility' to the private rented sector was 
reflected in its failure to introduce tax allowances against 
property depreciation, as advocated by Milner Holland, and 
supported by the Conservatives; and in its subsequent 
failure to introduce income assistance for low income house­
holds paying high rents in private property.
Duclaud - Williams' assessment of the influence of the
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Report on the attitude of the Conservatives both in opposi­
tion and subsequently in government can be accepted. 
[Although he does overlook the influence of prevailing 
political considerations on voting behaviour. The Conser­
vative leadership must have been aware of the possibility of 
a general election in the near future.] But there are 
several points with which one can take issue.
First - Duclaud - Williams underestimates the significance 
of the Report with regard to Labour attitudes. It is clear 
in the references which Crossman made to certain aspects of 
the Report during the Commons' debates, as quoted earlier in 
this chapter," that he depended on it to dampen down pos­
sible opposition from his own left wing. [Such a threat was 
particularly evident in the speech of Labour backbencher 
Frank Allaun during the Second Reading debate].100 And of 
course given Labour's small Commons majority such opposition 
could be very significant.
Second - It is unlikely that Labour's failure to introduce 
depreciation allowances should be attributed to opposition 
on either political or ideological grounds from the Labour 
Party. And is more likely to have been because of opposi­
tion from the Treasury - the evidence of which has just been 
referred to. It is significant, a fact which Duclaud - 
Williams ignores, that the Conservatives did not introduce 
such allowances when they subsequently came back into gov­
ernment .
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Finally - to argue that Labour's lack of enthusiasm for the 
introduction of rent allowances for low income households 
was also related to its 'hostility' to the private rented 
sector is clearly wrong. The political difficulty for
Labour lay in the fact that eligibility for the allowances 
depended on means testing. But as mentioned in the pre­
vious chapter, provision for such allowances having been 
introduced by the Conservatives in 1972 succeeding Labour 
governments did not reject the arrangement.
An element of the Report of course which was of particular 
interest, and which has been referred to earlier, was its 
examination of housing economics; in particular of the 
various 'subsidies' which were available, and of the inter­
action between the various sectors of the housing market. 
Again, as mentioned earlier, one of the principal contribu­
tors to this analysis was Adela Nevitt101 and she was to 
publish her own book on the subject shortly afterwards. 
Together these two works constituted a major contribution to 
the literature in this field [being the first since Marion 
Bowley's seminal work was published m  1945], and they 
provided significant vehicles for the dissemination of 
information on the topic albeit to a limited audience.
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CHAPTER V - THE FRANCIS REPORT AND THE 1974 RENT ACT
(
The Establishment of the Inquiry
As explained in the previous chapter the 1965 Rent Act did 
not extend security of tenure to furnished tenancies. As a 
consequence, while in the period from 1966 to 1971 the 
number of private unfurnished tenancies fell on average by 
122,000 per annum, the number of furnished tenancies in­
creased on average by 54,000 per annum.1 By the late 1960s 
concern about the vulnerable position of tenants of 
furnished premises had led to widespread demands for them to 
be given full security.2 However when, in December 1968, 
such a possibility was raised by the Labour Member for 
Croydon, David Winnick, with the then Labour Government, he 
was told that while 'closer integration1 [with the provi­
sions applying to the unfurnished sector] was hoped for in
-3
the future it was not possible at that stage. And when
the same issue was raised by the Liberal Member for Orping­
ton, Erick Lubbock, in the summer of 1969, the answer was in 
a similar vein, albeit on this occasion accompanied by a 
hint at the reason for the Government's reluctance to act. - 
"A further extension of the law on the lines suggested would 
have far reaching consequences not all of them necessarily 
favourable to tenants generally” - But, he was told "the 
possibility [was] being kept in mind”.4
Some three months later, at the end of September, and at the 
time of the Labour Party annual conference where security of
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tenure for furnished tenancies was about to be adopted as 
Party policy, the intention to appoint a committee of in­
quiry was announced. The Committee's terms of reference 
were: to review and report on -
a. the operation of rent regulation under the Rent Act, 
especially in large centres of population where accommoda­
tion [was] scarce; and
b. the relationship between the codes governing furnished 
and unfurnished lettings.5
Earlier in the same month there had been vociferous public 
criticism of ministers responsible for the housing programme 
by the director of Shelter [Des Wilson]. He had accused 
them of exaggerating Labour's housing achievements and 
called for resignations. This prompted responses from
ministers and there was to be an oblique reference to the 
criticism by Harold Wilson during his speech at the confer­
ence.6 Clearly the criticism from Shelter in the run up to 
the conference was timed to cause the maximum embarrassment, 
but any link between this development and the timing of the 
announcement of the inquiry seems unlikely, particularly as 
the Chairman was named the same week as the announcement was 
made. It is more likely that the criticism should be seen 
as the culmination of a longer term campaign on a broader 
front by Shelter which may have influenced the decision; 
in addition, of course, to the clear pressure from the Party 
membership.
Given the concern which Labour ministers clearly had, and
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doubtless officials as well, as to the likely consequences 
of extending security of tenure to the furnished rented 
sector, it is not surprising that they sought independent 
advice on the issue, but it is also possible, and indeed 
likely that the appointment of a committee of inquiry was 
perceived as a way of postponing a decision until after the 
next general election. This was due at the latest within 
18 months and, more likely, not more than 12 months. 
Certainly, the Committee having been appointed, ministers 
made it clear that it would not be under pressure to produce 
a report within 'a hard and fast deadline'.7
The Committee was appointed jointly by the Minister of 
Housing and Local Government and the Secretaries of State 
for Scotland and Wales, and had a membership of five. 
[Less than half the size of the Milner Holland Committee] . 
Chaired by Hugh E Francis, QC its other members included two 
aldermen, a chartered surveyor, and a Scottish solicitor.
The Committee received written evidence from over 260 bodies 
and individuals; and heard oral evidence at 18 of its 41 
meetings [some of which, including those where evidence was 
heard, being held in Glasgow and Cardiff] from 93 individ­
uals representing tenant groups, landlord groups, government 
departments, local authority organisations, professional 
bodies, pressure groups, and those involved in operating the 
rent assessment machinery. It inspected dwellings both 
furnished and unfurnished and attended rent assessment 
hearings. In addition, research was commissioned involving
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a tenant survey and a landlord survey, and a study of rent
Q
tribunal cases in Greater London.
The Report
The Committee’s Report, published on 2 March 1971, extends 
to 2 37 pages plus appendices. Four of the five members 
signed a majority report; Miss Lyndal Evans, one of the two 
aldermen on the Committee, and who served on Camden borough 
council, added a minority report.
The Committee concluded that the system of rent regulation 
introduced in 1965 for unfurnished dwellings was, in gen­
eral, working effectively although it recommended a number 
of changes including the following.
1. Local authorities in stress areas should be required to 
publicise the rent service.
2. The penalties for harassment and unlawful eviction
should be increased.
3. Controlled tenancies should become regulated as soon as 
possible on a phased basis. This was required on grounds 
of equity, and because the evident disparities between
regulated rents and controlled rents for similar properties 
in the same area tended to undermine public confidence in 
the rent assessment system.
4. The rateable value ceiling, under which rent regula­
tions applied, should be reduced from £400 to £300 in Great­
er London and from £2 00 to £150 elsewhere. Properties
above the proposed levels did not appear to be in short 
supply and were clearly occupied by 'well-to-do' tenants
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resort to the rent officer.
5. Newly erected dwellings should be removed from rent 
regulation altogether on the grounds that virtually no 
private dwellings were being built for letting and the 
removal of restrictions might induce some investors to 
increase the supply.
[The last two recommendations were opposed in the minority 
report].
Those signing the majority report were unable to recommend
that full security of tenure should be extended to furnished
tenants principally because they considered that this was
likely to lead to a serious reduction in the supply of
furnished property and make it more difficult for low income
families, unmarried mothers, unemployed immigrants, and
young married couples to find accommodation. "we do not
believe that this is an acceptable risk in the conditions
which now prevail in stress areas, especially in the stress
areas of London. The consequences, both in social terms
and more specifically in relation to the management of the
public sector housing would be great. It does not require
much imagination to see that it would have, in the words of
the Association of Municipal Corporations, serious implica­
te .tions for public sector housing". And there were, it was 
considered, additional dangers in such a change. In par­
ticular, if the prospect of such a legislative change became 
known, it might lead to the widespread termination of fur­
nished tenancies.
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As an alternative, the majority report recommended a partial 
assimilation of the codes governing the two types of tenancy 
by extending the 'fair rent' formula to the furnished te­
nancy and merging the rent assessment machinery. [Under 
existing arrangements the fixing of a 'fair rent' for unfur­
nished accommodation involved the assumption of an essenti­
ally balanced market whereas, furnished tenancies only 
required the assessment of a 'reasonable rent'.]
In stress areas local authorities should be required to 
undertake a more active role. In areas designated as such, 
by the Secretary of State, they should be under a statutory 
duty to provide advice, monitor rent levels, and enforce 
legislation with respect to harassment; and priority should 
be given to the establishment of housing aid and advice 
centres.
As indicated earlier, Miss Evans in her minority report 
opposed the recommendations that the rateable value ceiling, 
determining the cut off point for rent regulation, should be 
lowered; and that newly built dwellings should be excluded 
from regulation.
On the first issue she argued that:-
1. evidence from the Institute of Rent Officers suggested 
that the apparent adequate supply of better quality property 
merely reflected the depressing effect on demand of high 
rents, and that high rental levels further up the market 
tended to influence rental levels in the lower bands;
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2. tenants in the higher value properties would not only 
lose the benefit of rent regulation but also lose security 
of tenure.
On the second issue she argued that:-
1. removing such properties from the provisions of the 
Rent Acts would not increase the supply of new rented prop­
erty to any significant extent in the absence of changes in 
other factors - the tax benefits and inflation benefits of 
owner occupation, the lack of political consensus on the 
private rented sector etc;
2. to the extent that new dwellings were provided for 
renting, and this was happening in some areas, a new cate­
gory of property outwith the regulation provisions would 
emerge and undermine the effectiveness of the Rent Acts by 
creating anomalies akin to those between regulated and 
controlled dwellings, and in addition, the tenants of such 
properties would be denied security of tenure.
However, it was on the question of the rejection of the 
extension of full security of tenure to furnished tenancies 
that Miss Evans was most at odds with her colleagues. She 
pointed out that the prevailing distinction with regard to 
security of tenure had brought about a marked transfer of 
stock in stress areas from the unfurnished to the furnished 
category, adversely affecting vulnerable groups. Between 
1964 and 1967 the furnished share of the private rented 
sector had increased by 25% in London and 50% elsewhere. 
Further, the tenant survey had demonstrated that rents of 
furnished accommodation were substantially higher than for
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comparable unfurnished property and conditions were poorer.
She advocated abandoning the distinction between furnished 
and unfurnished tenancies. All tenants should have secur­
ity of tenure unless residing in 'small premises'10 where 
the landlord lived in the building and let not more than two 
dwellings to persons with whom he shared some accommodation 
eg. bathroom or w.c.
[This suggested change in approach to determining dwellings 
qualifying for full security of tenure was on the lines 
advocated by Shelter and had been put forward by way of a 
Commons question in November 1989].11
Miss Evans did not consider that adopting this proposal 
would reduce the supply of rented accommodation to any 
significant extent because the only part of the furnished 
section of the sector where the stock would be readily 
saleable for owner occupation was comprised of purpose built 
flats and whole houses let furnished. The tenant survey 
had shown that only 11% of furnished accommodation in 
Greater London fell into one or other of these categories. 
Much of it was furnished to a high standard and let to 
higher income tenants, and rental levels were likely to be 
such that it would remain in the rented market. Lack of 
facilities and difficulty in qualifying for mortgages would 
exclude much of the other property from sale. [The major­
ity report considered that "unconverted multi occupied 
houses might well be converted into boarding houses or bed 
and breakfast hotels, or converted into self-contained flats
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1 7and sold on long leases".]
The Response by the Conservative Government
Labour having lost the general election in June 1970, the 
Report was received by a Conservative administration and, on 
10 March 1971, Julian Amery, Minister for Housing and Con­
struction, made a statement on the Report to the House of
i ^Commons.
On the question of full security of tenure for the furnished 
rented sector he announced that the Government, having been 
'impressed by the solemn warnings' contained in the majority 
report, 'that to extend full security could well cause the 
supply of furnished accommodation to dry up', had according­
ly decided not to extend unfurnished security to furnished 
tenants. He had considered it necessary to make an early 
statement on this issue in case uncertainty had an unset­
tling effect on this sector of the housing market.
The Government had not found that the balance of argument 
supported reducing the rateable value ceiling and was thus 
following the minority report recommendation in this regard.
It was accepted that there was evidence of continuing har­
assment and illegal evictions in stress areas and the Gov­
ernment agreed with the Committee's view that penalties for 
such offences required strengthening.
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With regard to the recommendation for greater local govern­
ment intervention, there was much that could be done utilis­
ing existing powers and he intended holding discussions with 
Inner London borough councils.
By and large, the system of rent regulation introduced by 
the previous [Labour] government was working well and he 
•paid tribute' to them for it. [This could be seen as 
evidence of consensus but the attitude may well have been 
conditioned by the fact that the Government was about to 
extend the 'fair rent' system to public sector housing as a 
way of intervening on the level of local authority rents.]
There were other recommendations which the Committee had 
made for improving the system, some which would require 
legislation and the Government had them under consideration.
The Minister parried a suggestion made by a Conservative 
backbencher - David Waddington - Nelson & Colne, that the 
Government should adopt the majority recommendation to 
exclude new dwellings from regulations. He would consider 
the suggestion but it was likely to be 'administratively 
difficult'. [It would of course have been awkward to
justify such a change while at the same time accepting the 
effectiveness of the rent regulation mechanism and would 
have opened up the issue of the other factors inhibiting 
investment in the private rented sector].
Another Conservative backbencher - Geoffrey Finsberg
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Hampstead & Highgate, welcomed the decision not to lower the 
rateable value ceiling. [Subsequent pressure two years
later from Conservative backbenchers representing such high 
rent areas, was to lead to the rateable value ceiling being 
raised.]14
Richard Marsh, responding for the Opposition, said that for 
many people both inside and outside the House the Report was 
a grave disappointment. He complained that while the
minority report had dealt with the contentious issue of 
security of tenure for furnished tenants, the Minister had 
made up his mind without giving the House the opportunity to 
discuss the matter.
Several Labour backbenchers, most representing London con­
stituencies, expressed their disappointment and voiced 
criticism of the majority report. Bruce Douglas-Mann - 
Kensington North, claimed that the majority report view on 
security of tenure was based solely on assertions made by 
landlords and agents. [Clearly the majority were
influenced by this evidence but the opinions expressed by 
the Association of Municipal Corporations also appeared to 
have weighed heavily].
The following year the Conservative Government made 
provision in its Housing Finance Act, and in the parallel 
Housing [Financial Provisions][Scotland] Act for the phased 
transition to regulation of the remaining controlled tenan­
cies along the lines recommended by Francis, [at the same
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time introducing rent allowances - means tested subsidies - 
for private sector tenants]. But, beyond announcing at the 
end of March 1972 the intention to increase the penalties 
for harassment and illegal eviction under its Criminal 
Justice Bill, it took no further legislative action on the 
recommendations of the Report.
The 1974 Rent Act
At the February 1974 general election the Labour Party 
manifesto contained a commitment to introduce full security 
of tenure for furnished tenants and when a [minority] Labour 
government was returned it introduced a Bill to that effect 
[it was to become the Rent Act 1974] early in its legisla­
tive programme. Clearly the Conservatives had no plans to 
oppose the Bill as it started its parliamentary course in 
the Lords. The Bill amended the existing Rent Acts by 
removing the provision which had previously excluded fur­
nished tenancies from full protection thus extending to 
furnished tenants indefinite security of tenure and the 
right to have a 'fair rent' registered. Exempted from the 
entitlement were lettings by resident landlords [as proposed 
by the Francis minority report and by Shelter], holiday 
lettings, and lettings to students.
The Bill received its Second Reading in the House of Commons 
on 8 July 1974.15 Reginald Freeson - Minister for Housing 
& Construction, made it clear, that while the provisions 
fulfilled the manifesto commitment - furnished tenants 
required protection - the Government shared a widely held
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view that it would not be long before private lettings 
ceased to represent a significant feature of the housing 
market and that the future lay with social landlords [local 
authorities and housing associations].
Referring to Francis he suggested that the majority report's 
concern that the extension of security of tenure to 
furnished tenancies would reduce supply was the most weakly 
argued part of the Report and the evidence on which it was 
based insubstantial. He had not been convinced that intro­
ducing such a change would lead to the private rented sector 
shrinking any faster than it was anyway.
Margaret Thatcher, replying for the Opposition, took issue 
with Freeson on a suggestion he had made during his speech, 
that rent control and security of tenure were irrelevant to 
explaining the decline of the private rented sector. What, 
she argues, had caused continuing decline despite the intro­
duction of decontrol in 1957, and had frustrated Conserva­
tive attempts to regenerate the sector, had been Labour's 
threat to reverse decontrol legislation and reintroduce 
security of tenure.
Specific to the Bill, however, the Opposition offered little 
criticism beyond warning of the likely drying up of supply 
and the need to provide a fairer deal for landlords, and at 
the division only six Conservatives voted against the mo­
tion.
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Notes and References - Chapter V
1. 876 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col. 1032
2. 'Times' 3.3.71
3. 774 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col. 372
4. 785 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col. 237
5. The Department of the Environment; Report of the Com­
mittee on the Rent Acts. Cmnd. 4609, H.M.S.O., 1971
p.l
6. 'Times' Sept. 12, 17, 20, 22 and Oct.l, 1969
7. 791 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col. 1123
8. The tenant survey involved - [i] a random sampling of 
tenant housing conditions and attitudes [towards land­
lords, levels of rent, and procedures available for 
rent assessment and prevention of harassment] in the 
Greater London, West Midlands and Central Clydeside 
conurbations, and in part of South Wales; and [ii] a 
more intensive investigation of conditions and atti­
tudes in some selected stress areas within the 3 conur­
bations. The landlord survey involved a parallel
investigation of landlords relevant in the tenant 
survey but restricted to the Greater London and West 
Midlands conurbations. It sought information on
attitudes to rent levels, the operation of the Rent 
Act, and relations with tenants.
The objectives of the study on rent tribunal cases were 
to ascertain how long tenants had retained tenancies 
after the tribunal's decisions had been given, whether 
there had been any change in tenure of the property, 
whether the rent remained at the level fixed by the 
tribunal, and the attitudes of landlords and tenants to 
the decisions. And, why applicants had withdrawn
cases which they had submitted to the tribunal or 
allowed them to lapse.
9. Cmnd. 4609 pp. cit. p.205
10. 'Small premises' being defined as premises let under a 
separate letting or similar agreement in which there 
was not normally residential accommodation for more 
than two households in addition to the landlord's 
household.
11. 791 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Col. 1087
12. Cmnd. 4609 op. cit. p.203
13. 813 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Cols. 422 - 432
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14. Duclaud-Williams R.H., pp. cit. p.84
15. 876 H.C. Deb. 5 S. Cols. 1025 - 1088
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CHAPTER VI - INQUIRY BY THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE INTO THE 
PRIVATE RENTED HOUSING SECTOR 1981/82 AND SUBSEQUENT DEVE­
LOPMENTS
Background
In 1977 the Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, 
and the Scottish Development Department launched reviews of 
the Rent Acts and issued consultative papers inviting evi­
dence from interested parties, but no conclusions had been 
published before Labour lost the general election in 1979.
In 1980 the succeeding Conservative Government introduced 2 
new types of tenancy applicable to the private rented sector 
one of which the Labour Opposition threatened to repeal. 
The innovation in contention was what was termed in the 
English/Welsh Act1 a 'shorthold tenancy', and in the Scot­
tish Act2 a 'short tenancy' which provided for a house being 
let for a period of one to five years. Although such a 
tenancy had to be registered at a 'fair rent' - "a conces­
sion designed, unsuccessfully, to get all-party support for
 ^ . . .  the scheme" - there was also provision enabling the Secre­
tary of State to dispense with this requirement by way of a 
parliamentary order. At the Conservative Party conference 
in October 1981, John Stanley - Minister for Housing and 
Construction, announced the Government's intention, presum­
ably because of the evident lack of enthusiasm for the new 
arrangement among landlords, to exercise this power with 
respect to all future shorthold tenancies in England and 
Wales outside London. While there was nothing to prevent a 
tenant applying for a rent to be registered after a tenancy 
had commenced, the obvious criticism which could be made of
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the arrangement was that if the tenancy was only for say, 
one year, the landlord could, as a deterrent, indicate his 
intention to refuse to renew the tenancy.
The second type of tenancy introduced in 1980 [but not 
extending to Scotland] was the 'assured tenancy' - a 
provision intended to attract institutional investors who, 
as landlords approved by the Secretary of State, would 
operate outwith the constraints of rent regulation, catering 
primarily for relatively affluent mobile households. A 
similar arrangement had been sketched out in the consulta­
tive documents published by the preceding Labour Government 
in 19774 as part of its housing policy reviews initiated two 
years earlier, and the assured tenancy did not excite the 
controversy attaching to the shorthold tenancy. Subsequ­
ently it was announced as part of the 1982 Budget statement 
that building costs relating to the provision of dwellings 
to be let on assured tenancies would qualify for a 75% first 
year depreciation allowance followed by a 4% annual writing 
down allowance on the balance. Initially assured tenancies 
could only be adopted in the case of new property but in 
1986 further legislation extended their application to 
'substantially improved or repaired, or converted 
property'5.
The inquiry by the Environment Committee into the private 
rented sector [it constituted the second stage of a 2 part 
inquiry into rented housing which the Committee had decided 
to conduct when initially established in 1979, the first
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stage involving an inquiry into the financial and social 
implications of council house sales which is discussed in 
Chapter 10] appears to have been advocated by the leading 
Conservative member, Nicholas Scott.6 As the Committee was 
subsequently to observe in its report, there had been "no 
authoritative study of the private rented sector since the 
report of the Francis Committee in 1971. [And this was] 
particularly important as legislation affecting the private 
rented sector often [appeared] to have been enacted with 
little attempt either before or after legislation to assess
7
its impact on the sector".
The decision to conduct the inquiry having been made, writ­
ten evidence was sought during 1980 from some 200 witnesses 
relative to - 'the effects upon provision and demand for 
private rented accommodation of housing taxation and subsi­
dies, rent regulation, and security of tenure legislation'.
The commencement of the inquiry was delayed from April 1981
ft .to the following November [due to the chairman being ill] 
and when it was resumed it was decided, in view of the 
analysis of the written evidence by the Committee's three 
part-time specialist advisers, to take oral evidence 'to 
clarify further the current position of and trends in the 
private rented sector as well as the effectiveness of cur­
rent policies'. The oral evidence was taken over six ses­
sions from representatives of local authorities, landlord 
and tenant organisations, estate agents, a housing pressure 
group, and from the Minister for Housing and Construction, 
John Stanley.
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The Report
The report of the inquiry was published in July 1982. The 
Committee had noted at the outset that private renting of 
houses in England had fallen from 6.2 million dwellings in 
1938 to 2.2 million in 1977 [the last year for which figures 
were available] and had considered the reasons for the 
decline. Some witnesses had stressed the risk of not
obtaining repossession when required as a significant fac­
tor, especially in the case of small landlords, but beyond 
that the analysis added nothing to the reasons identified in 
the Milner Holland Report.
An examination of the current circumstances in the sector 
showed that they were in many regards similar to those 
prevailing in the 1960s and early 1970s. Housing stress 
was strongly associated with concentrations of privately 
rented housing, particularly in London; the physical char­
acteristics of the stock varied widely, some of it, terraces 
and purpose built flats, being more readily saleable for 
owner occupation; much of the stock was lacking in ameni­
ties, and the sector contained a disproportionate number of 
unfit dwellings. Tenants tended to be elderly and concen­
trated in unfurnished accommodation [although the elderly 
were a declining proportion of the total], or among those 
seeking easy access - the young, the highly mobile, and 
those who had recently experienced a change in personal 
circumstances such as separation or divorce. Most tenants 
had low incomes.
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The evidence on rent levels indicated that these varied 
widely depending on whether a tenant had an existing secure 
tenancy, and was thus able to obtain a low registered rent, 
or was seeking accommodation in a stress area where, if the 
letting was outwith the Rent Act, the rent could vary from 2 
to 4 times the registered rent. And avoidance of the Rent 
Act was clearly occurring on a very substantial scale; the 
most used devices for achieving it being licenses for non 
exclusive lettings, and holiday lets. "The Small Land­
lords' Association in their evidence said that their advice 
to any landlord contemplating a new let would be 'Avoid at 
all costs creating a full protected tenancy', while the 
British Property Federation argued that 'there is no reason 
at all why anyone should structure his affairs in such a way 
that he gives more security of tenure - - or anything else 
than he has to' . Some witnesses indeed argued that in 
parts of the country, particularly Central London, virtually 
all new lettings were outside the Rent Act.''9
The Committee was strongly critical of the quality of the 
information supplied by the DoE in the above connection 
observing that - "the evidence provided by the Department 
[could] not be used to substantiate the Minister of Hou­
sing's estimate that about 400,000 of the 500,000 lettings 
made in 1977 were regulated tenancies. Moreover, all the 
other evidence presented on this subject suggested that a 
substantial proportion of those tenancies [was] not seen by 
landlords or tenants as coming under the regulation of the
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Rent Act".10
The prevailing level of yields from rented housing invest­
ment and the levels which landlords considered might be 
reasonable had been explored. Evidence received from
professional valuers and from the DoE suggested that gross 
yields from regulated registered rents averaged around 3.5% 
although these averages masked significant differences 
between areas and dwelling types. Evidence on the level of 
unregistered rents and regulated premises was much more 
limited, however, such rents might increase the gross rate 
of return on this type of property to between 3% and 6%. 
"The evidence suggested that, on overage, net returns on 
registered rents were of the order of 1% to 2%. A number of 
respondents agreed with the view put forward by the British 
Property Federation that a rental return on vacant posses­
sion value of 6% net [about 9% gross] would be necessary to 
maintain the supply of privately rented accommodation at its 
current level. Few witnesses suggested a lesser return and 
many felt higher returns ranging from 10% to as much as 20% 
would be necessary to maintain the supply".11
A number of witnesses had suggested that tenants should be 
expected to pay 25% - 3 0% of their incomes on housing costs. 
Assuming a 9% gross yield and a 30% rent/income ratio "it 
[appeared] that perhaps 50% of unfurnished tenants and 40% 
of furnished tenants could not afford rent on even an unim­
proved 2 bedroomed terraced house in London. On this 
basis, even if the proportion that tenants were expected to
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pay was increased considerably - rents giving a 9% return
would require a very large increase in public expenditure on
12rent allowances and supplementary benefits". *
In its reply to the Committee's report on another topic - 
the implications for housing policies of the Government's 
expenditure plans,13 the DoE "had invited the Committee to 
consider why every other EEC country except the Republic of 
Ireland met a higher proportion of demand for rented accom­
modation from the private rented sector".14 This the
Committee had proceeded to do. It had obtained details of 
an earlier report on the subject produced by the Centre for 
Environmental Studies, information from the DoE itself, and 
evidence from academic witnesses. In the light of the 
information the Committee had concluded that, while several 
European countries and the USA had a higher proportion of 
housing stock in the private rented sector, they had, his­
torically, provided significant subsidies to landlords and 
controls had usually been less severe than in this country; 
and they had also in many cases developed the other sectors 
more slowly. If Britain had supported the private rented 
sector more heavily and developed the public sector and 
owner occupied sector more slowly, then things might have 
been different. However, "this [was] a largely historical 
and academic point - - existing policies towards the tenures 
[were] well established and unlikely to be reversed".15 What 
was of more significance was that the private rented sectors 
were now in decline in all of the comparison countries, at 
least in proportionate terms, and possibly in the majority
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in absolute terms. Inflation, stagnating incomes, and
support for other sectors were all playing a part in bring­
ing about decline.
The Committee had found little evidence to suggest that 
shorthold tenancies were being established on any signif­
icant scale and was disturbed to note that since the removal 
of the requirement to register a regulated rent in such 
cases outside London, "it would no longer be possible [for 
the DoE] to monitor the number of such tenancies [except in 
greater London]".16 It also doubted whether assured tenan­
cies would "make more than a minor, if useful, contribution
• , i 7to providing some good quality rented accommodation for 
those prepared to pay fairly substantial rents, unless 
radical change, for instance, removing the upper limit for
rent allowance and the extension of capital allowances to
• • 18 assured tenancies [was] introduced".
In the final chapter of the report the Committee identified 
'areas of concern' which led to the making of recommenda­
tions. One related to the lack of reliable information 
available, particularly on the incidence of lettings outwith 
the Rent Act and the levels of rent for such lettings, and 
the relationship between incomes, rents and other outgoings. 
It recommended that the Government undertake appropriate 
surveys, and also monitor the growth of shorthold and as­
sured tenancies.
Another area of concern was the incidence of harassment of
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tenants. Additional measures were required to reduce this 
and the Government should also consider the establishment of 
'some form of Housing Court' to aid the speedy resolution of 
disputes.
On a more general note, the Committee was of the view that 
the social and economic consequences of allowing the sector 
to decline would be very considerable. Even if public 
sector output was 'increased above the low level now fore­
cast' a further decline in the quantity and quality of 
houses in the sector was likely to cause stress and it would 
be unable to perform its traditional role of providing for 
the young, the transient, and many of the non-family house­
holds. "The only way in which a substantial improvement 
[could] be effected without placing unjustifiably heavy 
burdens on landlords or tenants [was] by significant changes
. . . .  , , 1 Qm  the distribution or total of subsidies". If this was
accepted, one possibility was to develop the assured tenancy 
concept but with security of tenure. "Other possible
mechanisms by which assistance could be provided [included] 
changes in the treatment of rental income and depreciation 
to assist landlords, rental tax relief for tenants, and some 
wider ranging American or European subsidy system aimed at 
both landlords and tenants. - - The Government should 
carry out an assessment of the feasibility and Exchequer 
cost of a system of assistance which would achieve compar­
able rent burdens for tenants across the whole rented 
stock".20
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During the Committee's discussion of the draft report there 
had been thirteen divisions but only one had resulted in a 
significant change to the text - the omission of a paragraph 
which referred to the importance which many witnesses had 
attached to the need for political consensus towards the 
sector in order to create confidence among investors, and 
the Committee's conclusion on the basis of this evidence, 
that "without some well defined, agreed long term policy to 
increase confidence the relative importance of the sector
p i ,
[would] continue to decline". x Nine of the thirteen
divisions had been on amendments proposed by one of the 
Labour members, David Winnick22, and were defeated by 
voting on party lines.
The Response & Subsequent Developments
As has been seen the Government's intention to extend capi­
tal allowances to investment in new building for assured 
tenancies had already been announced by the time the Commit­
tee's report was published but it does seem likely that its 
deliberations influenced the decision23 however, in its 
response to the report24, although the Department intimated 
an intention to pursue the recommendations on harassment and 
to consider the possibility of establishing a Housing Court, 
[and although there was to be subsequent evidence of in­
creased monitoring of developments in the private rented 
sector as had also been advocated], on the broader issues 
concerning the future of the sector it merely reiterated the 
Government's own measures.
148
In the event it was not until some 6 years later that im­
proved arrangements for dealing with harassment were intro­
duced under provisions of the Housing Act, and the Housing 
[Scotland] Act, of 1988. Previously, it had been an of­
fence for any person to harass a residential occupier with 
the intention of causing him to leave his home, and the test 
of intent had been difficult to prove. Henceforth it would 
be an offence to harass an occupier knowing that it was 
likely to drive him out - which could be expected to be 
easier to prove. These changes were accompanied by a new 
civil right to improved compensation for tenants driven out 
by harassment.
Through other provisions of the 1988 Housing Acts, and as 
the Committee had suggested [although doubtless not as all, 
if any, of the members had envisaged], the assured tenancy 
concept was developed [and extended to Scotland]. All
landlords would now be able to grant assured tenancies; 
landlords no longer had to be approved by the Secretary of 
State; and such tenancies would no longer be restricted to 
new or improved dwellings. As previously, assured tenants 
would have full security of tenure for the 5 year duration 
of their initial tenancy provided they complied with its 
terms. At the end of the tenancy the tenant would have the 
right to a new one on terms which might be agreed between 
the parties, or if they could not agree, at a market rent 
determined by a rent assessment committee.
The 1988 legislation also modified the provisions applying
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to shorthold and short tenancies, in future to be known as 
'assured' shorthold and short tenancies. Although a tenant 
renting on such a basis would continue to have the right to 
apply for registration of a rent, the rent would be a market 
rent instead of a 'fair rent' as previously. The rent 
determined would, however, reflect the limited security of 
tenure which was to be reduced to a new minimum of 6 months.
The provisions relating to existing tenancies under the Rent 
Acts remained generally intact [although modifications were 
made to rights of succession to such tenancies], and it was 
in order to deter any attempt by landlords to gain vacant 
possession of affected properties, repeating the events 
subsequent to the 1957 Act, that the new measures on harass­
ment had been framed.
During the Second Reading Debate on the English/Welsh Bill 
which was to become the 1988 Housing Act, Clive Soley, 
Labour's spokesman, criticised the proposed changes to 
assured tenancies. Assured tenancies were 'no longer
assured'. The requirement for approval of landlords by the 
Secretary of State had been abandoned and there was no 
provision for registration of responsible landlords as the 
previous Housing Minister [John Patten] had undertaken there 
would be. "An assured tenancy [was] in fact an insecure 
high rent tenancy and as a shorthold assured tenancy an 
insecure let. There could be no consensus between the 
parties on such a policy".25 Significantly, however, he 
did not commit a future Labour government to repeal of the
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provision.
Labour's policy document on housing published in 1991 did 
not contain comprehensive proposals for the private rented 
sector because, it was explained, "the upheavals that fol­
lowed the Conservatives' 1988 Housing Act, which undermined 
tenants' rights [had] yet to settle down", and consultation 
was continuing with landlords, investors in housing, te-
p c. ,
nants's groups, and pressure groups. ° It was recognised, 
however, that uncertainty could influence investors' deci­
sions and it was "guaranteed that there would be no retro­
spective legislation in the private sector".27
When - the document advises - Labour did introduce reforms 
they would be influenced by several considerations. There 
was a clear need for both a 'market' sector for more af­
fluent mobile households, and for a regulated sector for 
those in housing need 'where housing benefit was payable and 
rents were reasonable' . It might be better to look at 
grants to repair property as well as tax reliefs [echoes of 
the Environment Committee report?] rather than, as at pre­
sent, subsidising rents entirely through housing benefit. 
Short term lets were not ruled out but it would be expected 
that lower rents would be charged in such cases to reflect 
the limited security provided. Non residential landlords 
would be required to register with the local authority so 
that advice could be provided on availability of accommoda­
tion and the nature of tenancies offered, and so that the 
behaviour of landlords could be monitored. Finally, the
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arrangement whereby the Business Expansion Scheme was avail­
able to provide tax relief to investors in private rented 
housing [which had operated since the 1988 budget] would be 
discontinued. While some housing associations had benefi­
ted from the scheme other proposals which Labour had to 
increase production, particularly the establishment of a 
National Housing Bank to provide finance for both housing 
associations and the private sector, would render it redun­
dant .2 8
Reference to the private rented sector in Labour's manifesto 
for the general election in April 1992 was restricted to two 
sentences.
"In the private rented sector there is a need both for 
homes at market rents and those where rents are regul­
ated and housing benefit payable. We will consult 
fully before introducing reforms and will not legis-
2 Q
late retrospectively".
There was no mention of registration of landlords although 
there may well be subsequent pressure within the Party for 
this, at least for lower rented houses, and what constitutes 
'regulated rents' is not clarified. However, there seems 
to be a willingness in general to go along with current 
policies on higher rented property.
If sufficient of a consensus does exist, and if potential 
investors perceive this to be the case, then there may be 
some prospect for growth in the sector provided there is a 
reduction in the competitive advantage enjoyed by owner
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occupation through the impact of inflation, and mortgage 
interest tax relief. There is evidence of some success in 
tackling the former and, although both the principal Parties 
continue to commit themselves to the perpetuation of the 
latter, the indications are that there is tacit agreement to 
allow it to 'wither on the vine'. The mortgage ceiling of 
£30,000 up to which interest relief is allowable has not 
changed under a succession of Conservative Chancellors since 
1983. At the time of the 1992 budget it was announced that 
relief would henceforth be restricted to the standard rate 
of tax. At the subsequent general election Labour, for its 
part, promised that mortgage interest tax relief would 
continue as at present.30 There has been a suggestion 31 
that mortgage interest tax relief and housing benefit be 
replaced by a universal needs related housing allowance - 
phased in over a period of about ten years, but clearly this 
cannot enter the agenda as long as current postures go 
unmodified.
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SECTION III
SLUM CLEARANCE & IMPROVEMENT POLICY
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INTRODUCTION
Slum clearance to which emphasis had been given in the 1930s 
but which had come to a halt with the outbreak of war was 
recommenced in 1954, priority having been given in the 
earlier post war years, by both Labour and Conservative 
governments, to increasing the output of new houses.
As mentioned in Chapter III it had been announced in the 
White Papers produced by the Conservative Government in 
November 1953 that the recommencement of slum clearance was 
to be accompanied by increased attention to the improvement 
of those older houses considered to be worth retaining. 
Improvement grants had been available - at local authority 
discretion - since 1949 [the emphasis being on improvement, 
not on subsidising landlords to catch up with backlogs of 
repairs] but the conditions were restrictive and because of 
the priority being given to 'new build' there was little 
publicity.
In 1954 to encourage the utilisation of grants, the level of 
grant was raised, conditions eased, and publicity improved. 
Although there was a marked increase in the take up in the 
owner occupier sector, demand in the private rented sector 
remained sluggish.
Clearly the lack of demand on the part of landlords was to 
an extent related to restrictions on rental income - they 
were only allowed an increase equivalent to an 8% return on
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their share of the cost. There were also, however, other
impediments to a higher level of improvement activity. 
Some local authorities, particularly in Scotland, considered 
that it was wrong to give grant assistance to private owners 
whom they regarded as not requiring them, and refused to 
participate in the operation of the system. Other authori­
ties made payment of grant conditional on the carrying out 
of extensive repairs the cost of which was not grant 
eligible. Further, there was the problem that the standard 
of improvement required, envisaging as it did a 30 year 
minimum life for the improved property, was neither practi­
cal nor economic in the case of many dwellings lacking 
in basic amenities. In 1959 therefore the 'standard grant* 
was introduced for short life improvement involving the 
installation of such amenities. Provided certain criteria 
were met payment of this grant was to be mandatory. At the 
same time the rent increase allowed was raised from 8% to 
12.5% of the landlord's share of improvement cost.
Once again, improved arrangements brought a marked upsurge 
in demand from owner occupiers, but very little response 
from private landlords. The reaction to this continued 
lack of enthusiasm on the part of private landlords was the 
inclusion in the Housing Act 1964, by the Conservative 
Government, of measures to require the compulsory improve­
ment of private rented houses in areas designated as 'hous­
ing improvement areas'. In the event the procedures in­
volved proved cumbersome and were little used by local 
authorities.
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In its Housing Programmes produced in 1965 the Labour Gov­
ernment, returned to power the previous year, 'broadly' 
assessed new housing needs for Great Britain as including 
'about one million to replace unfit houses already identi­
fied as slums' and 'up to two million more to replace houses 
not yet slums but not worth improving'. Of the total, half 
a million were required in Scotland. The Government recog­
nised, however, that in assessing housing needs in general 
there was a need for better information. In particular
"one of the most difficult [information] gaps to fill 
[concerned] the condition of the housing stock. A set of 
common standards [was] needed by reference to which assess­
ments [could] be made of fitness for habitation and particu­
larly for improvement".1 And, it was intimated, a sub­
committee of the Central Housing Advisory Committee [the 
Denington Sub-committee] was currently examining the forma­
tion of such standards. Subsequently a sub-committee of 
the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee was to be appointed 
with a similar role - [the Cullingworth Sub-committee].
The Report of the CHAC Sub-committee was published in 1966 
under the title 'Our Older Homes: A Call for Action'2 and
the Report of the SHAC Sub-committee in 1967 under the title 
'Scotland's Older Houses'.3 It is with the work of these 
two sub-committees and the policy reflected in the housing 
legislation passed in 1969 with which the first chapter of 
this section is concerned.
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The second chapter explores the review of housing improve­
ment policy carried out by the Expenditure Committee of the 
House of Commons in 1973 and the policy changes reflected in 
the housing legislation passed in 1974.
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SECTION III - INTRODUCTION - NOTES
1. Ministry of Housing & Local Government The Housing 
Programme 1965 to 1970. Cmnd. 2838, H.M.S.O., 1965,
par.3.
2. Ministry of Housing & Local Government, Our Older
Homes: A Call for Action. op. cit.
3. Scottish Development Department, Scotland1s Older
Houses, o p. cit.
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CHAPTER VII - THE DENINGTON & CULLINGWORTH REPORTS AND 
THE 1969 HOUSING ACTS
The Denington Report
The CHAC Sub-committee was appointed in February 1965; its 
terms of reference being :- "to consider the practicality 
of specifying objective criteria for the purposes of slum 
clearance, rectification of disrepair and other housing 
powers relating to minimum tolerable standards for housing 
accommodation; and to make recommendations".1
The Sub-committee had a membership of eleven including :- 
two local government elected members, Mrs Evelyn Denington 
[who chaired the Sub-committee] from the Greater London 
Council, and K C Cohen from Leeds Corporation - [each chair­
person of their respective housing committees]; two acade­
mics - J B Cullingworth, the Director of the Centre for 
Urban and Regional Studies and D V Donnison, Professor of 
Social Administration at the London School of Economics who 
had also been a member of the Milner Holland Committee; 
[both Cullingworth and, as has been seen, Donnison, had 
researched and written extensively on housing issues. The 
former was subsequently to chair the SHAC Sub-committee, 
with similar terms of reference, discussed later]; two 
representatives of the medical profession specialising in 
public health; a housing director; an architect; an 
environmental health officer; and a representative of the 
National Building Agency.
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The Sub-committee took written evidence from the local 
authority associations, from fifteen local authorities 
covering a range from the G L C and the corporations of 
major cities to rural district councils; and from some 
twenty other organisations predominantly representative of 
the building, environmental health, and medical professions, 
but also including the Building Research Establishment, the 
Building Societies Association, and the National Association 
of Property Owners. Written evidence was also received 
from eight individuals, predominantly environmental health 
professionals. Oral evidence was taken from one rural 
district council, the Association of Public Health Inspec­
tors, the National Federation of Property Owners and an 
environmental health officer. In addition, the Sub-commit- 
tee visited eight local authority areas to inspect housing 
conditions and improvement initiatives. The Report was 
published in June 1966.
The Sub-committee did not commission any significant re­
search. A fact which is made clear at the beginning of the 
Report - "We were asked to go ahead with devising new stan­
dards as quickly as possible without undertaking major re­
search projects".2 Cullingworth and Donnison in a note of 
reservation to the Report, arguing that a ventilated food 
store should not be a mandatory requirement in a dwelling, 
make the following critical observations regarding the lack 
of research.
"In the time available for the work of the Committee no
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direct inquiry into the attitudes and opinions of the house­
holds whose needs we are considering was possible. Indeed, 
we were specifically advised not.to undertake major research 
projects. This was unfortunate: the surveys undertaken
for the Milner Holland Committee have demonstrated how 
useful research can be. As a result the Committee's recom­
mendations on standards largely represent the consensus of 
technical opinion. In one respect [the ventilated food 
store] - and there may be others - this is contrary to the 
weight of popular opinion".3
The Sub-committee identified at the outset a serious lack of 
information about older houses, but it was clear that the 
current rate of clearance of unfit housing was inadequate, 
and there was in addition the continuing problem of the 
deterioration of the existing stock - 'a vital national 
asset'. A comprehensive approach was required to the need 
for maintenance, improvement and slum clearance. If such a 
policy was to be pursued local authorities required more 
information about the condition of the stock in their areas 
and the Minister required information both to assess the 
total demand and to give priority in resource allocation to 
those authorities with the most acute problems. Local 
authorities should have a duty to assess the condition of 
all houses in their areas; methods were described whereby 
sample surveys could be carried out to assess conditions and 
it was suggested that the Minister might have a national 
sample survey carried out on such a basis, with follow up 
surveys being carried out perhaps once every three years.
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The information having been collected, local authorities 
should be required to draw up plans for the implementation 
of appropriate programmes - clearance and improvement, on an 
area basis, with targets approved by the Minister there was 
scope for further research on the relative advantages of 
redevelopment and rehabilitation from the viewpoint of 
economics and it is suggested the Minister might sponsor 
further work in this connection.4
Both the existing standard for assessing whether a house was 
unfit, and that used for assessing whether an improved house 
qualified for discretionary grant assistance [a standard 
which the Sub-committee suggested should in future consti­
tute the definition of a 'satisfactory' house] were, in 
general, considered adequate, although some amendments were 
recommended to both, and the former should be spelled out in 
a positive form. In the evidence received there had been 
substantial support for a new condemnatory standard closer 
to the improvement grant/proposed 'satisfactory' standard 
but the Sub-committee had "not been able to accept this as 
practical at the present time".5
While there was scope for expressing standards in more 
objective terms a substantial element of judgment based on 
experience must continue to be utilised. What was needed 
were more explanatory notes to indicate in greater detail 
what was required. The Sub-committee had been impressed by 
how well the existing standard for dealing with unfit houses 
had operated in practice. Although some local authority
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estimates of the extent of unfit housing within their areas 
might be 'wide of the mark' there was little reason for 
believing that there was a significant lack of uniformity of 
application of standards when slum clearance areas were 
being made. Almost all houses represented as unfit by 
local authorities had been found by the Ministry to be so. 
Criticism of local government proposals was often seen to be 
directed not so much at the standards used to assess the 
fitness of a dwelling as to the terms of the compensation 
payable to owners. [A matter, it was noted outwith the 
Sub-committee's terms of reference].
As standards rose, from those based purely on public health 
criteria, to take account of what was socially acceptable 
and of individual expectation, it followed that 
environmental factors became more significant. A house 
could not be considered satisfactory if its environment was 
not satisfactory. Where living conditions were considered 
intolerable as a result of noise [including excessive traf­
fic noise], atmospheric pollution, or vibration, and there 
was no foreseeable prospect of remedying the problem, then 
the houses in the vicinity should be demolished. Where the 
objective was to improve the dwellings in an area, then 
attention should be given to environmental improvement, and 
securing ready access to amenities and facilities.
"Sound houses must be maintained in good repair and improved 
where practicable. Successive Governments [had] tried to 
secure the voluntary modernisation of these houses but the
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response [had] been inadequate and disappointing. Present 
measures of compulsion, which [applied] in limited circum­
stances to tenanted property [under provision contained in 
the Housing Act 1964] [had] proved ineffective, perhaps 
because of the cumbersome procedure. In our view there is 
a need both for effective compulsion to improve and maintain 
the better old houses and more pressure for earlv clearance 
of the worst”.6
Standards both for improvement and maintenance, should be 
applied and enforced across the entire range of tenures. 
"It is arguable that the conditions in which owner-occupiers 
live are their own business. Nevertheless it is wrong from 
the point of view of the public interest for one house in a 
terrace, for example, to be allowed to lower the standard of 
the remainder because the owner is unwilling or unable to 
keep it in a reasonable condition".7 The legislative 
provisions applying to maintenance were also considered to 
be inadequate. Those under the Housing Act could only be 
used if a house was as a result of disrepair unfit; and 
then only if the property could be rendered fit at 'reason­
able expense'. Those under the Public Health Act were 
intended for the abatement of statutory nuisances. In 
either event the standard of repair which could be achieved 
was a very low one. Powers were required which would allow 
the effective tackling of disrepair at an earlier stage, and 
there would be advantage in embodying the various procedures 
of the public health and housing legislation in a single 
code.
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Regarding the standards for maintenance the Sub-committee 
could 'see no escape from some concept of reasonable cost' 
as a test of what level of work should be done. Three 
standards for maintenance relating to the general standard 
of the property in question were suggested. Work on prop­
erty which was unfit and could not be made fit at 
'reasonable expense' should be the minimum to make it weath­
erproof and deal with other nuisances. Property essential­
ly sound but incapable of improvement should be kept in 
'satisfactory repair' and that which could be brought to or 
which already met the proposed 'satisfactory' standard 
should be kept in 'good repair'.
Turning to the question of funding repairs the Sub-committee 
rejected the possibility of introducing a repair grant, and 
hoped that higher level of repair activity would flow from 
implementation of the 1965 Rent Act. "We recognise the 
difficulties created by past controls but we have come to 
the conclusion that to concede the principle of grants would 
be to put a premium on neglect - - - Repairs must be seen 
to be part of the duty of property owners but clearly it 
must be made economically possible for them to carry out 
this duty. At present this is frequently not the case. 
For rented property we hope that the Rent Act 1965 will help 
to deal with the situation when controlled properties are 
brought within the system of rent regulation. This ought 
not to be too long delayed".8 Some owners would continue 
to have problems but these could be met by several possible 
arrangements: local authorities providing loans [in the
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case of elderly owners registering a charge against the 
property]; requiring the local authority to buy the proper­
ty where an owner so elected; etc.
If improvement was to be compulsory then it was considered 
that the existing arrangements for mandatory grants and 
loans would require attention [although unlike the SHAC 
Report neither this point nor the relationship between 
mandatory grants and discretionary grants was developed in 
detail]. In addition urgent attention should be given to 
the adverse impact of the taxation provisions on housing 
improvement by landlords. "Again we draw attention to the 
financial position of private landlords and to the difficul­
ties [made clear in the Milner Holland Report] which present 
taxation imposes on landlords seeking a reasonable return 
form the improvement of residential property with a life 
shorter than 2 5 years".9 Further study on means of over­
coming both this problem and the problem of low controlled 
rents was recommended.
To ensure that adequate attention was given to improvement 
work, local authorities should be required to submit pro­
grammes to the Minister for approval. Although, in gen­
eral, the objective should be to improve sub-standard prop­
erty to the proposed 'satisfactory' standard there would be 
cases where, because full improvement was not physically 
practical, or for planning reasons a short life was 
envisaged, a lower standard of improvement would be ap­
propriate. The standard for such improvement should be
169
that currently applying to properties improved with the 
'standard' [mandatory] grant. [Both Leeds and Bristol
where considerable amounts of improvement had been carried 
out, had been visited by the Sub-committee and details of 
the approach adopted in Leeds were included in an appendix 
to the Report.]
Where a local authority could not undertake to clear all the 
unfit housing property designated for demolition within a 
seven year period, because of the scale of the problem in 
the area, a programme of acquisition and patching should be 
undertaken on similar lines to an extensive programme car­
ried out in Birmingham.
Cullingworth dissented from the recommendation with regard 
to compulsory improvement of property. He argued that
while a case could be made for compulsory repairs on the 
grounds that neglect of one property could adversely affect 
the interests of adjoining properties, and that a community 
asset was being allowed to decay, this argument could not be 
fairly extended to improvement which by definition involved 
much more than the arrest of decay. Compulsion could 
perhaps be justified when applied to facilities falling 
within a 'minimum socially acceptable standard' such as the 
availability of a WC, but the proposed minimum standard for 
a satisfactory dwelling went far beyond this. Before
recommending compulsory improvement it was necessary to ask 
why voluntary improvement had proved inadequate. It was, 
in Cullingworth's view, for two reasons. First - with
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regard to the private rented sector - because landlords were 
denied a reasonable post tax return on their properties. 
While the Sub-committee was recommending changes in this 
direction the other members looked upon it as an essential 
corollary to compulsory improvement. He, however, regarded 
it as a desirable reform which would make compulsion largely 
irrelevant. [Given such circumstances, if a tenant was 
denied improvements, then compulsion would be justified]. 
Second - more generally - it was because the improvement 
grant scheme had 'suffered from a lack of positive and 
purposive encouragement'. Some authorities notably Leeds 
and Bristol had demonstrated what could be done by adopting 
a 'forceful [yet understanding] and direct approach to 
individual owners on an area by area basis'.
The Cullingworth Report
The SHAC Sub-committee began its inquiry late in 1965, some 
nine months after the CHAC inquiry started. This delay was 
clearly attributable in part to the fact that the Scottish 
Committee had to be reconstituted [this being done in May 
1965].10 It seems rather surprising, however, that a fur­
ther six months were allowed to elapse before the Sub­
committee began work particularly when it was than 'urged to 
report as a matter of urgency'. Perhaps it was considered 
advisable to allow time for the general trend of the Dening- 
ton inquiry to emerge, and also for the initial results of a 
housing survey which was being conducted, to become avail­
able. The Sub-committee's terms of reference were:- "to 
examine the present statutory provisions relating to the
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determination of unfitness for human habitation and to make 
recommendations for amendments."11
The Sub-committee had a membership of seven. In addition 
to Cullingworth the chairman, it included two local govern­
ment elected members, a medical officer of health, an envir­
onmental health officer, an architect, and a builder.
Written evidence was received from:- the four counties of 
cities; the county councils; a wide range of large and 
small burghs; property owners and factors; and the public 
health, housing management, town planning, and building 
professions. Visits were made to Glasgow and Dundee, and 
to four counties - three predominantly rural. Oral evi­
dence was taken from representatives of the local authori­
ties in the places visited, and from the public health 
professions and the RICS.
The Sub-committee's Report was published in February 1967. 
It is considerably longer than the Denington Report extend­
ing to 288 paragraphs, while the latter contains 90. It
also is more outspoken and this is made explicit. "We have 
found ourselves forced to use strong and emotional language. 
Some may feel that this is inappropriate for an official 
committee of inquiry; but we have not hesitation in ex- 
pressing ourselves thus", *
The first chapter is devoted to the historical background to 
housing conditions in Scotland and legislative measures 
introduced over the years in an attempt to tackle perceived
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problems. The opening sentence reads - "It seems that 
housing conditions in Scotland have always been relatively 
poor compared with those obtaining in England".13 
Descriptions of Scottish housing conditions are quoted 
ranging from those by English travellers in the 18th cen­
tury, through to the Report of the Royal Commission on 
Scottish housing conditions published in 1917.14 Reference 
is made in particular to the high incidence of tenemental 
property in Scottish towns and it significance. "The
tradition of tenement building in the big Scottish towns has 
had ramifications throughout the whole social and economic 
fabric of Scotland's urban life, and helps to explain some 
of the differences which exist today between England and 
Scotland in housing conditions and housing policy".15 It 
is emphasised, however, that poor housing conditions were 
not restricted to towns and that housing conditions in rural 
areas had been described by the 1917 Royal Commission as 
just as bad if not worse than in urban areas.
The second chapter outlines the scale of the problem and 
identifies reasons why so little progress had been made in 
tackling it. As indicated earlier the Sub-committee had 
had access to advance information on the results of a hous­
ing survey which had been recently conducted. "This clear­
ly shows how inadequate are the official returns of unfit 
housing. We suspect that even the survey figures under­
estimate the problem, but they show that, whereas the offi­
cial returns indicate about 100,000 unfit houses, the true 
figure is considerably greater. Some 144,000 houses are
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unfit and have a life of less than 5 years. There are a 
further 129,000 houses which would probably have been inclu­
ded in the first category were this not already of such 
large dimensions. This gives a total of 273,000 houses 
which should be demolished rapidly. We think the target 
should be to get rid of them within ten years; am average 
of 27,000 demolitions a year. By contrast the present rate 
of clearance of unfit houses is only 15,000 a year - - -. 
But even this does not indicate the full extent of the 
problem - - - there are a further 193,000 houses which have 
a life of 15 - 29 years. Many of these would undoubtedly 
have been regarded as having a considerably shorter life if 
there were not so many worse houses which must be cleared 
first".16
"The problem would be more measurable if it were evenly 
spread throughout the country, but in fact it is heavily 
concentrated in certain areas particularly in the larger 
cities, and above all in Glasgow. - - - We have seen condi­
tions in Glasgow that can be described only as appalling. 
Families are condemned to live in atrocious conditions which 
should shock the national conscience -”17 "The enormity of 
the problem in Glasgow should not, however, obscure the very 
different but acute problem of unfit housing in rural areas. 
We, ourselves, have seen families inhabiting rural cottages
in unbelievably squalid conditions - without water, electri-
, . . i scity or sanitation".
In the Sub-committee's view "the situation in the country
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generally and in Glasgow in particular [constituted] an 
indictment of Government policy. - - - though local authori­
ties by no means [came] through [the] examination unscathed; 
the problem, especially in Glasgow [was] of such huge dimen­
sions as to place it beyond the resources of a single au­
thority" .19
Central Government was considered to have 'failed' in 5 
aspects. It had failed:-
1. by avoiding the real problem in accepting local author­
ity estimates of the size of the problem;
2. by taking insufficient account of the resource implica­
tions of more rapid slum clearance which it had 'exhorted'
local authorities to undertake;
3. by paying insufficient attention to how local 
authorities were using resources, in particular the propor­
tion of new housing allocated to slum clearance;
4. by regarding the problem as a 19th century legacy which 
would gradually disappear and, as a result, giving 
insufficient priority to improvement, to short term patch­
ing, and to arresting decay;
5. by retaining the 19th century concept of insanitary and
'unhealthy' housing and not adjusting standards for old 
housing to reflect rising standards in new housing.
Local authorities were criticised; for not making adequate 
assessments of the problem; for not allocating sufficient 
of their resources to slum clearance; for giving insuffi­
cient attention to improvement; and for carrying out very
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little short term patching.
In tackling the problem [as with the Denington Report], a 
comprehensive approach was advocated involving clearance, 
improvement, short term patching [where unavoidable], envir­
onmental upgrading, and improved maintenance, and with plans 
based on an accurate assessment of needs ignoring the re­
straints of resources. The determination of priorities at 
national and local level should be based on this assessment.
Nationally there must be a channelling of resources to the 
areas with the greatest problems. Locally there must be a 
concentration of resources on areas of bad housing, and 
local authorities should allocate a higher proportion of new 
build housing to slum clearance, than had been the case in 
the past. "Priority for this, means of course, that fewer 
houses will be available for other needs but this must be. 
The philosophy of 'equal shares for all' has to be rejected, 
since it is the very negation of a policy of priorities".20
With regard to improvement much more 'purposive action' was 
required. Proportionately the Scottish annual rate of
grant aided improvements was only half the English figure. 
This 'extremely disappointing progress' was attributed to 
four factors. The difficulties of improving the typical 
Scottish tenement, the level of grant available, the return 
allowed to private landlords, and the attitude of local 
authorities.
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Although the Sub-committee recognised that tenemental 
improvement was complex and that some local authorities were 
of the view that it was uneconomic, evidence suggested, 
particularly from the example of Dundee, that improvement of 
certain types of tenement could be worthwhile. It accord­
ingly recommended that research on this topic should be 
carried out and a manual of plans and advice should be pre­
pared and circulated to local authorities. In addition 
improvement grant levels for tenements should be reviewed.
On the question of the return available to landlords on 
improved property the Sub-committee identified the same two 
issues that Denington had - income tax arrangements and rent 
control. Attention was drawn to the disincentive effect of 
tax provisions on short life improvement of property, and 
included in the Report is an extract from the relevant 
section of the Milner Holland Report.
The existing constraints on rent increases permissible on 
houses improved with grant assistance [12.5% of the land­
lord's share of the improvement costs] were seen as acting 
as a further disincentive, and it was advocated that the 
rent regulation machinery of the 1965 Rent Act be extended 
to such properties. While the Denington Sub-committee was 
opposed in principle to providing grants for repairs, they 
considered that if their recommended changes regarding rent 
levels were not introduced - and they 'recognised the poli­
tical difficulties to which the proposals would give rise', 
then grants for repairs should be conceded and the percent­
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age level of improvement grant increased from the existing 
50% to 75%
The Sub-committee was particularly critical of the attitude 
of some local authorities with regard to improvement grants 
- "one local authority [Ayr Burgh] shocked us by responding 
that they 'do not operate the discretionary improvement 
grant provisions of Sec.Ill of the Housing Act'"21 And on 
the same theme - "We were appalled by the strong political 
line taken by some authorities who refuse to operate the 
discretionary grants scheme on the principle that it was not 
their business to support and subsidise the private housing 
sector. - - If the situation were not so tragic we would 
regard it as Gilbertian. It results in families having to 
live in totally inadequate and frequently intolerable hous­
ing conditions until such time as the local authority think 
they can catch up with the problem - - - this is sheer 
delusion: houses are deteriorating faster than new ones can
be built."22
In view of such opposition by some local authorities and the 
'half hearted way' in which other local authorities adminis­
tered the grants scheme it was recommended that right of 
appeal provisions should be introduced, analogous to those 
under town planning legislation "as protection against the 
arbitrary [and, indeed, irresponsible] use of power";23 and 
the Secretary of State should require local authorities to 
conduct surveys and submit proposals for dealing with sub­
standard properties. In addition to overcoming the reluc­
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tance of some local authorities to making grants available 
there was also a need for greater flexibility on their part 
in the interpretation of provisions applying to grants, and 
in this connection the existing discretionary and mandatory 
grants [the latter available for short life improvement] 
should be merged into a single scheme.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given Cullingworth's dissent on 
the issue in the Denington Report, the Sub-committee did not 
recommend compulsory improvement of owner occupied houses. 
It did not address the matter at length, possibly to avoid 
too striking a conflict with the CHAC conclusions, but 
restricted itself to recommending that in the case of 
tenemental upgrading in improvement areas where individual 
owners were involved, local authorities should not utilise 
existing powers of compulsion [applying only to tenements] 
but should instead acquire the properties and carry out the 
work themselves.
The standard recommended for a 'satisfactory' house was like 
the parallel Denington standard, based on the standard then 
existing for discretionary grant qualification. As with 
Denington, certain amendments were suggested: to introduce,
for example reference to structural stability and satisfac­
tory environment.
On comparison the two 'satisfactory' standards are broadly 
similar, although there are some differences in detail - the 
Cullingworth standard requiring a 'satisfactory' house to be
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•substantially free from rising and penetrating damp* 
[thereby excluding condensation damp]; the Denington stan­
dard requiring it to be 'free from damp'.24 And there are 
no corresponding provisions in the Cullingworth recommenda­
tions to two requirements in the Denington standard viz. 
'satisfactory internal arrangement' [perhaps because of 
anticipated problems with tenemental improvement], and 'a 
ventilated food store'. Cullingworth himself had, of
course, disagreed with this latter recommendation when on 
the Denington inquiry.
Regarding the question of an appropriate condemnatory stan­
dard the Sub-committee had received 'a great deal' of evi­
dence indicating a need for the existing 'unfitness 
standard' to be revised, and most of it relating to the lack 
of clarity and objectivity in the legislative provisions 
contained in the Housing [Scotland] Act 1962. As with the 
English legislation, these contained a list of matters to 
which 'regard was to be had' in determining whether a house 
was unfit for human habitation. The Sub-committee was in 
no doubt "that the present 'standard' [was] interpreted in 
widely different ways in different parts of the country. 
To a large extent this [was] a reflection on the variations 
in housing conditions, but this [was] not the only factor. 
Local authorities [differed] in the urgency with which they 
[were] tackling the problem and this [was] partly due to the 
lack of clarity in the present standard. A clearer and 
more objective standard [would] enable local authorities to 
assess their problems more accurately and enable the Secre-
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tary of State to assess the resources which were needed both 
nationally and locally to deal with the problem. It
[would] also enable property owners - - to establish more 
easily whether their property [fell] below the statutory 
standard".25
The Sub-committee considered "that the public health basis 
of the minimum standard should be superseded by a concept 
more in line with modern thinking. As an indication of 
this [it was proposed][going beyond the Denington recommen­
dation in this regard], that the term 'unfitness' and 
'fitness' should be discarded. [And that] in their place 
the term 'tolerable' [be adopted], 'tolerable standard' 
[being defined] by reference to [the] proposed satisfactory 
standard. This [had] incidentally allowed [the expression 
of] the standard in positive terms as many witnesses [had] 
proposed".26 If a house failed to meet any single one of 
the criteria listed then it would fail to meet the standard.
With reference to environmental conditions the Sub-committee 
again went further than its CHAC counterpart - proposing the 
concept of 'An Area of Unsatisfactory Environment'. This 
it was suggested might be defined as "an area in which the 
majority of the houses [fell] below the standard for a 
'satisfactory' house, or where the arrangement of the 
streets [was] unsatisfactory, or where there [were] unsatis­
factory environmental conditions such as those of noise, 
smell, dust, dirt, smoke, inadequate open space [including 
play space for children] or inadequate provision for gara­
181
ging and parking of cars".27 Action appropriate for such 
areas could be on the same lines as that for clearance areas 
or improvement areas, or a combination of both, together 
with environmental improvement such as provision of open 
space, play areas, parking, etc.
Similar problems existed in Scotland with regard to 
enforcing maintenance standards as had been identified in 
the Denington Report, and the Sub-committee recommended that 
all the existing enactments relating to maintenance should 
be consolidated in one code, which should be augmented by a 
strengthening of local authority powers to enforce repairs. 
The determination of what constituted 'reasonable expense' 
for establishing the standard of repair required, was some­
thing which the Sub-committee considered should be invest­
igated further. They did not have the time available and, 
in any case, were of the opinion that it could only be 
fruitfully considered in the context of a rational rent 
structure.
The Sub-committee had received a considerable amount of 
evidence criticising the 'cumbersome and protracted nature' 
of the statutory and administrative procedures involved in 
dealing with unfit houses, and although it had not been 
possible in the time available to examine the issue in 
depth, it was recommended that those provisions be reviewed.
Also, although the question was not within its remit, the 
Sub-committee had "no hesitation [in recommending] that a
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comprehensive review should be undertaken of the provisions 
relating to compensation for the compulsory acquisition of
0 ftsub-standard housing". °
On 15 February 1967, in reply to parliamentary questions 
from two Labour Members, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, William Ross, advised that he had sent copies of 
the recently published SHAC Report to all the local housing 
authorities, to local housing associations, and to a number 
of professional bodies concerned. The local authorities 
had been asked for their views, and within the next ten days 
one of his junior ministers would be having preliminary 
discussions with their housing conveners. Separate discus­
sions were to be held shortly with the other bodies.29
The English/Welsh White Paper
On 21 September of the same year, Richard Crossman, by then 
Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of 
Commons, recorded that he had had a meeting with Anthony 
Greenwood [Minister of Housing] and Bruce Millan [Under 
Secretary of State at the Scottish Office] "[They] came to 
persuade me to give them time for a big Bill on the 
compulsory improvement of old houses. I told them that the 
Bill is essential provided it's big enough. If they can 
get the Treasury to agree a really generous formula for 
compensating owner-occupiers of slum clearance property the 
Bill will be a winner. If they can't get that I wont give 
it time".30
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In April of the following year the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government published a White Paper entitled 'Old 
Houses into New Homes'.31 [To be followed 3 months later 
by a parallel Scottish White Paper - 'The Older Houses in 
Scotland - A Plan for Action',32 discussed later.] 
Indicating the main thrust of the intended policy it is 
stated at the beginning of the English/Welsh document that 
while "the need for new house building programmes [would] 
remain for many years ahead - the balance of need between 
new house building and improvement [was] now changing, so 
[that] there must be a corresponding change in the emphasis 
of the local authority housing programmes. The Government 
[intended] that within a total of public investment in 
housing at about the level it [had] now reached, a greater 
share should go to the improvement of older houses".33
A major influence on this policy development was obviously 
the economic problems which had bedevilled the Labour Gov­
ernment and which had come to a head with a devaluation in 
November of the previous year. The negotiation of an
international loan had required that £850m be taken out of 
the economy, and in the month following the devaluation the 
Treasury proposed a reduction of 10,000 - 15,000 in the
number of houses approved for construction between 1968 and 
1969. Although there was grave concern expressed about the 
electoral consequences, under pressure from other 'spending*
ministers the reduction finally agreed was 16,500 per 
34annum.J H
Increased emphasis on improvement utilising the grant sys-
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tern, clearly offered a way of providing some compensation 
for the reduction in new build output while at the same time 
achieving a reduction in public expenditure. This inter­
pretation is supported by comments made by Anthony Greenwood 
during the debate on the Second Reading of the subsequent 
English/Welsh Bill. Explaining why the Government did not 
wish to encourage large scale municipalisation of houses 
requiring improvement he said "If [local authorities] did 
take them over - - - the increase in public expenditure 
would be very much greater. Instead of only 50% of the 
cost of the policy coming out of public funds it would mean 
that 100% would do so".35
Accompanying the increased emphasis on improvement was a 
change in approach as to how it was to be achieved. Con­
trary to what was clearly the intention eight months ear­
lier, the Government view now was that "the voluntary prin­
ciple must be the guiding one".36 It seems likely that 
this retreat from compulsion was heavily influenced by the 
perception that if it were to be rendered politically ac­
ceptable a higher percentage grant would require to be paid. 
Although compulsory purchase powers would continue to be 
available, the implication was that these would be a last 
resort, and this was subsequently to be made explicit by the 
Minister during the Second Reading debate - compulsory 
purchase orders would not be entertained where they showed a 
"harsh and unconscionable use of the powers".37 Again the 
primary consideration was obviously to avoid extensive 
municipalisation but a virtue could be made out of a
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necessity.
The White Paper included information on the outcome of the 
sample house condition survey in England and Wales which the 
Government had commissioned in line with the Denington Sub­
committee's recommendation, and which had been carried out 
early in 1967. It had established that there were more 
unfit and sub-standard houses than had been known before and 
that they were more spread out than had been thought before. 
There were probably 1.8 million unfit dwellings; 1.1 mil­
lion in clearance areas and 0.7 million which would have to 
be dealt with individually. Some of these unfit properties 
would be worth saving and improving. There were in addi­
tion 1.5 million dwellings which were not unfit but which 
required significant repairs and of these 3.7 million lacked 
one or more of the basic amenities.
In the Government's view "The results of the survey [demon-
, O  O
strated] the need for a new deal for older housing areas". 
Poor housing conditions were not limited to any particular 
part of the country, to urban areas, or to particular te­
nures. Conditions were worse in the North but bad
conditions existed throughout the country. The policy
behind the legislative changes now proposed was that much 
more should be done year by year to improve and repair 
houses which could be improved and eliminate the unfit ones. 
The Government expected local authorities to be the 'main 
instruments of policy' in their areas [although there was a 
useful role for housing associations]. The difference
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between areas was very great, powers and methods must there­
fore be flexible, and local programmes would have to reflect 
different needs within the balance of a national programme 
of expenditure on new and older houses.
It is acknowledged that while academic studies had shown 
ways of relating the cost of immediate replacement to the 
cost of improvement taking account of the life of the im­
proved property, prevailing interest rates and other fac­
tory; there had in practice been difficulties in comparing 
benefits as rigorously as costs, and further research was 
being pursued in this field.
But, no further study [was] needed to prove that millions of 
families were going to be living in unsatisfactory housing 
for at least another twenty years unless new efforts [were] 
made, and it [was] already clear that the present grant 
limits [did] not reflect the maximum which it [might] be 
worthwhile to spend on improvement".39
It is not until paragraph ten that reference is made to the 
fact that "in reviewing the policy and legislation over the 
[previous] three years the Government had received the 
report of a sub-committee of the Central Housing Advisory 
Committee - - called 'Our Older Houses - A Call for Action'. 
This [had] advised a 'general'40 approach to slum clearance 
and improvement". It is also mentioned that the Minister 
of Housing and Local Government had published the 'Deeplish 
Study' in September 1966 which had examined the possibili-
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ties of an area improvement, in parts of Rochdale and that 
subsequently a pilot improvement scheme had been carried out 
in that area by the Ministry in conjunction with the local 
authority. The Government had also 'benefited' from two
reports on redevelopment initiatives by private sector 
organisations.
In addressing the improvement and repair of the older 
housing stock the Government wanted local authorities to 
give particular attention to area improvement. It was 
accepted that powers under the 1964 Act had been cumbersome 
and these were to be repealed. Under the proposed arrange­
ments local authorities would have powers to designate 
'general improvement areas' where the aim would be, in line 
with the 'voluntary principle', to help and persuade owners 
to improve their houses, and also to assist by improving the 
environment. Local residents should be fully consulted on 
the proposals but to avoid delay there would be no require­
ment for ministerial approval. The maximum level of dis­
cretionary improvement grants would be increased by 150%, 
and the maximum grant for the provision of standard ameni­
ties by one third, and local authorities would have powers 
to waive certain conditions applying to grants, (for example 
with regard to the minimum anticipated life of the house 
after improvement and the requirement that all the basic 
amenities must be provided). Grants would also be avail­
able to local authorities for environmental improvement (50% 
of a maximum of £100 per house) such as the provision of 
play spaces, car parking, and so forth.
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In order to tackle the problem of disrepair which the house 
condition survey had disclosed, it was proposed to give 
local authorities powers to secure repairs not only, as 
previously, when a house became unfit, but where there was 
'serious' disrepair. The work required should be 'reason­
able having regard to the age, character and location of the 
house'.
To encourage landlords to improve their properties, and 
subsequently to maintain them, it was proposed that when a 
house let on a regulated tenancy was improved with grant 
assistance the rent should be determined under Part II of 
the Rent Act and not, as before, by conditions obtaining to 
the grant; and that where a house, let on a controlled 
tenancy was improved with grant assistance, the tenancy 
should become regulated with the rent determined as above. 
In addition, to secure equity, where a house let on a con­
trolled tenancy had not been improved with grant assistance 
but could be demonstrated to be in good repair and to poss­
ess at least the basic amenities, it too would qualify for a 
regulated tenancy. In all cases, however, the resulting 
increases would be phased over a period.
On the question of slum clearance three issues are discus­
sed:- standards for determining unfitness, past and future 
progress in slum clearance, and compensation for owners of 
property declared unfit.
With regard to standards "The criteria by which a house
189
[was] judged to be fit or unfit [were] set out in Section 4 
of the Housing Act 1957. The Government [believed] that 
these criteria [were] in the main still the right ones, but, 
as was pointed out in the Denington Report, an important 
contributing factor making for an unfit house [might] be 
that it [had] a very bad layout: for example, a WC opening
directly from the living room or kitchen, and narrow, steep 
or winding staircases. The Government [proposed] therefore 
to add the internal arrangement of a house to the list of 
criteria."41 There was, however, no suggestion of express­
ing the standard in a positive form as the Sub-committee had 
suggested.
Turning to progress on slum clearance, the statistics inclu­
ded showed that 'the number of slums dealt with' in each of
the previous 7 years. There had been a fairly marked
increase from 61,200 in 1964 [when Labour came into power] 
to 71,800 in 1967. "This [was] by no means an unsatisfac­
tory record, but it [was] no longer good enough. As more 
and more new houses [were] built [and record figures were 
now being achieved] more unfit old houses ought to be 
cleared. The Government [intended] to continue to give 
first priority in the allocation of the housing programme to 
areas with large numbers of slums".42
The need for faster slum clearance was related to the
question of compensation. "There was no doubt that, as the 
Denington Committee [had] noticed, the objections local 
authorities [met] with to clearance proposals [were] not
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really so much directed to the standards applied as to the 
terms of the compensation". The existing position was that 
if a house was declared unfit for human habitation it could 
not be assumed to have any value and compensation was there­
fore restricted to cleared site value, although there were 
certain qualifications to this. If the interest was that 
of an owner occupier then the minimum compensation was the 
gross value of the property for rating purposes. In addi­
tion, where a property had been well maintained then the 
owner, whether an owner occupier or a landlord, was eligible 
for a 'well maintained' payment up to a maximum equal to 
twice the rateable value of the property.
"A growing proportion [about 20% nationally and much higher 
in some areas] of owners of houses in clearance areas were 
owner occupiers; and they [had] a special grievance.
Often they [had] bought their houses when it was not pos­
sible to get anything better, and they [had] put their 
savings into it. In any case, it [was] their home which 
[was] being demolished and the average difference between 
site value and the full market value [was] significantly 
greater for owner occupied than for tenanted houses";43
Given these considerations the Government proposed that, 
although the site value basis for compensation should be 
continued as a general rule, where a house which had been 
owner occupied for a minimum period of 2 years was declared 
unfit by way of the procedures available under the existing 
housing legislation and was subsequently acquired by a local
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authority, the owner would in addition to recovering a sum 
equivalent to the gross value, also qualify for a supplemen­
tary payment equivalent to the difference between the gross 
value and the market value of the property. Where in the 
same circumstances a house was declared unfit, but was not 
acquired, the owner would be eligible for the supplementary 
payment but not the gross value. In addition the 'well 
maintained' payments, already available to both landlords 
and owner occupiers of unfit houses compulsorily acquired, 
would be increased from twice to four times the rateable 
value of the property.
The Scottish White Paper
The Scottish White Paper acknowledges in its second para­
graph the 'substantial help' which the Government had re­
ceived from the Cullingworth Report in considering the 
proposals and goes on to refer to the Sub-committee's 
assessment that 300,000 houses were in such bad condition 
that they ought to be replaced quickly - within ten years if 
possible, and to the need for rehabilitation and improvement 
of at least 20,000 more.
The Sub-committee's findings implied that 30% of Scotland's 
total housing stock required 'effective action, taken or 
planned in the near future'. Subsequent additional infor­
mation from the house condition survey showed that one ninth 
of the stock lacked a bath or shower, one quarter a hot 
water supply, and one ninth an internal w.c. And further 
research ['A Profile of Glasgow Housing'] suggested that the
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lack of amenities was in 'many ways more shocking in Glasgow 
houses than in the Scottish stock generally'. "As the 
Cullingworth Sub-committee [had] emphasised, however, sta­
tistics alone [could not] adequately describe the pro­
blem".44
As with the proposals for England and Wales the principal 
emphasis of the White Paper was on encouraging more volun­
tary improvement of older houses ['within the total of 
public investment which had now been reached'], utilising an 
area approach supported by higher improvement grants with 
reduced conditions, and by environmental improvement grants. 
And further proposals - for rent increases for improved 
houses; for increases in compensation for owners of unfit 
houses; and for additional local authority powers to secure 
repairs, were also in line with those proposed for England 
and Wales.
However, a section of the White Paper is devoted to discuss­
ing the 'Typical Problem of the Tenements' which were 'at 
the heart of the Scottish housing problem'. They constitu­
ted 25% of the total stock with the highest proportion 
located in urban areas where the problems were most severe. 
Because of the small size of the houses involved, improving 
such property could be difficult and costly. "It [was] 
nevertheless important that the improvement of tenements 
should not be written off as being too difficult or too 
costly - - . limitation of the range of the improvement 
work done would enable the cost to be kept down. The
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improved houses would generally be smaller than houses 
[then] being built, but by providing good accommodation for 
smaller households they would meet the needs of a section of 
the community whose housing conditions had always been a 
particular problem".45 Whether the best approach was
replacement or improvement in a particular case could only 
be decided after individual assessment of the properties 
concerned.
Because such assessments were likely to result in areas of 
sub-standard tenemental property being dealt with by a 
mixture of redevelopment and improvement, and because exist­
ing procedures for area improvement had proved cumbersome, 
the Government [departing from the proposed arrangements in 
England and Wales] intended to introduce mechanisms which 
would assimilate clearance and improvement procedures to
each other, providing for flexibility and less delay. 
Although the White Paper does not mention the term, these 
were to become known as 'housing treatment areas'.
A further difference from the English/Welsh proposals was to 
be the adoption of a 'tolerable standard' for inter alia 
identifying those areas requiring treatment. "The Report 
'Scotland's Older Houses' [had] recommended that for pur­
poses such as this there should be a statutory standard of
'tolerability' which would depend largely on objective 
considerations such as the provision within the house of a 
sink provided with both hot and cold water, and a w.c., but 
which would also include tests requiring the exercise of
194
some judgment -. The Government [agreed] that in Scottish 
conditions a statutory standard would be a desirable start­
ing point for [the new] procedures and [proposed] that the 
legislation should introduce provisions to define the stan­
dard".46
With regard to progress in slum clearance the statistics 
showed an increase in the annual rate of clearance of nearly 
5000 per annum to 19,000 per annum in the first 3 years of 
Labour government. "These figures [were] encouraging as 
far as they [went] but fell far short of the average of 
30,000 a year required to meet the recommendations of the 
Cullingworth Sub-committee. Determined efforts must be
made to increase the rate of clearance and local authorities 
must use a greater proportion of their available houses 
[both those newly built and those becoming available for 
reletting] specifically for the purpose of enabling unsatis­
factory houses to be closed".47
The English/Welsh Bill
The English/Welsh Bill which received its Second Reading on 
10 February 1969 adopted all of the proposals in the White 
Paper. Anthony Greenwood [Minister of Housing and Local 
Government] opening the debate introduced a new slant to the 
argument in support of an increased emphasis in improvement, 
suggesting that "it had become increasingly clear that it 
would make good social sense [as well as] good economic 
sense to prevent old houses deteriorating into slums and to 
avoid, as far as possible, the breaking-up of well estab-
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A  Olished communities by the redevelopment of whole areas". °
Many of the areas were old fashioned, but they [were] quiet 
and near the centre of town. People liked then, and would 
like them still more if the houses were improved and re­
paired and the environment made more attractive. So once
A Qagain there [was] an important human element [there]"  ^
The White Paper, the Minister claimed, had 'an almost uni­
versally warm welcome', and certainly the spokesmen for both 
the main opposition parties were generally supportive of the 
proposals. The only significant criticism came from back­
benchers on the Government side with regard to the impact of 
the planned introduction of regulated rents for improved 
houses and for those already possessing the standard ameni­
ties. One Labour Member, Frank Allaun [Salford East], 
claimed that there was "an unholy alliance - - between the 
two Front Benches; they say in remarkable chorus 'Rents 
must go up'".50 Addressing the issue the Minister said 
that the policy on rents set out in the White Paper had 
"received the longest and most careful and anxious 
thought",51 because it was known that some Labour Members 
were unhappy about it. He had studied 5 published surveys 
of private landlords including the Milner Holland Report.52 
Although there were disparities, taken together these sur­
veys showed the range of individual landlords owning one 
rented dwelling as being between 61% and 78% of all land­
lords. And the proportion of individual landlords who were 
elderly ranged from 39% to 63%. He had concluded that 
there clearly were rent difficulties for many landlords in 
adequately maintaining their property. Although this
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argument did not convince Allaun, who was of the view that 
grants to owners were already generous, and that the 'big 
property firms which [were] hiding behind the skirt of the 
small landlords [were] jubilant at the prospect of rent 
increases', the motion for the Second Reading went unop­
posed.
The Scottish Bill
The motion for the Second Reading of the parallel Scottish 
Bill was debated in the Scottish Grand Committee, some five 
weeks later, on 18 and 20 March 1969. As with the
English/Welsh Bill its provisions embraced all the proposals 
outlined in the preceding White Paper. William Ross
[Secretary of State] - opening the debate paid "a sincere 
tribute to the fine work" which the Cullingworth Sub-commit- 
tee had done in giving "a new emphasis" to the "problem of 
Scotland's slums".53 And having referred to the importance 
of local authorities allocating a larger proportion of new 
tenancies to slum clearance and giving "every possible 
assistance and encouragement to private owners to do [impro­
vement] work themselves"54 he described the Bill as a 
"distinctive Scottish" one. "We have different problems in 
Scotland and therefore the Bill differs from the English 
Bill".55
In outlining the details of the Bill he mentioned the pro­
posed 'tolerable standard', which would require inter alia 
the "exclusive use of a wc."56 In fact, the legislation, 
in requiring that this 'be suitably located within the
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building containing the house', fell short of the Culling­
worth recommendations which required that the wc be suitably 
located within the house. Another departure from the
Cullingworth recommendations in this connection was the 
omission of any reference to the state of repair of the 
property. This point was to be taken up by one of the 
Opposition spokesmen {Earl of Dalkeith], who pointed out 
that even the prevailing arrangements required that regard 
be had to the general state of repair of a house when deter­
mining whether or not it was fit for human habitation.
When dealing with the provisions regarding rent increases 
for improved properties the Secretary of State reminded the 
Committee that "an important issue stressed by the Culling­
worth Report was the need to give landlords who [improved] 
their homes an adequate return in the form of an increased 
rent, - [and] the Bill [did] this by providing for the rents 
of houses which were improved to a fully satisfactory state 
to be fixed under the 'fair' rent machinery of the Rent Act 
1965".57
He also referred to the Cullingworth Report in the context 
of grants for environmental improvements - "for instance, 
erecting play spaces for children, planting trees and provi­
ding parking spaces. The Committee was very concerned 
about the lack of any provision of this kind, and anybody 
who [was] familiar with the neglect and squalor that often 
occurred in the backlands of tenements [would] appreciate 
the need for it".58
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Mr Gordon Campbell opening for the Opposition said that 
Members on both sides of the Grand Committee were indebted 
to the Cullingworth Committee for its Report. "The Commit­
tee did what [could] only be described as an excellent job 
and its findings and recommendations should claim Members* 
full attention and study. [He hoped] in due course action 
[would] be taken in line with all the recommendations of the 
Cullingworth Committee. This Bill clearly [was] based on 
the Report of that Committee and [did] to some extent follow 
its recommendations. To that extent [he welcomed] it".59
The Conservative Members collectively drew attention to 
several departures from the Cullingworth recommendations; - 
there was no provision for appeal in the event of refusal of 
an application for improvement grant; there was no mention 
of changing the tax provisions applying to improved tenanted 
property; and [as previously mentioned] the state of repair 
of property was not included in the 'tolerable standard' 
criteria. However, there was also an evident willingness 
to combine with Labour Members in pointing out that Scotland 
was getting more favourable treatment than England. - Sir 
Fitzroy Maclean [Conservative], Bute and North Ayrshire - "I 
also welcome the Bill because it gives more generous treat­
ment to Scotland than is being given at present to England. 
Like other Conservative Members, I, too, feel that it is a 
pity the hon. lady, the Member for Hamilton [Mrs Ewing} has 
not chosen to grace the Committee with her presence today to 
take on that point".60 Mr William Hannan [Labour Glasgow, 
Maryhill] - "The Bill is different from other legislation in
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that, in these provisions applying to Scotland, particular 
emphasis is laid on the replacement of older houses, whereas 
in the legislation for England and Wales the emphasis is on 
improvement. Most of us welcome this feature".61
This latter point was underlined by the Minister of State - 
J Dickson Mabon - in winding up the debate. "The principal 
purpose of the Bill, as distinct from the English Measure, 
is to clear away slums faster than we have done before. 
This is the first thing. Its object is not to keep going 
many old houses which ought not to be left standing" .62
The Reports Compared
Clearly the SHAC Report was given a more enthusiastic recep­
tion by ministers [and by Labour and Conservative MPs], and 
was given more visibility, than was the CHAC Report. And, 
while a considerable proportion of the proposals contained 
in the English/Welsh White Paper could be related to the 
CHAC Sub-committee's specific recommendations or suggestions 
for review of existing policies there was sufficient evi­
dence of lack of consensus and unhappiness with the attitude 
of the Department evident in the Report, to reduce its 
utility. Perhaps most significantly, however, as the
result of the Government's volte-face on compulsory improve­
ment of owner occupied property, the Sub-committee had 'got 
it wrong'.
The SHAC Sub-committee, on the other hand, had not only 
escaped such pitfalls, but also produced in a forceful
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style, at a time when the Government and the Conservative 
Opposition were regarding with concern a perceived threat 
from the SNP, a report, which highlighted the special nature 
of the Scottish housing problem, and by implication, provi­
ded a case if not - given the prevailing economic circum­
stances, - for more resources, at least for no reduction of 
resources, and also for 'distinctively Scottish' legislative 
provisions. Beyond that, the Sub-committee's detailed
examination of, and comments on the improvement grant system 
provided a basis for justifying higher levels of grant and 
for defending the resource implications, while also offering 
scope for encouraging the greater commitment on the part of 
local authorities which was essential to the implementation 
of the scheme.
The views of both Sub-committees may also have been used to 
support the case for higher expenditure on compensation to 
owner occupiers of sub-standard housing, although only the 
CHAC Sub-committee's observations in this connection were 
referred to during the parliamentary debates. The SHAC 
Sub-committee's recommendations were also referred to when 
justifying the provisions for higher rent levels for im­
proved houses in the Scottish Bill, although in the case of 
the English/Welsh Bill the minister concerned quoted in 
support the Milner Holland Report et al.
Given the Government's claim that the purpose of the Scot­
tish Bill was to accelerate slum clearance, as distinct from 
the English/Welsh Bill where the emphasis was on improve-
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merit, it is interesting to compare the pattern emerging from 
the two policies. Examination of the slum clearance fig­
ures shows, that in Scotland, the annual average rate of 
demolitions and closures over the four years subsequent to 
1969 was 2.1% higher than the 1969 level,63 while in England 
and Wales, on the same comparison the rate fell by 3.4%64 
The small upturn shown in the Scottish average was, however, 
attributable to increases over the 1969 figure [17,847] in 
the years 1971 [20,555 - up 15.16%] and 1972 [18,518 - up
3.76%], only; the figures for 1970 [17,345] and 1973
[16,479] representing reductions of 2.81% and 7.66% respect­
ively on the 1969 rate.65 [The figure for 1971 was margin­
ally the highest achieved during the currency of the post 
war slum clearance programme. The Cullingworth Sub­
committee's target, of course, had been 30,000 per annum.] 
The English/Welsh rate after showing a slight increase of
1.19% in 1971 over the 1969 figure, declined slowly over the 
next two years.66 In 1974 both the Scottish and
English/Welsh rates dropped off sharply.
Although there was a decline in both the Scottish and Engl­
ish/Welsh public sector new build outputs in the early 
1970s, particularly from 1972 onwards [the Scottish figure 
for 1972 being 42%, and the English/Welsh 33% below their 
respective 1969 levels], while the English/Welsh decline was 
a continuation of a trend which had started in 1968 the fall 
in Scottish output did not start until 1971 [down 15.8% on 
the 1969 level].67 Indeed, apart from a small downturn in 
1969 the Scottish figure had progressively increased over
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each full year of Labour government since 1965, the momentum 
of the programme carrying through into 1970 when Labour were 
defeated and, to a somewhat lesser extent, into 1971. The 
figure for 1970 [34,360] was the highest since the post war 
peak of output [35,331] in 1954 and [allowing for a lag of 
12 months between new build completion and demolition of the 
vacated dwellings] clearly contributed to the peak in the 
slum clearance rate in 1971, albeit that there was evidence 
of a rise that year [and in the years immediately following] 
in the proportion of new build housing devoted, directly or 
indirectly to slum clearance.
Turning to housing improvement, analysis shows that the 
number of grants awarded to the private sector increased in 
England and Wales, between 1969 and 1971, by 71%; and in 
Scotland over the same period by 85%.68 However, as the 
prevailing Scottish pro rata level of improvement grant 
awards was, as the SHAC Sub-committee had pointed out, 
substantially below that of England and Wales, this higher 
percentage increase was not reflected in as high an increase 
in relative absolute terms. It was only following the 
introduction, in 1971, by the Conservative Government, as 
part of its economic policy, of a preferential level of 
grant - 75% as against the normal 50% for 'development
areas' and 'intermediate areas' [which collectively covered 
the whole of Scotland] that the level of improvement activ­
ity in Scotland began to catch up with that in England and 
Wales.
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There is only a short time span over which the outcome of 
Labour's 1969 policies relative to Scotland, and to England 
and Wales, can be compared. However, it is clear that, 
while by about 1973 there was a decline throughout Great 
Britain in public sector new build activity [and in slum 
clearance], and an increased dependancy on improvement of 
the existing stock, this pattern of events occurred later in 
Scotland; and, in the last years of the [1964 -70] Labour 
Government the SDD was able to expand the Scottish slum 
clearnace programme [a programme which in pro rata terms was
* ♦ • g oalready much higher than elsewhere m  Great Britain]. 
This ability was based on the successful defence, and indeed 
enhancement of a high level of new build activity at a time 
when, in the face of severe economic problems, the 
English/Welsh programme was being cut. At the same time it 
also found resources sufficient to fund a modest expansion 
in the number of private sector improvement grants awarded.
One is drawn to the conclusion, although the evidence is 
admittedly limited, that Scotland, as had been claimed 
during the Second Reading debate on the Scottish Bill, was 
given favourable treatment, and that to this outcome the 
SHAC Sub-committee's Report appears to have made a signif­
icant contribution.
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CHAPTER VIII - INQUIRY BY THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE INTO 
HOUSING IMPROVEMENT POLICY 1973 - & THE 1974 HOUSING ACTS
Introduction
As explained at the outset the Expenditure Committee was the 
forerunner to the departmental select committees. The
inquiry described here provides a useful comparison - first, 
because in contrast to the departmental committee inquiries 
it was conducted in a pre-legislative situation; and sec­
ond, because it examined and compared policy in England and 
Wales, and in Scotland.
Background
The preferential rate of improvement grant for development 
areas and intermediate areas, referred to towards the end of 
the previous chapter, was introduced by the Housing Act 1971 
and was available for work started and completed within a 
period of 2 years, subsequently extended to 3 years, from 
June 1971. As a result of this higher level of grant, 
coupled with the amendments made to the existing system by 
the 1969 Acts, and encouragement, at least initially, from 
central government, the number of grants approved in Great 
Britain in 1972 for the private sector was almost treble 
that for 1969. In Scotland the number approved was more 
than quadruple the 1969 figure.1
During the debate on the Second Reading of the Housing 
[Amendment] Bill in November 1972, which provided for ex­
tending the period for which the preferential rate of grant
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was to be available to 3 years, Paul Channon - Minister for 
Housing and Construction, referred to the fact that, around 
the middle of that year, "a good deal of attention [had] 
been focussed on possible abuses of the improvement grant 
system”2 concern having been expressed both by MPs and 
others outwith the House of Commons. The criticism had 
related to the exploitation of the grant system and harass­
ment of tenants by speculator landlords, mainly in London, 
and to the giving of grants by local authorities in rural 
areas for second homes.
The Minister intimated that, as part of a policy review, the 
Government was "looking especially at ways in which the 
improvement grant system [could] be modified in order to 
concentrate help on areas and classes of people most in 
need".3 They were also "looking very carefully into al­
leged abuses",4 and during the previous summer a study had 
been launched of the social implications of improvement 
within the stress areas of inner London. The results of 
that study having been assessed the Government would take 
whatever steps were considered necessary.
"In the meantime, [the Minister looked] to local authorities 
to exercise their already considerable discretionary powers 
to deal with the problem of undue speculation and harassment 
of tenants. Local authorities [had] power to refuse impro­
vement grants in such cases, and [he hoped] that they 
[would] exercise them. If they [did] not they [were] 
failing in their responsibilities".5 As far as grants for
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second homes were concerned, in the Minister's view there 
was little justification for making grants but it was up to 
local authorities; they had been given the discretion and 
currently he had no power to stop them.
Clearly prompted by the circumstances just described the 
inquiry into Housing Improvement policy by the Expenditure 
Committee commenced in January of the following year [1973]. 
It was conducted by the Committee's Environment and Home 
Office Sub-committee which was required to examine the 
following issues.
1. The operation of the 1969 Housing Acts [throughout 
Great Britain] and such matters as to whom improvement and 
standard grants had been paid on what basis and for what 
improvements.
2. The long term effects of grants on the nation's housing 
stock, its condition, its ownership and its price.
3. The objectives of the Housing Acts and whether they
were being fulfilled; whether the resources allocated to
the area were justified.
The inquiry was conducted concurrently with the Government's 
review of policy towards the older housing stock referred to 
above which culminated in the publication of White Papers on 
the topic by the DoE and the Welsh Office, and by the Scot­
tish Office in June of that year. Because the Sub­
committee's report makes extensive reference to the White 
Papers their contents are described first.
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The English/Welsh White Paper
The English/Welsh White Paper6 intimated, that while the 
evidence from the 1971 National House Conditions Survey and 
statistics on slum clearance and improvement indicated 
'encouraging progress', there was in the Government's view 
•no room for complacency', and that although it was intended 
to maintain the slum clearance programme broadly at its 
current level, significant changes in emphasis were inten­
ded.
"The key to success [lay] in the development of complemen­
tary strategies for unfit and older houses and in getting 
priorities right".7 The Government considered that
comprehensive redevelopment was no longer an appropriate 
approach in most cases of sub-standard housing resulting, as 
it did, in the disruption of communities and their environ­
ment, long periods of blight and loss of housing units, and 
lack of choice in housing type, tenure and cost. The 
intention was instead, to encourage 'gradual renewal' - the 
worst housing being cleared and the sites redeveloped quick­
ly, some housing being improved pending future clearance, 
and the sounder being given substantial rehabilitation with 
a view to long term retention.
Priorities for the allocation of resources were identified 
as follows.
1. Areas where bad housing conditions were accompanied by 
high levels of demand for accommodation and where the re­
sulting housing stress was characterised by multiple occupa­
tion, overcrowding, and in extreme cases homelessness. Such 
conditions were typically found in inner urban areas, parti­
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cularly London, and sensitive application of improvement 
policies was required to avoid hardship and abuse of grants.
2. Areas where poor physical and environmental conditions 
were accompanied by falling population levels and where 
demand was low as in the central area of many old industrial 
cities, where owners might be unable to meet their share of 
the cost of improvement or be unwilling to invest because 
the area was in decline.
3. Areas appropriate for general improvement area [GIA] 
treatment. Such areas should be free from stress
conditions and contain older housing suitable for thirty 
year minimum life improvement, accompanied where appropriate 
by environmental upgrading. The Government considered that 
the potential for providing better quality living for estab­
lished communities and achieving the best value for money by 
this approach had, as yet, to be fully exploited.
4. Areas where there were low income owners in old proper­
ties requiring assistance with repair costs, and property 
where repair work was required in conjunction with grant 
assisted provision of standard amenities.
In order to tackle areas of sub-standard housing comprehens­
ively, and to target resources effectively the Government 
intended to introduce a new concept, - 'the housing action 
area' [HAA]. Within HAAs a preferential level of improve­
ment grant would operate, with local authorities having 
discretion to pay grants at an even higher level in cases of 
financial hardship. HAAs would be identified on the basis 
of criteria to be discussed with local authorities but would
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include both social factors eg. the incidence of overcrowd­
ing, furnished tenancies, shared accommodation, elderly, and 
large families; and physical factors eg. the lack of a hot 
water supply, bath, or internal wc. For each of these a 
qualifying value would be specified expressed as a propor­
tion of all the dwellings within the HAA. [While it was 
recognised in the White Paper 'that housing stress would 
manifest itself in different ways in different parts of 
England and Wales' and that the declaration procedures would 
need to be flexible, clearly the social criteria mentioned 
and the concept of 'housing stress' indicated were most 
likely to be met in areas of inner London.]
Beyond the provisions relating to preferential levels of 
grant local authorities would be given additional powers 
operable in HAAs which, subject to 'consultation with local 
authorities and other bodies, and to the consideration by 
the Government of the forthcoming report of the Environment 
and Home Office Sub-committee', would provide for:-
1. At the discretion of the local authority [and where
owner occupiers were involved, subject to special condi­
tions] compelling owners to carry out minimum standards of 
improvement and repair;
2. At the discretion of the local authority, attaching
conditions to the payment of improvement grants;
3. Requiring landlords selling property to offer first 
refusal to a housing association or the local authority, and 
the local authority nominating tenants for property deliber­
ately being held empty by landlords;
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4. Awarding grants to assist with the cost of repairs.
Within GIAs, in order to encourage their development, impro­
vement grants would also be available at a higher level than 
generally obtaining but at a lower level than those avail­
able in HAAs. Repair grants would also extend to such 
areas.
With regard to the general application of improvement grants 
several changes were planned. First, those owners qualify­
ing for a 'standard grant', for the provision of the stan­
dard amenities, would in future also qualify for assistance 
with associated repair costs. Previously such assistance 
had only been given in the case of discretionary grants. 
The grant in its enhanced form would be known as the 'inter­
mediate grant'.
Second, because there was evidence of the system having been 
abused by owners making excessive profits on the sale of 
improved properties, discretionary grants would in future 
not be available for properties with rateable values above a 
prescribed ceiling. Third, local authorities would be 
given a discretionary power [distinct from that applicable 
within HAAs] to attach conditions to the payment of grants 
to owners, other than owner occupiers. Such conditions 
would require that the house be kept for letting at a regis­
tered rent for a minimum prescribed period, and if the house 
was sold within that period a proportion of the grant would 
be repayable together with compound interest. Finally, the
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payment of any form of grant towards the provision of a 
second home would be proscribed.
The Scottish White Paper
The Scottish White Paper8 begins with the assessment that, 
while 'very substantial progress' had been made in dealing 
with sub-standard housing by a combination of slum clearance 
and improvement, some 180,000 to 190,000 houses [10% of the 
total Scottish stock] remained below the 'tolerable stan­
dard'. It had emerged from the Scottish policy review that 
'it was much more effective to deal with bad housing, wher­
ever possible, by areas rather than by individual houses or 
single blocks of houses, but, while the existing mechanisms 
were effective in securing the clearance of areas of sub­
standard housing they were less effective in securing the 
improvement of areas of such housing to a reasonable stan­
dard . '
More generally, it had been concluded from the review, that 
the Scottish housing situation had changed from that 
prevailing in earlier years and that policy on improvement 
grants should change in light of this. "A consistent 
principle under the improvement scheme since its introduc­
tion in 1949, [had] been that all effective improvement of 
houses had been equally welcome as a contribution to upgrad­
ing the Scottish housing stock - the housing position [was 
now] very different - - as [had] been stated in the recent 
Report of the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee 'Planning 
for Housing Needs: Pointers towards a Comprehensive Ap­
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proach'9, the numerical shortage of houses [was] now no 
longer significant in many areas and the 'housing problem', 
whether of shortage or condition, [had] become much less a 
single national problem and much more a series of local 
problems in particular districts. These considerations 
clearly [pointed] to a need to adapt the improvement grant 
scheme so as to make it deal as effectively as possible with 
the surviving sub-standard houses".10
The changes which the Government intended [as with England 
and Wales it was emphasised, that they had not been worked 
out in detail - consultations would be carried out with 
local authorities and other concerned, and it was intended 
to take account of the report from the Sub-committee of the 
Expenditure Committee] were based on the premise that sub­
standard housing conditions must be dealt with by improve­
ment as well as clearance. " Subject to considerations of 
cost and other relevant factors, what [was] needed [was] a 
fully flexible approach providing remedies ranging from 
clearance at one end of the scale to full long term 
improvement at the other, with other possibilities between 
these two extremes. In this way the improvement grant 
scheme [could] help to achieve the best form of action with 
the minimum disruption of existing communities. For those 
reasons the Government's proposals [continued] to embody the 
concept introduced by the 1969 Act that clearance and impro­
vement must both be considered in deciding upon [appropri­
ate] action".11
216
Following from this last point, although the proposals were 
broadly on the same lines as those for England and Wales, 
while in England and Wales the GIA procedure was to be 
retained, in Scotland the housing treatment area procedure 
was to be replaced by an 'all purpose' HAA mechanism. 
There were also significant differences of detail in some of 
the intended arrangements. The principal provisions were 
as follows.
1. The introduction of HAA procedure whereby sub-standard 
housing could be tackled by clearance, improvement or a 
combination of both. The criteria for identifying such 
areas would, unlike England and Wales, relate solely to the 
standard of housing prevailing; there was no suggestion of 
social criteria being applied in addition. The physical 
standard to be applied had still to be decided but might 'be 
on the lines of the twelve point standard for [discretion­
ary] improvement grant1.
2. Within HAAs improvement grants at a preferential level, 
and repair grants, would be available; and local authori­
ties would have powers to compulsorily acquire sub-standard 
property if the owner failed to carry out the required 
improvements.
3. Local authorities would be given discretionary powers 
to attach to a privately owned rented house improved with a 
grant a condition relating to occupancy.
4. The standard grant would be replaced with an
intermediate grant which would include an element for repair 
costs.
5. Improvement grants would be restricted to houses fall­
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ing within specified rateable value limits and payment of 
improvement grants for second homes would be made illegal.
The Report of the Sub-committee
The Environment and Home Office Sub-committee, which had a
membership of 8 met on twenty-three occasions between Jan­
uary and May 1973 and heard oral evidence from
representatives of local authority associations, individual 
local authorities, professional bodies, and development 
companies; from civil servants from the DoE, the SDD, and 
the Welsh Office; and from the 3 ministers responsible for 
housing policy within those Departments. It also received 
a considerable amount of written evidence from local
authorities, professional bodies, other agencies and pres­
sure groups and the Departments.
* i 9The Sub-committee's Report published at the end of June 
1973 appeared shortly after the two White Papers, and as 
indicated earlier focused on their contents. The Sub­
committee ' s view was that the evidence received indicated 
the need for a 'revolutionary approach' to areas of housing 
stress with some form of special treatment on the lines of 
the proposed HAAs the likely solution. "Only by a unified 
approach with stronger powers could such areas be tackled 
effectively"13.
On the details of the provisions relating to HAAs however, 
the Sub-committee was critical of the absence of social 
factors from those to be considered in the identification of
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such areas in Scotland. "Social factors such as overcrowd­
ing [were] vitally relevant to the housing conditions of the 
population [and] should be included in the criteria for the 
selection of HAAs in Scotland as well as in England and 
Wales".14
It is perhaps instructive to note at this point that when 
giving evidence to the Sub-committee, the Scottish Office 
Minister, George Younger [Under Secretary of State for 
Development], had mentioned that there would be a difference 
in the criteria, but the point was not pursued. What was 
questioned was why, if the HAA approach was to be applied 
generally to sub-standard housing in Scotland, eg. to ter­
raced miners' cottages - and not only to tenemental housing 
which Younger had sited when pressed, as demonstrating the 
need for different Scottish policies, it could not have the 
same breadth of application in England and Wales. When 
Tony Rowlands, representing a Welsh constituency15, observed 
that "provincial England and Wales [had] problems very close 
to [the Scottish ones], and different from those of London 
and [that he was] trying to connect the separate [Scottish] 
policy on HAAs with the difference in the nature of the 
problem", there was no convincing response from the Mini­
ster. 16
Turning to another issue however, the Sub-committee 'strong­
ly preferred* the Scottish proposal to the English/Welsh 
one. This was the intention to use the 'twelve point 
standard' as the physical criterion for identifying HAAs
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rather than, as in England and Wales, the possession by 
dwellings of the standard amenities [the 'five point stan­
dard']; and it was recommended that the higher standard be 
adopted in England and Wales as well.
The Sub-committee identified a further inconsistency between 
the two White Papers in the provisions for securing the 
compulsory improvement of sub-standard property. The
English/Welsh White Paper proposed giving local authorities 
power in HAAs to carry out such work in default. The 
Scottish White Paper proposed that, in the same event, a 
local authority should be empowered to acquire a house if 
necessary by compulsion. While recognising that in the 
case of the conversion of tenemental properties such powers 
were necessary, the Sub-committee could see no justification 
for their application in other circumstances. It accord­
ingly recommended that the power to acquire an unimproved 
property compulsorily should relate only to tenements, and 
that for other properties, Scottish local authorities should 
be given powers similar to those proposed for England and 
Wales.
With regard to the compulsory improvement of owner occupied 
properties the Sub-committee was concerned that the powers 
which both White Papers proposed should be given to local 
authorities went unnecessarily far, and amounted to an abuse 
of personal liberty. It recommended that, in the case of 
such properties, compulsory powers should be restricted to 
requiring works external to a building, and not extend to
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requiring provision of amenities internally. On the other 
hand, it considered that in the case of tenanted properties 
the minimum required standard should be the ' twelve point 
standard', rather than the lower 'five point standard' 
throughout Great Britain.
On other provisions relating to HAAs the Sub-committee made 
3 further recommendations:- Any repayment of grant re­
quired because of breach of conditions should be of the full 
sum involved; Scottish local authorities should have the 
same power as those in England and Wales to require land­
lords selling houses to offer first refusal to a housing 
association or local authority; and landlords should have 
the right to serve a purchase notice on a local authority in 
lieu of accepting tenants compulsorily.
The Sub-committee was concerned to ensure that the effecti­
veness of the HAA arrangements be monitored. "Almost all 
the evidence submitted [suggested] that the introduction of 
the proposals for HAAs [would] result in a very limited role 
for the private landlord involved in voluntary improvement - 
the emphasis [was being] shifted dramatically from voluntary 
to compulsory improvement, from private to public action - 
and if the new local authority powers [were] not exercised 
or proved inoperative - the only result would be an even 
more rapid deterioration in the provision of rented accommo-
• 1 7 .dation". In the Sub-committee's view the proposals were
therefore 'something of a gamble' although a 'justified 
gamble' but it was crucial that similar difficulties did not
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arise in the case of the new compulsory powers as had been 
experienced with those in the 1964 Act. It was therefore 
recommended that a detailed monitoring and survey of the 
application of the new powers be carried out twelve months 
after the implementation of the new legislation.
With regard to grants the Sub-committee considered that:-
1. in GIAs, because they were to be 'free from housing 
stress' and would therefore contain less urgent problems, 
properties should not - contrary to what the English/Welsh 
White Paper proposed - receive a rate of grant higher than 
the normal, [The normal rate it was suggested should be 50% 
of the approved cost] - and it recommended accordingly;
2 . while the proposal for the payment of repair grants 
could be justified in the conditions prevailing in HAAs, it 
could not in those prevailing in GIAs, but made no recommen­
dation on this latter point;
3. a repairs element should be included, as the White 
Papers proposed, in the new intermediate grant which was to 
replace the standard grant;
4. payment of improvement grant for second homes was not a 
proper use of public money - [One Scottish local authority, 
Argyll County Council, when giving evidence, had argued that 
payment of grant in such circumstances could be justified on 
the grounds of the stimulation given to the local economy.], 
and it strongly supported the proposal to prevent payment of 
grant for this purpose in the future;
5. payment of improvement grant to those who could easily
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support the whole cost from their own resources was also 
wrong, and it welcomed the intention to exclude owner occup­
iers of properties with gross rateable values above a pre­
scribed level [as a preferred alternative to a means test], 
although it considered the proposed ceiling too low and 
recommended that it be raised;
6 . an age threshold should be introduced below which 
properties should not qualify for grant, and the date of 
first implementation of the building standards regulations 
was recommended;
7. the evidence received had demonstrated that the upsurge 
in grant assisted improvement work created by the increase 
in grant levels in development and intermediate areas since 
1971 had placed a heavy demand on both the construction 
industry and local authority staff, leading in the case of 
the former to shortages of skilled operatives and an influx 
of 'cowboy' labour, and it recommended that local authori­
ties should be given a discretionary power to extend the 
deadline [June 1974] for the completion of work in bona fide 
cases;
8 . there were areas of low demand where compulsory powers 
were not necessary but where higher than average concentra­
tions of unimproved housing in the hands of low income owner 
occupiers [conditions typical of some smaller provincial 
cities and the South Wales valleys] made preferential 
levels of improvement grant necessary and, striking a more 
radical note, recommended that such areas, which it sug­
gested be called 'areas of greatest improvement potential', 
be designated at district or sub-regional level.
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In relation to the last point the Sub-committee observed 
that Mr Gibson-Watt, the Welsh Office Minister, had, when
giving evidence, defined the 'special' Welsh problem as
1 8comprising the conditions described. Doubtless the
suggestion for the proposed 'areas of greatest improvement 
potential* and, in particular, the reference to the Welsh 
conditions owed much to the influence of Rowlands. It may 
be that he was acting in concert with the Welsh Office, but 
on this one can only speculate. It seems likely, however,
that there would be bi-partisan support within the Sub­
committee for this obvious attempt to counter the London 
orientated priorities of the DoE.19
In a section entitled 'Our Conclusions on the White Papers' 
the Sub-committee suggested that, while the measures 
proposed would meet a number of the criticisms that had been 
expressed of the operation of the improvement grant system, 
such as grants for better off owner occupiers and for second 
homes, the real test would come in the affect of the new 
compulsory arrangements on the private rented sector. It 
considered that within HAAs and GIAs, provided local author­
ities utilised the new powers and found them practical to 
operate, they would be a substantial increase in improve­
ments in the privately rented sector. Outwith HAAs the 
effect of the proposed changes was likely to be fairly 
neutral.
Having considered the impact of the current grant system on 
stress areas, however, the Sub-committee was less sanguine
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about the effectiveness of the proposed arrangements in some 
inner city areas particularly inner London. "It was made 
very clear to us that many social problems had been caused 
by the process of emptying multiple occupied houses in order 
to sell them as single units for improvement or conversion 
into several dwelling units - - the main complaint by the 
London Boroughs seemed to be, firstly, that existing resi­
dents were being forced out of the areas by more affluent 
people coming in from outside, and, secondly, that there had 
been a net loss of dwellings where large numbers of families 
had previously lived in large properties which were now 
being converted for the use of one prosperous family - both 
trends were increasing homelessness and creating an addi­
tional burden on the provision of council housing".20 In 
the Sub-committee's view, the scale proposed of a typical 
HAA - 400/500 houses - would do little or nothing to the 
'chequerboard' problem of bad housing scattered throughout 
relatively large urban areas as in some areas of Inner 
London. Local authorities in such areas needed to secure 
improvements throughout their areas and, it was recommended 
that local authorities should be free to declare HAAs wher­
ever there was severe housing stress.21
Moving beyond the contents of the two White Papers the Sub­
committee examined the discretion which local authorities 
possessed under the existing improvement grant system. Two 
problems which local authorities had to face were identi­
fied:- first - the extent to which they should refuse an 
application on grounds other than failure to meet statutory
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obligations; second - the kind of work which should be 
allowed for discretionary grant.
On the first issue the Sub-committee noted that "the advice 
from Government Departments to local authorities on how to 
deal with applications [had] until very recently, consist­
ently urged generosity in the awarding of grants. The Act 
of 1969 implied such generosity by imposing on local au­
thorities a duty to give reasons to an applicant where they 
refused an application for grant below the maximum. Then a 
DoE circular [in 1971] asked local authorities who did not 
pay grants or did so subject to certain restrictions, to 
review their current practice - - officers of two of the 
London Boroughs had, until mid 1972, understood the discre­
tion of local authorities to be very limited and had advised 
their councils accordingly".22 "By 1972, the emphasis of 
Departmental advice had changed, Ministers and officials 
began to stress the local authority's power to reject appli­
cations - - - . Public speeches by the Minister on the
2 3extent of discretion were very clear - - -". And the
Sub-committee quoted the speech by the Minister for Housing 
and Construction, Paul Channon, referred to earlier. "Yet 
[the Report continued] the whole emphasis of the DoE circu­
lars until 1972 had been to try to expand the improvement 
grant programme by being as generous as possible over grant 
applications, and the circulars were not withdrawn."24
In the light of the evidence the Sub-committee concluded 
that there was 'a clear need for a complete review of the
i
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formal advice which was given to local authorities' and it 
was considered that 'the Departments should issue an interim 
circular setting out the recent statements by Ministers 
which emphasised the authorities' right to reject applica­
tions '.
Turning to the second issue - what kinds of work to allow 
for grant - many local authority witnesses had complained to 
the Sub-committee of lack of clear guidance provided by the 
legislation and/or the Departments, particularly with regard 
to kitchens, additional bedrooms and central heating. 
There had, as a result, been different interpretations by 
various local authorities and complaints from applicants for 
grants of lack of consistency in treatment. Some local 
authority witnesses had requested a reintroduction of gui­
dance notes which the DoE had operated prior to 1969. On 
the other hand, the reluctance by the Departments to be more 
directive had been explained by Government witnesses as 
being caused by a desire to preserve flexibility. The Sub­
committee 'supported the Acts' refusal to over-define impro­
vement' but considered that 'their failure to define it at 
all and lack of clear guidance to local authorities from the 
Departments had produced variations in interpretation and 
confusion in understanding'. It recommended that the
Secretaries of State should be obliged to issue detailed 
guidelines which would have statutory authority.
A further topic considered was the adequacy of the housing 
statistics available. "Our difficulty [the Sub-committee
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observed] in assessing the housing improvement programme has 
been the astonishing lack of detailed reliable information 
about the state of the housing stock". 3 In particular, 
what was unavailable, was an estimate of the number of 
houses which might possess the standard amenities but were 
nevertheless in an unsatisfactory condition. It was recom­
mended:- that urgent action be taken to complete the 
collection of statistics on houses below the 'twelve point 
standard'; and, that the Departments should carry out a 
review of housing statistics in general, in order to provide 
a factual background for a proper evaluation of the housing 
programme.
In the final part of its Report the Sub-committee examined 
the criteria for choosing between improvement and redevelop­
ment, and considered whether the financial structure posses­
sed a bias in either direction. On the latter issue having 
received conflicting evidence - on the one hand, from a 
local authority [Lambeth], which claimed that improvement 
through a relatively greater burden on the ratepayer, and on 
the other, from the DoE, which argued that central govern­
ment financial support was the same for both improvement and 
redevelopment - the Sub- committee offered no comment.
On the former issue it was established that the DoE provided 
advice to local authorities on a formula based technique for 
making assessments between the alternatives. The SDD did 
not suggest a comparable formula but research to produce one 
was continuing. Although the formula by the DoE had been
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subject to some criticism the Sub-committee did not consider 
this justified, although it accepted that a higher discount 
rate should be adopted than was currently used. It was not 
satisfied, however, that decisions should be made on econo­
mic criteria alone; social factors should be taken into 
account as well. And, it recommended that the Departments 
should give close attention to monitoring the social effects 
of alterations to housing policies and should attempt to 
develop criteria for judging the relative merits of renewal 
and improvement [or the appropriate mix in a programme] 
taking into account both social and economic factors.26
The Response
The Government's response was not published until January 
1974, some 6 months after the Sub-committee's Report. It 
took the form of a White Paper27 and appeared the same day 
as the Housing and Planning Bill, giving effect to the 
Government's proposals throughout Great Britain, was intro­
duced. The White Paper 'emphasised' at the outset:- that 
the main objective of the proposed legislation was to redir­
ect resources more positively to those living in the worst 
housing conditions, and to provide more effective powers and 
incentives in areas of housing stress, greater selectivity 
being the keynote; that the criteria for establishing HAAs 
in England and Wales were now in a more flexible form than 
originally envisaged [ensuring that housing deprivation was 
tackled on the broadest possible front]; and, that the 
conditions proposed to be attached to improvement grants
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throughout Great Britain had been strengthened to rule out 
possible abuses, and other restrictions adopted to prevent 
improvement grants being made where there was no priority 
required for rehabilitation or the owners could afford to 
carry out the work without assistance from grant. Further, 
the respective Secretaries of State had already issued 
circulars emphasising local authority discretion in awarding 
grants as the Sub-committee had suggested.
Of a total of twenty-two recommendations made by the Sub­
committee ten were rejected:-
1. that social factors be included in the criteria for
selecting HAAs in Scotland, as in England and Wales - 
because the stress conditions involving a concentration of 
high demand and sub-standard housing had not emerged, and 
the priority was on upgrading sub-standard houses [Social 
considerations would, however, be referred to in the gui­
dance issued to local authorities to assist in selecting 
such areas.];
2 . that the 'twelve point standard' be included in the
criteria for the selection of HAAs in England and Wales, as 
well as in Scotland - because it had been concluded that the 
standard was not after all the best for application in 
Scotland, being insufficiently objective and pitched too 
high for the purpose, and the intention now was to use the 
possession by dwellings of the standard amenities as the 
criterion instead;
3. that the powers of Scottish local authorities to ac­
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quire unimproved dwellings should be restricted to tenement 
property and, that they be given instead powers to carry out 
improvements compulsorily similar to those of England and 
Wales - because deleting the acquisition power would involve 
removing a power the local authorities already possessed, 
and the alternative procedure which would be slower, was 
undesirable given the urgent need to deal with sub-standard 
houses in Scotland as quickly as possible;
4. that the standard for improvement of owner occupied
dwellings should only relate to external works - because 
circumstances could arise, especially in tenement buildings 
or terraced flats where this restraint could inhibit the 
internal improvement of adjoining property and the compul­
sory power would only be exercised where essential;
5. that the minimum standard for compulsorily improved
tenanted properties should, where practical, be the 'twelve 
point standard', rather than the 'five point standard' - 
because the Government considered it right to concentrate 
resources upon people living in the worst conditions, the 
application of the higher standard would involve more 
subjective assessments by local authorities, and the number 
of appeals and objections in Scottish HAAs could be expected 
to increase significantly delaying progress in dealing with 
bad housing,
6. that the Secretary of State for Scotland considered
empowering local authorities to require landlords selling 
properties in HAAs to offer first refusal to a housing 
association or local authority, as proposed for England and 
Wales - because the urgent need in Scotland was to have sub­
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standard houses improved by existing owners, whether owner 
occupiers or landlords, and conditions had not emerged which 
made it desirable to have such a statutory requirement;
7. that properties in GIAs should not receive a preferen­
tial rate of grant - because, although there was an absence 
of housing stress in such areas, it was important to prevent 
the 'agreeable old dwellings' characteristic of them from 
deteriorating to a level where there was no alternative but 
demolition, and the local authority associations had argued 
that a preferential level of grant was necessary to achieve 
this;
8. that local authorities should have discretion to extend 
the deadline by which work must be completed to qualify for 
the current preferential grant in development areas and 
intermediate areas - because of the administrative problems 
it was likely to create, and because the Government consid­
ered the additional expenditure which would arise was better 
directed to the priorities which had been defined in the 
White Papers;
9. that 'areas of greatest improvement potential' should 
be defined on a district or sub-regional basis and given a 
preferential rate of grant - because the Government consid­
ered that such an approach would be insufficiently discrimi­
nating and that HAAs and GIAs would be more effective ways 
of concentrating resources;
10. that it should be open to local authorities to declare 
HAAs where there was severe housing need - because decisions 
on what constituted 'severe housing need' would be extremely 
difficult to make in the absence of specific criteria, and
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given the inevitable limitations to what could be achieved 
quickly it was essential to concentrate resources.
Of the recommendations not rejected outright some were 
accepted unreservedly, others with qualifications, and 
others were promised further consideration. The first
category included the recommendations relating to the repay­
ment of grant in the event of non-compliance with condi­
tions, the age threshold below which properties would be 
ineligible for grant, and the consideration of social as 
well as economic factors in the appraisal of housing invest­
ment proposals. The second included the recommendation 
relating to the provision of detailed guidelines to local 
authorities for assessing improvement grants - rather than 
the Secretary of State being 'obliged' to issue detailed 
guidelines which would have statutory authority, provision 
would be made enabling the Secretary of State to give 
directions requiring that any application for grant relating 
to a specified description of improvement should not be 
approved without his consent. [The Secretary of State for 
Scotland already possessed such a power which perhaps ex­
plains, given the potential for criticism for not having 
intervened on the question of second grants for homes, the 
Scottish White Paper, unlike the English/Welsh, had found it 
necessary to refer to the "consistent principal since 1949, 
now under review in the light of changing circumstances,
p q
that all effective improvement had been equally welcome".] 
The third category included the rateable value ceiling for 
improvement grant eligibility, which clearly had resource
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implications.
On the face of it, the resultant change to the legislative 
proposals outlined in the original White Papers as the 
result of the Sub-committee's recommendations was marginal, 
being limited to the threshold age applying to property for 
grant eligibility, and the provision that the entire grant 
be repayable in the event of non-compliance with the condi­
tions. However, it can be argued that some of the recom­
mendations, although rejected, had an impact in a more obli­
que way and, of these, some can be seen as being so de­
signed. While the recommendation that the higher 'twelve 
point standard' be adopted as a criterion for the identifi­
cation of HAAs in England and Wales as well as in Scotland, 
by highlighting the differences in the Scottish proposals, 
may well have contributed to the Scottish standard being 
lowered it would be unfair to suggest that this was inten­
ded. But the recommendation for the establishment of
'areas of greatest improvement potential' with a preferen­
tial level of grant, together with the recommendation that 
social factors be included in the criteria for identifying 
HAAs in Scotland [particularly when the latter is seen in 
the context of the remarks made during Younger's evidence 
session], clearly were intended to signal to the DoE the 
dissatisfaction felt by some of the Sub-committee members 
that application of the proposed criteria would result in so 
much priority being given to the London area at the expense 
of other parts of England and Wales, and to create pressure 
for amendments in this connection.
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The first indication of the effect of this approach had been 
evident at the beginning of the Government's response when, 
as mentioned previously, it was 'emphasised' that the cri­
teria for identifying HAAs were to be defined 'in a more 
flexible form'. The significance of this became clearer 
during the debate, in February 1974, on the Second Reading 
of the Housing and Planning Bill when Paul Channon intimated 
that:- "the principal factors to be taken into account, in 
addition to the lack of basic amenities, would include the 
amount of tenanted accommodation; overcrowding and multiple 
occupation; large families; the number of elderly people, 
including elderly owner occupiers; and the need to preserve 
existing communities. This last factor was particularly
0 Qrelevant to certain areas in Wales".
The Legislation
The Housing and Planning Bill failed to complete the 
legislative process as the result of the Conservatives 
losing the general election in February 1974, and in the 
following May the new Labour Government introduced further 
legislation - The Housing Bill, and the Housing [Scotland] 
Bill which adopted the Conservatives' proposals with minor 
amendments. The Housing Bill in addition to containing the 
provisions relating to improvement policy - HAAs, GIAs, 
grants, and compulsory improvement - applicable to England 
and Wales, also, as the Conservative Bill had been intended 
to do, introduced measures to enhance the role of the Hous­
ing Corporation, and to establish a new subsidy for housing 
associations registering with it - Housing Association
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Grant.
Anthony Crosland introducing the Bill, acknowledged that, 
when in opposition Labour had supported the Expenditure 
Committee's criticism that HAAs as proposed would be inade­
quate to tackle the •chequerboard' problem of bad housing in 
large urban areas. He claimed, however, that the conse­
quential delay involved in providing a more radical approach 
would, given the prevailing circumstances have been unac­
ceptable.
The Scottish Bill absorbed the provisions relating to impro­
vement - HAAs, grants, etc., specific to Scotland which had 
originally been contained in a separate part of the Conser­
vative Bill.
Sequel
The annual rate of improvement grant awards to the private 
sector, having reached a peak in England and Wales in 1973, 
and in Scotland in 197430, progressively declined over most 
of the remainder of the decade 31. Comparison of the 
annual rate of award for the period 1975 - 1978 with the 
rate for 1974 shows a fall in Great Britain as a whole of 
54%, and in Scotland of nearly 70%. As was to be expected 
the greatest reductions occurred in the areas where the 
preferential level of grant was available prior to 1974, 
regions such as the North West of England, and Yorkshire and 
Humberside coming close to equalling the changes in Scot­
land. But there were also reductions outwith such regions.
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In Greater London for example, the fall in the equivalent 
figure was 44%, and other factors can be identified as 
contributing to the decline - the prevailing economic situa­
tion and, more immediately obvious, the tighter restrictions 
on grants. Further analysis of statistics on the lines 
just described shows in the South East outwith Greater 
London, a fall over the period in question [1974/78] of 34%, 
appearing to suggest that the more affluent areas were least 
affected and attempts to give greater priority to high 
stress areas were achieving little immediate success, and 
this interpretation was supported by a report in 197932 that 
proportionately more finance was being invested in smaller 
provincial towns than in urban areas with the most acute 
needs.
By the end of 1979 when 471 HAAs had been declared in Eng­
land and Wales, only 33% of the households in them [20% in 
London] had taken up improvement grants, suggesting that 
even with grants at 75% - 90% the ceiling on maximum eli­
gible expenditure was too low to make improvement viable for 
the predominantly low income residents. A year later, when 
the DoE had anticipated that HAAs would contain over one 
million dwellings, they contained only about 150,000. In 
those HAAs which had been declared compulsory improvement 
powers available to local authorities had been little uti­
lised because they were too cumbersome, and building socie­
ties had been unenthusiastic about lending.33
In 1980, the rate of private sector improvement activity
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having shown only a slight upturn, the new Conservative 
Government introduced certain changes relevant to grants to 
England and Wales by way of its Housing Act of that year. 
Tenants in addition to owners would in future be eligible 
for grants; the '5 year rule' on the sale of grant improved 
owner-occupied dwellings, which was considered a deterrent 
to building society lending, was abolished; the require­
ments applying to intermediate grants for short life impro­
vement were relaxed; and repair grants would be available 
for pre-1919 dwellings outwith HAAs34. Later in the same 
year eligible expenditure ceilings for grant aided works 
were raised.
Any positive impact the foregoing changes might have had was 
blunted in the short run by cut backs in public expenditure 
consents to local authorities but, in 1982, possibly 
influenced by the relatively low level of new house building 
activity and the prospect of a general election the follow­
ing year, capital allocations for private sector improvement 
were increased and intermediate grants and repair grants 
raised to 90% of eligible expenditure for what transpired to 
be a period of 2 years. The number of grants awarded in 
Great Britain in 1984 soared to a record level of 320,000, 
quadruple the 1979 figure, but 3 years later it had halved 
to 160,00035.
The dramatic increase in public expenditure on improvement 
grants in the 1983 - 85 period appears to have prompted the 
Treasury to question the efficacy of the system36. Influ­
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enced by this development, and with support from the deli­
berations and subsequent report of an inquiry into British 
housing sponsored by the National Federation of Housing
. 37 . •Associations'* , which concluded - "that while the main re­
sponsibility for maintenance and improvement of private 
sector houses should be with individual owners this did not 
absolve the state from responsibility for encouraging volun­
tary action, dealing with the worst stock, and helping the 
worst off; that the improvement grant system [had] not been 
fully effective in reaching the poorest and most vulnerable 
occupiers nor [in reaching] the worst properties; that 
public money for improving and repairing the private sector 
stock should be focussed to a greater extent on those who 
[could not] otherwise afford to take action"38 - the DoE 
and Welsh Office intimated new proposals 'for encouraging
thfe repair and improvement of private sector housing' in a
3 9Green Paper published m  May 1985 .
The several forms of grant currently available for improve­
ment and repair would be merged into one grant related to 
the cost of any work required to bring a dwelling up to a 
'new standard of fitness for human habitation', and avail­
able on a mandatory basis to owner-occupiers judged to 
qualify on a means test of household resources. Those 
qualifying for grant assistance would also be eligible for 
an interest free equity sharing loan, payable by and at the 
discretion of the local authority, to meet the additional 
cost involved in raising the property to a higher 'thirty 
year life' standard.
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Relative to the fitness standard to be applied, and evoking 
the different approaches adopted by the English/Welsh and 
Scottish Housing Acts 16 years before, the Green Paper 
contains the following paragraph. "In Scotland the fitness 
standard was replaced in 1974 by the tolerable standard. 
[In fact it was 1969.] Under this standard local authori­
ties are still required to consider houses against a list of 
criteria but the property is automatically below the stan­
dard if it fails to meet the requirements in one or more 
respects - there is no need for authorities to try to reach 
an overall judgment about its condition. The system to be 
adopted in England and Wales will follow this approach"40.
Six months after the publication of the Green Paper a 
'Guardian' article41 speculated that the Government might 
quietly drop the proposals as "every published response 
[had] contained strong criticism of the proposed changes 
with private interests joining common cause with charitable 
housing groups". The Association of Metropolitan Authori­
ties had described the Green Paper as "an exercise in redu­
cing public expenditure", and had been particularly critical 
of the proposed equity sharing loan arrangements.
In September 1987 the Government published a White Paper 
'Housing: The Government's Proposals'42. With regard to 
improvement policy it was announced that changes in the 
grant system would be introduced, but in an amended form to 
those in the Green Paper. Instead of the proposed loans 
for eligible owner-occupiers for improvement beyond the
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fitness standard, grant assistance would be available at the 
discretion of the local authority. But, to avoid the 
possibility of windfall profits a discretionary grant would 
be repayable on a sliding scale where a property was sold 
within 3 years, and if the selling price exceeded a set 
figure. Provisions on these lines were subsequently enac­
ted in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. Labour 
has criticised the amended fitness standard as being "too 
narrow" and as requiring to be "strengthened" as resources 
permit; and the means test for improvement grants as "far 
too restrictive and requiring review", but do not appear to 
be opposed to the changes in principle43.
Initially the movement towards a means tested system, and to 
a common grant for improvement and repair, took the same 
pattern in Scotland although the Scottish Green Paper 44 did 
not appear until December 1985, some seven months after its 
English counterpart. A difference in the Scottish propo­
sals which would doubtless require Treasurer approval, and 
may thus help to explain the delay, was a concession to the 
occupiers of tenements. Because in such buildings "the 
ability of one owner or occupier to act to secure the impro­
vement of his property [was] physically constrained by the 
action of his neighbours, the application of an individual 
test of resources to determine eligibility for assistance 
would seriously impede progress with rehabilitation - - - 
and the Government [proposed] that the provision of assis­
tance to bring [tenemental dwellings] to the tolerable 
standard [which it was proposed to raise] should be exempt
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from the test of resources.45
However, by the time the Scottish parallel to the 
English/Welsh White Paper mentioned earlier ['Housing: The 
Government's Proposals for Scotland'] 46 was published in 
November 1987 the proposals with regard to grant assistance 
for tenemental improvement had been modified somewhat. It 
was now intended that there "be special arrangements con­
cerning the availability of grants for improvement of tene­
ments: [whereby] in certain cases where some individual
owners [were] eligible for grants, assistance [would] be
given to other owners who would otherwise have to bear the 
full cost of their share of the works."47
In May 1988 the SDD issued a consultative paper 'Private
Housing Renewal: The Government's Proposals for Scotland'.
On the issue of grants for tenemental improvement the propo­
sals now involved making a minimum level of grant available 
without means testing, and a higher level subject to means 
testing.
So far the Scottish Office has made no move to introduce 
legislation to affect changes in grant arrangements and to 
bring Scotland into line with England and Wales, and there 
are no plans to do so in the proposals in the Queen's Speech 
for the 1992/93 session of Parliament. The reasons for the 
inaction are not clear but it seems two factors may be 
contributory. First - criticism by local authorities, in 
particular perhaps by Glasgow District Council whose corn-
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ments were "based on considerable experience of private 
housing renewal widely recognised as one of the most effec­
tive and significant in Britain and Europe", and who were 
concerned at the disincentive effect means testing would 
have on major tenemental repair and the high administrative 
costs involved, and who could point to evidence from acade­
mic research within the city that assistance with housing 
improvement costs could be effectively targeted without
A Q ,resort to means testing. Second - the conclusion reached
by the Comptroller and Auditor General after an investiga­
tion by the National Audit Office "that the accuracy of the 
reported figures for housing below the tolerable standard in
• • A Q  • iScotland could be called into question"^, which in turn 
prompted and inquiry into the matter by the Public Accounts 
Committee.50 This development will be dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter IX but the point here is that the Depart­
ment is unlikely to want to give the topic of substandard 
housing prominence until ministers can speak with conviction 
as to the prevailing situation.
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SECTION IV
INQUIRIES ON OTHER HOUSING ISSUES
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CHAPTER IX - THE SALE OF COUNCIL HOUSES, AND HOUSING POLICY 
IN SCOTLAND - FURTHER INQUIRIES BY THE DEPARTMENTAL SELECT 
COMMITTEES
In this chapter three inquiries conducted by the Depart­
mental Select Committees - one by the Environment Committee 
into Council House Sales,1 and two by the Committee on 
Scottish Affairs, the first into Housing Capital Alloca-
. 9  . “5tions, and the second into Dampness m  Housing are ex­
amined.
COUNCIL HOUSE SALES 
Background
The sale of local authority houses to sitting tenants had 
been permissible since 1957 but it did not become a signif­
icant issue until the 1970s. During that decade sales 
tended to increase during periods of Conservative government 
and/or when Conservative control of local government in­
creased. At the October 1974 general election the Conser­
vatives committed themselves to legislation providing coun­
cil tenants with a right to buy and increasing the current 
discount on the sale price of 2 0% to one-third, and their 
1979 manifesto promised legislation in the first session of 
the new parliament to give the right to buy at discounts up 
to one-half.4
In 1977 the Labour Government, which in England and Wales 
operated a 'general consent'5 to sales recognised in its 
Housing Policy Review Green Paper6 that a right to buy had 
been proposed but concluded that it should not depart from
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its current policy of 'not favouring sales' where there was 
unmet demand for rented accommodation - "the Government 
rejects a statutory right for tenants to buy. Indeed it 
would be anomalous for the Government to direct their poli­
cies and priorities, as they have done, to the assistance of 
areas of housing stress and at the same time to accept a 
substantial depletion of the kind of stock which they are 
encouraging authorities to provide".
The two Housing Bills introduced by the Conservatives after 
coming to power in 1979 - the Housing Bill 1980 [applicable 
to England and Wales], and the Tenants' Rights, etc. [Scot­
land] Bill 1980, provided inter alia for a right to buy for 
the majority of public sector tenants of a minimum of three 
years standing with discounts ranging from one-third up to a 
maximum of one-half of market value after twenty years 
tenancy.
As indicated earlier the inquiry by the Environment Commit­
tee into Council House Sales, more specifically 'the finan­
cial and social implications of Council House Sales', con­
stituted the first part of a two stage inquiry into rented 
housing, the second stage involving the inquiry into the 
private rented sector discussed in Chapter VI. And, while 
the latter inquiry appears to have been advocated by the 
leading Conservative member Nicholas Scott, the Council 
House Sales inquiry was conducted at the instigation of the 
Labour chairman Bruce Douglas-Mann.8
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The Inquiry and The Report
Evidence was taken from local authorities, construction 
companies, credit institutions, pressure groups, academics 
and professional bodies; the examination of witnesses 
extending over fifteen sessions between April and July 1980. 
Research by three part-time specialist advisors appointed 
for the inquiry, and who produced eight memoranda, took a 
further three months to complete.
The Report was not published until July 1981, and only after 
three drafts had been produced. The final version, the 
preparation of which appears to have involved close co­
operation between Bruce Douglas-Mann and Nicholas Scott,9 
was agreed by a majority of five to four with two Conserva­
tive members including Mawhinney and two Labour members 
including Winnick voting against. Reginald Freeson voted 
in favour together with four Conservatives.
The Committee had divided its investigation according to the 
effect upon five main areas: local authority housing;
private housing market and provision; public sector finance; 
equity between individuals; and, the wider economic implica­
tions.
Impact Upon Local Authority Housing - The Committee 
reckoned that the level of sales in the first five years of 
the existence of the Act was likely to be in the region of 
100,000per annum.10 Over a ten year period such a rate of 
sales would reduce the stock of houses [as distinct from
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flats] by nearly one-third. While the evidence was not 
conclusive it seemed likely that sales would be dispropor­
tionately of houses rather than flats, and that houses sold 
would tend to be the better houses in the more popular 
areas.
The Committee took issue with the DoE concerning the impact 
of sales on the availability of re-lets. The Department 
had originally suggested the impact would be 'minimal'. 
However, under pressure from the Committee, the Department 
produced figures suggesting a loss of 2.6% per annum of 
houses sold. On the assumption of sales at a rate of 
100,000 per annum there would be a loss of 26,000 re-lets in 
the first ten years and of 78,000 in thirty years. The 
resulting effect on the number of new lettings and transfers 
would be substantial. The fact that the Government's
assessment in this regard had, 'to a degree', been based on 
•a false premise', gave added grounds for re-examining the 
proposed reductions in public expenditure on housing pro­
posed in the Public Expenditure White Papers of 1980 and 
1981. While recognising that sheltered housing was exclu­
ded from the 'right to buy', the Committee remained con­
cerned about the adverse effect on sales upon the housing 
opportunities of the elderly. Concern was also expressed 
about the impact on rural areas, notwithstanding the exis­
tence of designated area exceptions.
Impact on Private Housing - The Committee considered that 
the impact on the availability of mortgage finance for
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private housing was unlikely to be significant because it 
was anticipated that the proportion of local authority house 
sales financed privately would be small. In the longer
term, however, as resales occurred this could become more of 
a problem.11
Effect on Public Finance - In the Committee's view the 
assumptions on which the Department had based its appraisal 
of the financial effects of sales were 'unrealistic' and the 
appraisal might give an 'unduly favourable' impression. 
"The Committee accepted many of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General's criticisms of the Department's assumptions; for 
instance, in his view the lowest assumption on the rate of 
increase in rent was clearly less probable than the highest 
assumption, that the highest of the Department's assumptions 
on savings in upkeep and management expenditure should not 
have been included, that the public sector cost of private 
improvements should be included. - - One of the alterna­
tives which should have been considered was an increase of 
rents in relation to earnings - The Committee regret­
ted that the Department's appraisal "should have been shown 
in these and several other ways to contain so many defects". 
One of the special advisors had applied the same analytical 
technique used by the Department with some alterations to 
the assumptions and had "concluded that while the financial 
effects remained favourable in the short term, the twenty 
year appraisal contained both losses and gains and over a 
fifty year period every variant under the assumptions used, 
showed a loss".12
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Since the Committee's findings 'differed so radically from 
those of the Department a thorough and comprehensive reply 
from the Department was of paramount importance.'
Equity between Individuals - The Committee recognised that 
there were substantial advantages to tenant purchasers, both 
financial and non financial. These included meeting tenure 
preference, mobility and security and the opportunity to 
acquire an asset likely to appreciate in value at a dis­
count .
During the debate on the Second Reading of the Housing Bill 
the Secretary of State had justified the discount on two 
grounds. First - that sitting tenants in the private
sector often purchased their houses at prices significantly 
below vacant possession value. Second - that many tenants 
had paid more in rent than early post war owner occupiers 
had paid in mortgages. Yet the latter now had an asset 
worth £20,000 - £30,000. The Committee considered that
"the new discounts can be justified on the grounds that they 
increase council house sales and that they will result in 
greater accretion of wealth to tenant purchasers. The 
Committee welcomes the discount on both counts".13 During 
the discussion of the draft David Winnick proposed an amend­
ment to have the word 'justified' changed to 'argued' but 
the motion was defeated by voting on straight party lines.
Effect on the Economy - The Committee considered three 
theses which emerged from the evidence it had heard. First
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- that increased owner occupation would increase labour 
mobility. Second - that council house sales would worsen 
the housing prospects of lower paid workers in areas where 
housing shortages existed. Third - that in areas where 
there was a low proportion of houses available for owner 
occupation professional and skilled workers would tend to 
move out and industry consequently to do the same.
The Committee considered that while there was a possibility 
that council house sales might benefit the economy, in most 
areas the benefit was likely to be slight and in some areas 
the effect would be damaging. "The benefit could to a 
large extend be achieved by other means at much less cost to 
public funds."14
Reaction to the Report and the Government's Response
The inquiry started too late to influence the Second Reading 
of the Housing Bill in the Commons in January 1980 but both 
Douglas-Mann and Winnick referred to the Committee and the 
evidence it had collected.15 The evidence from witnesses 
was published between April and July 1980 and was available 
to the Lords at their debates on the Bill. The evidence on 
the impact of sales in rural areas may have contributed to 
the acceptance of an amendment restricting sales in areas 
where there was a high demand for holiday and retirement 
homes.16
When the Report was published a press conference was held at 
which Bruce Douglas-Mann maintained that although the
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majority for accepting the Report was small, the voting went 
against party lines and showed that Select Committees could 
present a balanced critique on controversial issues. 'The 
Guardian' while highlighting the criticisms which had been 
made of the DoE's reasoning, statistics and assumptions, 
also emphasised the conflict which had occurred within the 
Committee over the issue and the fact that the Report had 
been drafted three times before it was adopted. "The
accusations came in a report which emerged only after pro­
longed wrangling between positions so polarised as to call 
the Select Committee system into question".17
The DoE's response to the Committee's criticism came in
l O  ,
October 1981. In its general observations the Department
suggested "that a more balanced picture would have been 
produced had the opinions of actual and prospective 
purchasers been collected, and if the opinions received had 
been weighed more critically". On the issue of the loss of 
re-lets the suggestion that the House was given information 
which was less than accurate was totally rejected. With 
regard to the type of property likely to be sold the Commit­
tee did "not appear to give full weight to the wider and 
contrary evidence of the housing market - there is a wide­
spread demand for low priced property".19 As to the finan­
cial effects of sales the Department counter-challenged the 
approach adopted by the Committee's special advisor. In 
its observations on the impact of sales on housing for the 
elderly and on housing in rural areas the Committee had in 
the Department's opinion not given "adequate recognition to
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the strong desire of many tenants in these categories to buy 
their homes".20
The Report appeared to have little impact on the Government 
which went ahead with proposals to extend the 'right to buy' 
to charitable organisations - although here it met opposi­
tion in the Lords, and to increase the discount available to 
tenants of thirty years standing to 60%. At the same time 
there was no increase in new public sector housing provi­
sion.
Attitude of the Labour Party
At the June 1983 general election Labour's manifesto an­
nounced that a Labour government would "End enforced council 
house sales, empower public landlords to purchase houses 
sold under the Tories on first resale and provide that 
future agreed sales [would] be at market value". A Follow­
ing the loss of that general election there were indica­
tions, that Labour's policy on the issue was about to 
change. At the Party's annual conference later that same 
year a motion seeking to commit the Party to outright oppo­
sition to sales was defeated and there was evidence of a 
strong body of opinion that opposition to sales had cost the 
Party a lot of votes on local authority estates. Subsequ­
ently the matter was referred to a sub-committee of the NEC 
for re-examination.22 The current policy is to retain the 
right to buy and to "increase the number of homes for rent 
by establishing a Housing Bank to facilitate the balanced 
use of councils' capital receipts and offer investment
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capital at attractive rates of interest".
HOUSING CAPITAL ALLOCATION 
Background
Capital expenditure by local authorities requires the appro­
val of the relevant Secretary of State. However, whereas 
in the past consent had to be obtained on an individual 
basis for each proposed project the system operated in 
recent years has involved the granting of annual block 
consents to each local authority based on submitted pro­
grammes. These programmes cover proposed expenditure on 
both the local authority's own housing stock and on grants 
and loans to the private sector. In Scotland, unlike in 
England and Wales, the capital allocation to public and 
private sector expenditure is split into two blocks 
'housing revenue account' and 'non housing revenue account' 
with virement restricted.
Capital expenditure consent allocations are in turn related 
to a system of housing plans [in England and Wales housing 
investment programmes] introduced in 1977. Local authori­
ties were initially required to submit these to the SDD on 
an annual basis but this was subsequently revised to a four 
yearly basis [with the exception of Glasgow which submits on 
a two yearly basis]. The objective of housing plans as 
described in the relevant SDD circular24 is;
1. to provide local authorities with an opportunity to 
assess fully the housing requirements of their area and
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formulate appropriate policies to meet these requirements;
2. to establish spending programmes which were consistent 
with policies and available resources;
3. to inform the Government of locally assessed housing 
needs which should be taken into account when making capital 
allocations.
The Inquiry and The Report
The inquiry was chaired by Robert Hughes. A former SDD 
civil servant acted as special advisor to the Committee. 
The Committee heard evidence from Malcolm Rifkind, then 
Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment at the Scot­
tish Office, and from two civil servants from the SDD.
The inquiry commenced in January 1981 and the Report was 
published two months later. The Committee make it clear 
that it was "limiting [itself] not only by subject - housing 
capital allocation, not housing supply - but also in ap­
proach, which [was] to describe the system and underline 
what [was] significant, rather than to dissect it and make 
far reaching recommendations for change".25
The Committee had received memoranda from Shelter, the 
Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, and COSLA. It 
seems likely that the last named body was influential in the 
issue being selected for investigation. On the face of it 
it seems surprising that representatives from COSLA were not 
called to give oral evidence. Perhaps, and of course one 
can only speculate, it was to avoid the possibility of
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matters becoming too controversial. The contents of the 
memoranda to a large extent provided the issues raised by 
the members. Most of the other points arising obviously 
had a constituency background.
The issues covered included:- the extent to which the need 
demonstrated in housing plans determined capital allocation; 
the change from annual submission of housing plans to a four 
year cycle - about which COSLA was unhappy; why the gap 
between bids and allocations tended to have closed - Conser­
vative members suggesting that there was now a quantitative 
surplus but that more attention should be given to special 
needs; the Government's recently announced intention to link 
capital expenditure allocations to rate fund contributions 
to the housing revenue account to encourage local authori­
ties to restrict these; and, to what extent the Scottish 
Office would accommodate local authorities where slippage 
occurred in a capital budget for any year.
An issue raised, and one which was to arise again during the 
Committee's investigation into dampness in housing was why 
the SDD did not utilise the national house condition survey 
technique adopted in England. The SDD's response was that 
both the SHAC 1972 Report on assessing housing needs,26 and 
the 1977 Green Paper on the Housing Policy review27 had 
placed increasing emphasis on the fact that local problems 
were different. "I think it is because of this emphasis on 
the distinct nature of the problem between one area and 
another that the Scottish Office has not so far thought that
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the relatively elaborate kind of survey that would be needed 
if any value was to be got out of it is a useful thing".28
The only sustained questioning came from the Chairman to 
the Minister and sought to establish why the Scottish Office 
had chosen to link capital expenditure consents to rent 
increases rather than to utilise the public inquiry provi­
sions of the Housing Rents and Subsidies [Scotland] Act
1975. [This exchange it would be fair to say, the Minister 
won on points.] In general members appeared to lack the 
specialist knowledge required to pursue points raised. 
This coupled with the Conservative members' tendency to 
emphasise the quantitative surplus rather than the qualita­
tive problems existing and to suggest that large urban areas 
such as Glasgow were attracting more than their fair share 
of resources combined to give the witnesses a fairly 'easy 
ride'. In particular the Committee failed to establish the 
criteria which the SDD utilised in allocating capital expen­
diture consents.
It was interesting to note that when David Lambie raised the 
question of equity in subsidy allocation between the owner 
occupier and the public sector he was quickly cut off by the 
chairman suggesting that Labour did not wish to imply that 
they intended to challenge the status quo on mortgage inter­
est tax relief.
As indicated at the outset the Report is largely confined to 
a description of the system. It does, however, contain
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some comments and implied criticism. First - insufficient 
attention was being given to special needs. Second -
whilst accepting on balance that there was a case for dis­
continuing annual submissions of housing plans this was with 
two provisos [a] that where there were gaps in the plans 
local authorities should be encouraged to submit ahead of 
schedule and, [b] that there should be positive and not 
grudging encouragement to local authorities to submit ahead 
of schedule.
There was also an implication that the SDD was taking too 
hard a line on rent increases when half the housing authori­
ties in Scotland had budgeted that year for a rate fund 
contribution in excess of the SDD guidelines. Glasgow had 
been penalised by the withholding of capital expenditure 
consent although its rents were above the national average. 
"We think it right to bear in mind the special housing 
management and repairs problems which Glasgow must encounter 
as the result of the high proportion of multi storey flats
9 Q .[it its stock]". Although the Minister had raised the
issue of Glasgow's high level of expenditure on repairs 
during the evidence session he was not challenged on these 
grounds at the time. Once again suggesting a lack of 
specialist knowledge on the part of members.
The Report did not seek any specific response from Govern­
ment and had no observable impact on policy.
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DAMPNESS IN HOUSING 
Introduction
This inquiry which commenced in February 1983 was chaired by 
David Lambie. The Buildings Officer of Dundee University 
acted as special advisor to the Committee. The selection 
of the topic appears to have owed much to the constituency 
experiences of Committee members. It was also an issue 
about which members could agree that something required to 
be done, the question being how best to achieve the objec­
tive - what has been described as a 'valence issue'.30 
There was also the advantage that the cause of the problem 
could not be attributed to any particular government al­
though as remedies had resource implications there was 
inevitably going to be conflict with the Government.
The Inquiry and The Report
The Committee heard evidence on eleven occasions between 14 
February 1983 and 27 April 1983.31 Oral evidence was given 
by Allan Stewart, Under-Secretary at the Scottish Office, 
and SDD officials; and, by representatives from the Building 
Research Establishment, COSLA, the Scottish Local Authori­
ties' Special Housing Group, local authorities, tenants' 
groups, pressure groups,professional and building trade 
employers' organisations and Strathclyde University. 
Written evidence was received from trade and professional
organisations and from local authorities. In addition the
Committee visited the Building Research Establishment at 
East Kilbride and inspected houses affected by dampness and
remedial work being carried out.
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The wide range of topics arising during the evidence ses­
sions included:- the extent of the problem; the type of 
dwelling affected and the estimated cost of effectively 
tackling the problem. The efficacy of different remedial 
techniques such as the use of dehumidifiers, heat pumps and 
cavity wall insulation; to what extent the problem was 
conditioned by, on the one hand, physical factors, and on 
the other, social factors; the role of the SDD in 
controlling housing standards, the introduction of advisory 
housing cost indicators and the desirability of 'whole life 
costing' in housing investment appraisal; the significance 
of the Building Standards Regulations, in particular their 
application to modernisation work and the proposal to delete 
space standards from the Regulations [The Building Regula­
tions were currently under review.]; heating standards and 
the adequacy of heating allowances to low income households 
- particularly those occupying difficult to heat houses; the 
lack of independence of environmental health officers in 
dealing with complaints of dampness in local authority 
dwellings, and the inadequacy of the nuisance provisions of 
the 1897 Public Health Act; the effect of cuts in expendi­
ture on public sector housing, and whether or not a capital 
expenditure allocation to local authorities for dealing with 
the problem should be hypothecated; the advantages of the 
development of district heating systems; and, the need for 
further research.
The issue which perhaps created most controversy and, as 
mentioned earlier arose during the inquiry into capital
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mentioned earlier arose during the inquiry into capital 
allocations, was as to whether or not there was a need for a 
national house condition survey in Scotland, on the lines 
practiced in England. The SDD was opposed to the sugges­
tion while all the other witnesses who were asked to comment 
on the issue were in favour, although one witness, from the 
Scottish Local Authorities' Special Housing Group qualified 
his support by suggesting that a pilot survey should be 
carried out in the first instance. The SDD argued that the 
existing machinery for collecting information on dampness 
was adequate and indeed superior to the national house 
conditions survey in this regard. It did, however, intend 
to expand the information being gathered during a forthcom­
ing EEC Labour Force Survey. While the evidence sessions 
were being conducted the SDD announced that it intended to 
carry out a house condition survey of the inter war private 
sector stock in and around the main urban areas. The 
primary motivation appears to have been, and indeed the 
Minister made this clear during the final evidence
on  . . . .session, * that the Department, in conjunction with COSLA, 
was in the process of reviewing the arrangements for the 
distribution of repair grants. It is also significant that 
Conservative backbenchers had been advocating the raising of 
rateable value ceilings in order to make repair grants more 
widely available to retired owner occupiers.
During the sessions much of the evidence given was of a 
technical nature. On the whole, the Committee members 
appeared to cope pretty well with this and were able to
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they appeared less adequately equipped was on the admin­
istrative and legal background and on housing statistics. 
For example, during the final evidence session when the 
provisions of the 1897 Public Health Act were being discus­
sed, and reference was made to an important test case in the 
Renfrew district, the chairman did not appear to be clear as 
to whether he was dealing with one Act or two.33 At one 
point in an earlier session a Conservative member suggested 
that "193,000 private sector houses were built this year in 
Scotland".34 The actual figure was nearer 15,000.
At the time of the 1983 dissolution the Committee had not 
produced its Report and publication was delayed until Febr­
uary 1984 by which time the Committee had been restructured 
and only seven of the members who had been involved in the 
inquiry remained on it. At the press conference which 
accompanied the publication David Lambie, the Chairman, 
"confessed that the recommendations of the Report had been 
'watered down' from the one planned before Parliament was 
dissolved". Barry Henderson, the senior Conservative
member, said "the Report was 'not as sharply worded' as the 
one the old Committee would have provided".35
The three principal recommendations were:- first - for the 
establishment of a 'dampness task force', a temporary spe­
cial co-ordinating body which would be quasi autonomous in 
status and composed of representatives from the SDD, COSLA, 
the Scottish Local Authorities' Special Housing Group, and 
the Building Research Establishment, and which would be
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augmented as necessary from other institutions such as the 
universities. It would also advise on research, dissemi­
nate information, and take a leading role in co-ordinating 
survey work. "It would not allocate resources, but would
be in a position to give authoritative advice to those who 
do".36 Second - the initiation of a small scale pilot 
survey to establish whether or not a national comprehensive 
survey was required and to identify techniques which could 
be most effectively used in such a survey. Third - the 
hypothecation of capital allocations to combat dampness to 
ensure they were not spent on other areas of housing need.
The other recommendations included: more emphasis on whole
life costing; the wording of the Building Regulations in 
such a way that disputes over interpretation of their appli­
cation to improvement work would be less likely to arise, 
and the deletion of space standards from the Regulations 
only subject to safeguards; higher priority for maintenance 
work; a publicity campaign to inform tenants on methods of 
reducing condensation; a review of the position of environ­
mental health officers and the adequacy of the Public Health 
Act nuisance provisions; the carrying out of further re­
search into methods of eliminating dampness; the installa­
tion wherever possible in modernisation schemes of landlord 
controlled district heating systems; and, an inter-depart­
mental inquiry should be carried out into the adequacy of 
heating allowances.
No specific recommendations were made on the financial
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resources required. The evidence received had produced 
widely varying estimates as to the cost of the remedial work 
required. A comprehensive survey of the type recommended 
"might enable the necessary level of resources to be more 
accurately estimated".37 However, at the press conference 
David Lambie quoted a figure of £500 million given by the 
Scottish Local Authorities' Special Housing Group.
The Government's Response
The Government's reply was published on 9 May 1984. "The 
Government [were] not convinced that a national house condi­
tions survey could be justified by any further light it 
might be expected to shed on the problem of condensation 
[and] in the circumstances [did] not consider that a centr­
ally funded pilot survey would be appropriate". The Gov­
ernment was "not persuaded of the necessity or desirability 
of establishing a dampness task force". No additional 
funds would be available and the recommendation that funds
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should be hypothecated was not acceptable.
The Committee's view that 'whole life costing' should be the 
norm was endorsed; account would be taken of the Committee's 
suggestions during the current review of the Building Regu­
lations; the Committee's comments on planned maintenance 
were endorsed; the Government would take up with COSLA the 
question of a publicity campaign for tenants; emphasis on 
the environmental health officers' lack of independence 
since local government reorganisation 'might be misplaced' 
but the Government would take up with COSLA and the environ­
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mental health officers' professional body the problems 
relating to the Public Health Act; the Government intended 
to encourage the formation of consortia to develop district 
heating schemes in suitable areas; since the Committee had 
reported the Government had announced a review of the sup­
plementary benefits scheme, however, difficulties were 
foreseen in the Committee's specific proposals for heating 
allowances and the Government did not believe 'any useful 
purpose' would be served in setting up an inter-departmental 
inquiry; the Government was already funding research by the 
Building Research Establishment into causes of condensation 
and would continue to support such research.
The rejection of the principal recommendations was predict­
able. The Department had all along resisted the suggestion 
of a national house condition survey for the fairly obvious 
reason that it might bring to light poor maintenance stan­
dards which could be attributed to cutbacks in expenditure . 
The proposed quasi autonomous task force, particularly as it 
was to have the role of making recommendations on resource 
allocations, was obviously unappealing to Government. The 
hypothecation of capital allocations for the eradication of 
dampness was advocated by COSLA. On the face of it this is 
somewhat surprising because it runs counter to the concept 
of local autonomy. The explanation for COSLA's support, 
and it seems likely in part at least, for the Government's 
rejection of the proposals, was that it would have placed 
the latter in a situation where it was disclosing to an 
extent the criteria by which it arrived at capital alloca­
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tions, something which it had so far successfully avoided as 
was seen when examining the Report on Housing Capital Allo­
cation.
The only apparent immediate impact of the Report was to 
bring a commitment on the part of Government to take account 
of the Committee's observations when reviewing the Building 
Regulations, and to review the nuisance provisions of the 
1897 Public Health Act. However, the Report obviously 
embarrassed the Government. The Secretary of State was 
advised by his civil servants not to hold the customary 
press conference when the Government's response was pub­
lished because it "would be likely to focus on very unhelp­
ful questions about the extent of condensation problems and 
why no additional resources had been made available to help 
local authorities deal with the problem".39 This fact had 
come to light when a copy of the memo to the Secretary of 
State was inadvertently enclosed with a copy of the reply 
sent to the Chairman.
A National House Conditions Survey - Subsequent Developments
As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter the accuracy 
of the Scottish Office Environment Department's40 statistics 
on Scottish housing conditions was recently the subject of 
inquiries, the first by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
[the report41 being published during session 1990/91], and 
subsequently by the Commons Public Accounts Committee [which 
reported42 in November 1991].
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The Public Accounts Committee had questioned Department 
officials "on the reliability of their information on house 
condition, the reasons for shortcomings in their informa­
tion, how they intended to improve their information and
what action they intended to take to monitor progress in 
house condition". The officials had "agreed that comparat­
ively little information was available on the condition of 
the housing stock in Scotland. They [had] explained that 
they were actively seeking more information and that the
picture was becoming clearer all the time. But local 
surveys did not provide all the information they needed 
about Scottish housing and that was why they were conducting 
a national house condition survey of the sort which had been 
conducted regularly in England, Wales and Northern Ireland". 
The officials had "accepted that the information available 
to them on below tolerable standard housing was unsatisfac­
tory and that the figures were likely to be considerably too 
low. - - The current national survey [announced in March 
1989] was due to be completed in 1993. It was intended to 
repeat the survey every five years which would give a pic­
ture of the trend and enable [it to be seen] more clearly 
what was happening". The officials had "agreed that unless 
they had a total picture of house condition they were not in 
a position to frame the best policy for meeting problems. 
They [had] acknowledged that the results of the surveys 
would enable them to target resources with greater
accuracy".43
The Committee concluded "that the Department [needed] better
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information on the condition of housing in Scotland, and 
[noted the] agreement [of officials] that improved informa­
tion would enable them in future to target their resources 
with much greater accuracy. [It was] therefore glad to note 
the Department's decision to launch a national house condi­
tion survey and their intention to conduct further such 
surveys every five years".44
If nothing else, these events may serve to redress the 
'power' balance between the Scottish Office and a re­
established Committee on Scottish Affairs. A balance which 
was so clearly cast in the Scottish Office's favour in the 
inquiry into Housing Capital Allocation.
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CHAPTER X - LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING ALLOCATION POLICIES
Introduction
As Dame Evelyn Sharp, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government 1965/66, was to observe in 
1969, selection of tenants for their housing stock was an 
area in which local authorities enjoyed complete discretion. 
"Ministers are frequently pressed to intervene - - but are 
usually glad enough to disclaim responsibility. General 
advice is given to local authorities from time to time, but 
they are free to go their own way - and do. These are 
indeed matters which must be settled locally; but the 
degree of local independence does not make it any easier 
when it comes to trying to meet housing needs which often 
have no relationship to local boundaries".1
It is with the preparation of 'general advice1 for local 
authorities on housing allocation, and in particular the 
utilisation of a committee of inquiry in this connection - a 
Sub-committee of the Central Housing Advisory Committee - 
more specifically the Housing Management Sub-committee, that 
this chapter is concerned.
Chaired by J B Cullingworth the Sub-committee was appointed 
in February 1968 its terms of reference being - 'to review 
the practice of housing authorities in allocating tenancies 
and rehousing and to suggest rules or principles to be 
followed in these matters'.
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In addition to the Chairman the Sub-committee had a member­
ship of twelve, seven of whom were co-opted. A
considerable proportion of the membership were from local 
authority backgrounds either elected members or officials, 
and there was one MP - Julius Silverman. The Sub-committee 
was supported by two assessors, one of them an academic, and 
by two joint secretaries and an assistant secretary, one of 
the joint secretaries being a qualified housing manager. 
Research assistance was provided by two academics from the 
Centre for Urban and Regional Studies at Birmingham Univers­
ity.
The Inquiry and The Report
Evidence was called for by press notice and by invitation to 
selected individuals, organisations including professional 
bodies, and government departments; and a questionnaire was 
sent to 131 local authorities chosen on a sampling basis. 
The Sub-committee which was asked to complete its work 
•within about a year1 [a period which proved inadequate] met 
on twenty-five occasions and its Report - ’Council Housing - 
Purposes, Procedures and Priorities'2 was published in the 
summer of 1969.
As the title suggests the Sub-committee considered at the 
outset the purpose of council housing - 'what was council 
housing for', and how was the context in which it was admin­
istered changing. It concluded that the purpose of the 
sector, and the policies which should be pursued within it,
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could not be determined without regard to the purposes and 
policies of the other sectors of the housing market. "The 
most significant feature of housing provision in Britain is 
its division into a number of sectors each of which is 
affected, aided and controlled in different and frequently 
conflicting ways by Government. There is little relation­
ship between the policies operated in relation to these 
different sectors. As a result major issues facing each 
sector stem from policies designed to deal with quite dif- 
ferent issues m  other sectors".
This conclusion reinforced by recommendations of the recent­
ly published Seebohm Report4 that local authorities should 
take a 'comprehensive and extended view of their housing 
responsibilities to meet the housing needs of their areas', 
and that there should be a 'thorough examination of the 
whole field of the allocation and subsidisation of housing' 
led in turn to the Sub-committee highlighting the restric­
tive nature of its terms of reference and the 'dilemma' with 
which it had been faced. "Our terms of reference referred 
only to council housing but how were we to consider this 
adequately without looking at other agencies of housing 
provision and the policies operated in relation to them - we 
were asked to look at only one patch of a patchwork quilt. 
We were not asked to carry out an investigation into the 
changing housing situation and the ways in which housing 
needs could best be met. We could not look at broad issues 
such as the relationship between council housing and owner 
occupation or the impact of housing finance - subsidies and
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tax relief on the total housing situation".5 It was
pleased to learn that the Ministry was undertaking a study 
of housing finance in both the public and private sectors - 
the Report might need reviewing in the light of any funda­
mental changes which might emerge from the review, and 
contribute to a wider review of which the Ministry's study 
was an essential part.
Turning to the changing context of council housing - the 
changing character of the housing situation, the Sub­
committee identified two aspects for particular considera­
tion - the changing tenure pattern and the changing use of 
housing space. With regard to the former the most signif­
icant development was the 'huge decline' in the privately 
rented sector with its consequences for households wishing 
to rent or unable to buy. Local authorities must take a 
wider responsibility for people who at one time would have 
been housed it the private sector and this had implications 
for policies with regard to acceptance of applications on to 
waiting lists, and as to whom local authorities were pre­
pared to house. With regard to the use of housing space 
the most significant development over the preceding fifty 
years had been the decline in room occupancy rates mainly as 
the result of a fall in average household size to which a 
growth in the number of single person and elderly households 
had contributed.
Its review of current local policies had convinced the Sub­
committee that local authorities required a "clearer, deeper
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and more detailed understanding of the housing situation 
in their areas; [there was] no longer a single 'national' 
housing problem but a large number of local problems of 
great variety and local and regional policies [required] to 
be forged to deal appropriately with particular problems".6 
"And the responsibilities of local housing authorities 
should extend far beyond providing for the needs of those
who were actually to be housed by them - they should be
looking for hidden needs, for needs which were not met 
elsewhere and for needs which might arise in the future".7 
The traditional 'waiting list' approach to assessing housing 
need was clearly inadequate. What was required was compre­
hensive information - and a procedure, analogous to that 
recently introduced for the production on a 'continuous re­
view1 basis of development plans for the town planning 
system, was suggested.
When it came to allocating council houses what were to be 
the priorities? It was no longer sufficient to depend on 
objective factors such as overcrowding and sharing, social 
and economic circumstances should also be taken into 
account. Particular attention should be given to those
whose incomes were low in relation to their needs, although
it was also important to maintain a broad spectrum of income 
groups within a community.
More controversially, it was also suggested 'problem fami­
lies' should be given special consideration. "It is not 
easy for a council to justify to its electorate the rehous­
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ing of families in arrears of rent, unmarried mothers or, 
indeed any group which does not conform to the accepted 
canons of good behaviour. Yet these are often the very 
people [and electors] whose social needs demand attention by 
local authorities. Unlike others who may be judged to have 
a stronger moral claim on the local authority their only 
opportunity to obtain good housing may be via the local 
authority. At the same time, to the extent that their mode 
of life is judged to be inadequate and in need of change, 
the tenancy of a council house provides a base on which the
• • • ft .personal social services can build". The Sub-committee
was convinced that fears expressed by housing managers that 
such policies would encourage 'queue jumping' were exaggera­
ted.
Although there had been arguments presented to the Sub­
committee for more central government control over alloca­
tion policies in a bid to secure greater uniformity of 
practice in housing allocations, to prevent discrimination 
against particular groups or to ensure greater equity, it 
did not favour such a development. What it recommended was 
that the housing management advisory functions of the Mini­
stry be strengthened "to assist local authorities to keep up 
with current thinking on housing policy and the best in 
management at a time when social and economic changes [were] 
taking place on a broad front. It [implied] no sanction 
other than the normal persuasive pressure which it was 
already open to the Ministry to apply" .9
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Turning to the details of selection schemes the Sub­
committee considered - that local authorities should have a 
statutory duty to publish details of the method used, and 
measures should be taken to ensure that information and 
advice reached those who required it. Training of housing 
visitors and housing managers 'left much to be desired' and 
arrangements for this should be reviewed. The practice of 
'grading' prospective tenants by some authorities with a 
view to allocating 'suitable' houses gave the Sub-committee 
particular grounds for concern. "There is a danger that 
applicants are graded according to the interpretation of 
their desert - we were surprised to find a number of housing 
authorities who took up a moralistic attitude towards appli­
cants; the underlying philosophy seemed to be that council 
houses were to be given only to those who 'deserved' them. 
Thus unmarried mothers, cohabitees, 'dirty' families and 
transients tended to be grouped as 'undesirable'. Moral 
rectitude, social conformity, clean living, and a 'clear' 
rent book sometimes seemed to be essential qualifications 
for eligibility at least for new houses".10. [An appendix 
to the Report gives details of the matters which the Sub­
committee considered should be discussed on a home visit.]
In the Sub-committee's view the selection of individual 
tenants for houses should be undertaken by officers and not 
by elected members, although the latter should be respons­
ible for the formulation of policy - clearly set out - on 
which practice was based. Various selection systems in use 
were reviewed and it was concluded that no one system was
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appropriate generally. 'Merit' schemes had the fundamental 
drawback that they could not be published and consistency 
and impartiality must always be in doubt. Points schemes 
could measure only objective factors which were capable of 
pointing. Date order schemes had advantages where there 
was no real housing problem. Social need, the importance 
of which the Sub-coiiun^ t£ep 4 s£rve^ sed, 4 shQuldv bev separately' * > 
assessed by the 'appropriate non-housing department'.
'Residential qualifications' for admission to local author­
ity waiting lists had given rise to 'much controversy' and 
had been 'unanimously condemned' by previous reports of the 
Housing Management Sub-committee, the last occasion being 
fourteen years earlier. The Sub-committee concurred with 
these earlier reports regarding it as important both in 
relation to the rights of applicants and the requirement of 
local authorities to have as full information as possible on 
the demand in their area that there be no barrier to appli­
cation. And, it went further in "holding it to be funda­
mental that no one should be precluded from applying for, or 
being considered for, a council tenancy on any ground what­
soever".11 This rule the Sub-committee considered should 
be made a statutory obligation.
On the issue of exchanges and transfers for tenants the Sub­
committee noted that much of the debate was pre-occupied 
with the issue of under occupation and it considered this to 
be wrong. It "did not view under occupation as a 'problem' 
but as a great deal of argument [centred] on it [had] felt
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it necessary to discuss it at some length, [and had reached
the conclusion] "that the real problem was that of providing
a good balance of house types in each locality and assisting
the movement of those occupying dwellings of a size which
1 2they themselves considered to be too large". [It noted
that a better use of space had been achieved in the local 
authority sector than in the owner occupier, and privately 
rented sectors.]
The Sub-committee endorsed a request issued two years ear­
lier by the Ministry that local authorities should accept 
applications from incoming workers. It 'deprecated1 the 
practice of tying council houses to particular firms. If 
workers were needed for the economy of an area then the 
local authority had a responsibility to ensure houses 
[without any special conditions] were provided.
Having reviewed the existing statutory provision and current 
practice with regard to rehousing of people displaced by 
'any public action' the Sub-committee concluded that an 
obligation to rehouse should extend to all households and 
parts of households irrespective of size or tenure, but the 
obligation should not necessarily be to provide a local 
authority house. A household might prefer accommodation in 
one of the other sectors, and the obligation should be to 
ensure that 'all persons displaced were satisfactorily 
rehoused'. Where a local authority acquired an owner
occupied house and gave the dispossessed owner tenancy of 
one of their houses this should not reduce the compensation
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payable. In general the operative date for the rehousing 
obligation should be the date of confirmation of the rele­
vant compulsory purchase order, but that approach might have 
to be modified in areas of acute housing stress.
There were 'some important needs1 to be taken into account 
when considering housing provision to which the Sub­
committee drew attention. An adequate number of larger 
houses should be provided for large households within their 
rent paying capacity. The number of elderly households was 
increasing rapidly - provision should not be solely of one 
bedroom houses - they should have the choice of more space 
if they wished; and elderly owner occupiers should not be 
excluded from applying for local authority houses. There 
was also a significant increase in the number of one person 
households, while the supply of accommodation traditionally 
occupied by this group was declining; encouraging
development by housing associations would be a possible 
source of new provision.
The Sub-committee had "devoted a considerable proportion of 
its Report to the question of housing coloured people. 
Despite a significant body of evidence which [had] urged 
[it] not to 'make an issue' of colour". It had done this 
for two reasons. First because it considered that housing 
management like industrial management could "not do its job 
in Britain today without a conscious and positive approach 
to race relations". Secondly because there was "undoubted­
ly a need for guidance to be provided for local authorities
Ij
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and local authorities would expect a lead from [it]".13 
Although charges of discrimination had been made against 
local authorities the Sub-committee had not attempted to 
establish whether or not they could be justified. ['we 
stress that we are not a court of inquiry'.] "Nevertheless 
it [was] clear that [there were] policies and practices 
which [had] a discriminatory effect. Coloured people being 
largely newcomers [were] affected by residential qualifica­
tions, and because newcomers tended to take furnished accom­
modation, they [were] particularly affected by an interpre­
tation of rehousing obligations which [excluded] those in 
furnished tenancies. These, and similar, generally applic­
able rules [had] the effect [though not the purpose] of 
discriminating against coloured immigrants".14
Coloured immigrants, like any group from cultural back­
grounds which [were] 'strange' to housing visitors [might] 
also tend to be unfavourably treated - from the practice of 
assessing applicants according to their housekeeping stan­
dards".15 "Coloured people [would] also tend to be ignor­
ant of the 'council house system'. They [might] find it 
incomprehensible and shrouded in mystery".16 With regard 
to these matters the Sub-committee expected coloured people 
to benefit from the changes recommended on general grounds.
The case for 'positive discrimination' had been considered 
by the Sub-committee but it had rejected it. "It is ap­
propriate for areas of concentrated need but not for partic­
ular groups of people" .17
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It had also considered the issue of dispersal and was con­
cerned "that any policy of dispersal in the field of housing 
must be implemented with great sensitivity, with no element 
of compulsion or direction, and [could] proceed only at the 
pace of the needs and wishes of the people involved. It 
must not be assumed that coloured people [wished] to dis­
perse themselves among the white community but at the same 
time the opposite must not be assumed - it [was] very easy 
for local authorities to conclude that coloured people 
[wished] to live in concentrations. Limited employment 
opportunities [could] conspire to reinforce this".18
Reaction to The Report
As mentioned in Chapter II the Sub-committee's criticism of 
its terms of reference and its call for a review of policy 
particularly with regard to subsidy arrangements was unlike­
ly to have been very well received in government and may, to 
an extent, have contributed to CHAC's demise. Beyond that, 
central government's response to the recommendations was 
rather mixed and slow.
In 1973 the Conservative Government's Land Compensation Act 
[together with a subsequent amendment in the Housing Act of 
the following year] provided that persons displaced from 
their homes by acquisition, redevelopment, or improvement be 
entitled to rehousing if suitable alternative residential 
accommodation on reasonable terms was not otherwise avail­
able to them. The same Act provided that the provision of
285
a local authority house should not be taken into account in 
the assessment of any entitlement to compensation for acqui­
sition of property.
The Labour Government's 1977 Housing Policy Review Green 
Paper in a section on 'local authority allocation practices' 
includes the following passage.
"The Government wish to maintain their policy of giving 
the maximum freedom to authorities to interpret and 
implement national policies in the light of local 
circumstances. They therefore believe that proposals 
to control local authorities' allocation policies 
centrally - for example by laying down a statutory 
framework for allocation schemes - should be rejected 
with the following exceptions:
- ending the practice of imposing residential and 
other qualifications for inclusion on a housing 
list;
- requiring the publication of allocation schemes.
On the first exception, the Government shared the view 
of the Cullingworth Committee that it is 'fundamental 
that no one should be precluded from applying for or 
being considered for a council tenancy on any ground 
whatsoever'. Today, eight years after the committee 
reported the practice of acquiring a period of resi­
dence is still widespread. The case for legislation 
will be considered.
As regards the second, a local authority's method of
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allocating housing must be seen to be fair. The
Government will introduce legislation requiring alloca­
tion schemes to be published. Such a requirement need 
not entail impersonal or rigid procedures. But the 
criteria for allocation must be clear".19
The Conservatives' Housing Act of 1980, although it required 
local authorities to publish details of their housing allo­
cation rules, made no provision against residential qualifi­
cations. On the latter aspect it differed from the paral­
lel Scottish legislation, albeit that the Scottish measure-
. . 2 0  • • was qualified. u The decision not to take similar action
in England and Wales was, in all probability, conditioned by
concern for the implications for London housing authorities.
There was to be no review of training for housing management
0 1 •as the Sub-committee had recommended. But, its recommen­
dation on improving the housing advisory functions of the 
DoE did eventually bear some fruit when in 1976 "a housing 
advisor was appointed [the post of housing management advi­
sor established in 1944 had been vacant since 1973] to 
determine the organisation and working arrangements of a 
professional advisory unit, to promote good professional 
practice within housing organisations and to advise the 
Department on matters relating to housing policy".22 The 
advisory unit was to be supported by a housing services 
advisory group which had been established in 1975 and which 
"included local authority members and officers, 
representatives of the voluntary housing movement and others
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with a special knowledge of housing. [It was] to consider 
the field which housing services in the public sector should 
embrace, and to examine and provide guidance on the handling 
of specific issues". J
It was with regard to its proposals for the comprehensive 
assessment and continuous review of local housing needs that 
the Sub-committee perhaps had its most significant impact. 
Although the system of housing investment programmes was not 
to be in operation until some nine years later, and although 
there were to be other motivating factors involved, includ­
ing the Department's desire to withdraw from individual 
project approval, it clearly had its genesis in this Report.
And, although the Report of the 1972 SHAC Working Party on 
assessing housing needs,24 which Cullingworth also chaired, 
has been credited with containing the origins of the Scot­
tish housing plan system,25 its findings had much in common 
with the CHAC Report [published three years earlier]. 
While the SHAC Report developed further concepts, particu­
larly that of the 'comprehensive housing programme', its 
material on the changing housing situation and the require­
ment for a comprehensive assessment of local housing needs 
is very similar.
The response of local authorities, and of those responsible 
for implementing housing allocation procedures, is more 
difficult to assess, although it is evident from the extract 
quoted earlier from Labours' 1977 Green Paper that, on one
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aspect significant to central government - residential 
qualifications, with their implications for impeding labour 
mobility, there had been little change for the better, and 
that housing allocation rules still gave grounds for con­
cern.
The Report had a wide circulation - in 1974, five years 
after its initial publication it was in its third impres­
sion, and it may well have had a significant positive effect 
both in terms of educating, and in achieving changes in 
attitude. However, the degree of influence in this regard 
would be impossible to separate from the effect of increas­
ing professionalisation occurring. Professionalisation was 
itself encouraged by the increasing size, scope, and status 
of housing departments to which local government re­
organisation, in the mid 1970s and advocacy for the estab­
lishment of comprehensive departments from professional 
bodies utilising the recommendations of the Seebohm Report25 
contributed.
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I - GOVERNMENT APPOINTED COMMITTEES OF INQUIRY
Inquiries conducted by six government appointed committees 
of inquiry have been reviewed. The first three - the
Ridley Committee, the Milner Holland Committee, and the 
Francis Committee were concerned exclusively or mainly with 
the private rented sector of the housing market. Two 
others - the Denington Sub-committee, and the Cullingworth 
Sub-committee were concerned with slum clearance and impro­
vement policy. The sixth - the Cullingworth [Housing
Management] Sub-committee was concerned with local authority 
housing allocation practice.
At the outset seven possible benefits, in addition to delay, 
were identified as flowing to government from the use of 
committees of inquiry, and it was postulated that there 
might be an inclination to establish an inquiry in circum­
stances where such considerations individually or in combi­
nation could be seen to be of significance. To what extent 
do the inquiries considered here support that prediction; 
what was the impact of the anticipated benefits; and, were 
there circumstances where some other of the potential bene­
fits listed became significant, or the anticipated benefits 
less significant, due to changing circumstances? The
inquiries will be considered in turn.
The establishment of the Ridley Inquiry, it is suggested, 
could be anticipated as bringing three of the benefits: 
producing a solution to the problem of inconsistencies in
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rent levels which had developed; building a political 
consensus across the Parties to support the continuation of 
state intervention in the private rented sector and for the 
introduction of 'fair' rents; and, legitimising the adverse 
impact the proposals might have on individual landlords and 
tenants. In the event, as has been seen, the 'solution' - 
the establishment of tribunals to determine 'fair' rents - 
was not complete, because the Committee did not provide a 
method of achieving consistency between different areas [and 
for that matter was vague about what should constitute a 
'fair' rent], and although a consensus was achieved for the 
application of rent regulation to the existing private 
sector stock, it was not achieved for new properties nor for 
the local authority stock. [Despite the shortcomings of 
the Report subsequent developments in the mid 1960s suggest 
that a 'fair' rent system could have been successfully 
introduced at that time had there been the political will so 
to do.]
The Milner Holland Committee was appointed to independently 
establish the facts - it was not expected to produce recom­
mendations, and clearly, whatever problems it might identify 
in the private rented sector, there was a confident expecta­
tion on the part of the Conservative Government [in the 
event unfulfilled] that the Report would show that the 
public sector housing stock in London was being inefficient­
ly utilised, both in terms of the income groups being ca­
tered for, and in terms of levels of occupation of space.
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As was demonstrated earlier, and as was pointed out at the 
time by the Conservative spokesman,1 and subsequently by the 
then Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Housing - it 
was "after the decision to appoint a Committee that the 
scandal associated with the name of Rachman broke". But, 
"it became generally [though wrongly] supposed that this 
was the reason for the Committee's appointment".
While not disputing this sequence of events it does seem 
that there had been no haste to set the necessary machinery 
in motiion - five months having elapsed [and circumstances 
of considerable political pressure having developed] before 
the chairman of the inquiry was named - a point about which 
the Minister, Keith Joseph, seemed somewhat defensive when 
making the announcement. And, once it was established, 
although the Minister expressed himself as 'anxious to have 
the Report as soon as possible' the Committee does not 
appear to have been put under much pressure. In short, one 
gains the impression that delay in publication of the Report 
until after the impending general election would not be 
unwelcome.
It can be concluded then, that independent establishment of 
the facts and probably an element of delay were perceived as 
the principal benefits of the establishment of the inquiry. 
However, in the event, with a change in circumstances - the 
election of a Labour Government - a further major benefit 
emerged in the use by Crossman of the Report's findings to 
build sufficient of a consensus within his own party to
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persuade left wing backbenchers to accept the proposals for 
'fair' rents.
One can argue, as has Duclaud-Williams,3 that the Report 
helped to include the Conservatives in the consensus as 
reflected in their failure to vote against the Second Read­
ing of the Bill or to amend Labour's provisions when subse­
quently returned to power. And, reverting back to the 
reasons for the establishment of the Inquiry it is also 
possible that the Conservative Government anticipated the 
Report as providing evidence which would persuade its own 
right wing to accept some intervention in the private sector 
of the London housing market if the need was demonstrated [a 
policy to which the Party was committed at the 1964 elec­
tion] .
A major problem which had to be solved before the new 'fair' 
rent arrangements could be put into operation and one to 
which no solution had been found in the twenty year period 
which had elapsed since the publication of the Ridley Re­
port, was what should constitute a 'fair' rent, and how to 
achieve consistency between different areas. As has been 
seen, the solution did not come from the Committee [it was 
not asked to address the issue] but it did come from a group 
of advisors which included members of the Committee. The 
significance of the existence of the Committee in this 
regard was, not only that it put Crossman in easy contact 
with expert advice, but more importantly, that he was able 
to use the status given to the advisors by their membership
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of the Committee to 'sell' the solution to his own backben­
chers.
While the objectives contributing to the establishment of 
the Francis Inquiry doubtless included the independent 
establishment of the facts, it is likely that the most 
important consideration was the provision of independent 
expert advice. Labour Ministers [and it is reasonable to 
assume their civil service advisors as well], were clearly 
concerned about the possible implications of responding to 
pressure from within their own Party to extend security of 
tenure to the furnished rented sector and must have hoped 
that such action would be recommended by the Committee. It 
also seems very likely that the delay resulting from the 
establishment of the inquiry was seen as a benefit. As it 
transpired of course the majority of the Committee recommen­
ded against security of tenure for the furnished sector.
Three potential benefits can be seen as contributing to the 
establishment of the Denington Inquiry - the solution of 
problems, legitimisation, and case building. The problems 
lay in the need to establish more accurately the condition 
of the housing stock. The Sub-committee was not expected 
to collect statistics, indeed as has been shown, it was 
discouraged from carrying out research. What it was expec­
ted to do was to devise [and legitimise] a set of common 
standards to reduce subjectivity, and so increase con­
sistency, in assessing the extent of sub-standard housing, 
and the need for improvement, and for repair. [As it
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transpired, establishing the extent of varying housing 
conditions was to be assisted by the application of sample 
survey techniques which the Report described - also introdu­
cing an educational role; and by the national house condi­
tions survey which it recommended - at the same time legiti­
mising central government intervention in an area which had 
traditionally been exclusively that of local government.]
In addition to house condition standards the legitimisation 
function could also be expected to extend to: perhaps more
importantly, proposals for measures to secure the compulsory 
improvement and repair of owner occupied housing; and justi­
fying rent increases for improved properties. Case build­
ing could be expected to support arguments: for modifying
the Inland Revenue's attitude to depreciation allowances on 
improved property; for a more generous attitude to compen­
sating owner occupiers of slum clearance property; and, for 
higher levels of expenditure on improvement grants.
The Sub-committee's legitimising role was substantially 
undermined by its failure to reach a consensus on compulsory 
improvement of owner occupied houses. Although, as has 
been seen, as events were to develop, this was rendered 
irrelevant. When it came to problem solving it clearly did 
not produce the response it was hoped for with regard to 
objective criteria for assessing housing conditions, al­
though the national house conditions survey, which it en­
dorsed, did provide significant information.4 The Report
may have been used to support the case which was 
successfully made for improved compensation for the owner
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occupiers of slum clearance houses, but it produced no 
change with regard to tax allowances for depreciation of 
improved property. And, while there was to be an increase 
in expenditure on improvement grants, this was a result of a 
redirection of resources dictated by economic circumstances.
The Denington Committee's 'potential benefits' of problem 
solving, legitimisation, and case building were obviously 
shared by the Cullingworth Sub-committee, although the 
Scottish Office doubtless perceived them from a somewhat 
different perspective than the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. Legitimisation of compulsory improvement of 
owner occupied property [which in the event the Sub­
committee did not do] was clearly a less significant objec­
tive in the Scottish situation. Compulsory powers already 
existed for tenemental improvement; and municipalisation in 
such cases, which the Sub-committee was to recommend, was 
probably favoured by officials because much of the work in 
tenemental improvement was likely to involve combination of 
existing flats.
The case building role would be seen as very important - 
indeed as presenting a special case - for resources. As 
the Report was, in the event effectively, to put it - "it 
[seemed] that housing conditions in Scotland [had] always 
been relatively poor compared with those obtaining in Eng­
land".5 With regard to problem solving the Cullingworth 
Sub-committee did a tidier job than Denington - producing 
the 'tolerable standard'. However, as mentioned earlier,
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as subsequent events were to demonstrate this seemed to do 
little to improve the dependability of statistics on Scot­
tish housing conditions.
A further perceived role for the Scottish Sub-committee was 
clearly to encourage greater local authority commitment to 
the improvement grant system. As has been seen a number of 
authorities had refused to operate the discretionary grant 
arrangements, and grant uptake levels were [proportionately] 
much lower in Scotland than in England and Wales. In the 
event, it could be argued that the approach adopted by the 
Sub-committee was to upbraid, and threaten with legislation 
as much as to attempt to establish a consensus, but it may 
have contributed to the increase in grant assisted improve­
ment activity evident in the late 1960s.
In the case of the last of the six inquiries involved - that 
by the Cullingworth [Housing Management] Sub-committee into 
local authority housing allocation practice - the three 
potential benefits clearly discernible are consensus build­
ing, legitimisation, and education and attitudinal change. 
Consensus building was required if local authority co­
operation was to be secured in, for example - the comprehen­
sive assessment of housing need, removing restraints on 
admission to waiting lists, achieving a more positive 
approach to housing provision for labour mobility, and 
devolving authority for housing allocation to officials. 
Legitimisation would be required in attempting to achieve 
positive discrimination in housing allocation for groups
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such as 'problem' families. Education and attitudinal
change would be involved in disseminating information on 
housing allocation techniques, and improving staff practices 
when assessing households for rehousing. In relation to 
some aspects, arguably including some of those just men­
tioned, and certainly in addressing the question of housing 
coloured families, a combination of two or all three of the 
benefits was likely to be required.
The impact of the Report is difficult, indeed in some re­
gards impossible, to assess. It is clear that attempts to 
build a consensus with local authorities on the need to 
remove residential requirements for admission to waiting 
lists, and to adopt a more enlightened approach to housing 
allocation policy were not particularly successful. Among 
those responsible for implementing local authority policies 
the Report may well have had a significant beneficial ef­
fect, both educationally and in changing attitudes, but the 
extent of the influence cannot be determined separately from 
that of increasing professionalisation.
In looking, by way of comparison, at situations where 
government has introduced legislation without a preceding 
inquiry it has been judged appropriate to focus on the 
policy area to which so much controversy has attached - the 
private rented sector.
The first significant piece of post war legislation affect­
ing that sector, not preceded by an inquiry, was the Conser­
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vative Government's Housing [Repairs & Rents] Act of 1954 
which provided for an increase in rent to reflect the in­
creased cost of carrying out repairs. A landlord qualified 
for the increase provided the property in question was in 
good repair and there was evidence of a specified minimum 
level of expenditure on repairs in several years previous. 
Here the Government was able to found its case on two inde­
pendent reports, one produced by a professional body, the 
other by a specialist government appointed committee on 
construction costs which, together, offered a solution to 
the problem of how to determine the increase payable in 
individual cases and legitimised the level of increase. In 
the face of these reports there was general acceptance by 
the Opposition of the proposals.
The foregoing provisions apart, the 1957 Rent Act [also a 
Conservative measure], providing for the decontrol of rents 
and discontinuation of security of tenure, was the first 
occasion when legislation in this area had been introduced 
without a preceding inquiry since control was first intro­
duced in 1915. The departure from conventional practice 
was conditioned by at least two considerations, both invol­
ving the need to minimise delay. First - stimulating 
supply in the private rented sector to compensate for the 
reduction in public sector supply arising from the proposed 
withdrawal of the general needs subsidy. Second - process­
ing the legislation as early as possible in the life of the 
parliament in order to minimise the adverse electoral impact 
of the provisions.
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It can be argued that as a result of the failure to appoint 
a committee of inquiry the Conservative Government missed 
out on the opportunity to gain access to expert advice which 
might have brought a more appropriate response to the per­
ceived problem of security of tenure [and for that matter 
rent control], and the possibility of building a consensus 
across the Parties sufficient to achieve confidence on the 
part of investors essential to the effective operation of 
the market.
When Labour was returned to power in the autumn of 1964 it 
was committed to repealing the 1957 Act and as has been seen 
Crossman utilised the Milner Holland Report to support his 
proposals for introducing 'fair' rents and benefited from 
advice from members of the Committee. But in the absence 
of the Report would Labour have established an inquiry of 
its own, and if not, what would have been the consequences? 
The answer to the first question seems almost certainly 
'no1. Electoral considerations were too pressing, as an 
extract from Dalyell's account of events demonstrates. "The 
1964 Election had been fought by the Labour Party on the 
issue of exploitation by slum landlords of tenants in the 
inner cities, and it was precisely such urban areas that had 
produced for Harold Wilson the slimmest of parliamentary 
majorities.- - An incoming government with a majority so 
fragile that it could be forced into a general election at 
any time from the spring onwards. [And] with a major
pledge on a populist issue, rent control, to be 
implemented" .6
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Labour had no developed proposals for implementing its 
commitment. Crossman, we are told, was "appalled [to
find] the housing cupboard was bare".7 Nevertheless, it 
does seem likely, that in the absence of an inquiry, Cross­
man would not have been denied a solution to the problem of 
implementing 'fair' rents. Other advisors in addition to 
members of the Committee contributed to the solution, notab­
ly Goodman, and the Committee members being significant 
figures in their field, woudl doubtless have been approached 
in any event. What Crossman would have lost was the legi­
timising role that the advisors performed by virtue of their 
membership of the Committee. This last point, coupled with 
the loss of evidence from the Report itself, would have, of 
course, made it more difficult for him to persuade Labour's 
left wing to accept the proposals. That this would have 
resulted in the loss of the Bill or even its significant 
amendment, however, seems unlikely. What would have been 
more at risk was Crossman's reputation within the Party.
It is also unlikely that the absence of a report would have 
made the Conservatives more inclined to subsequently amend 
the 1965 Act's provisions. As mentioned earlier, in Chap­
ter V, they clearly saw the 'fair' rent concept as one which 
could be conveniently extended to the public sector - which 
they did in 1972.
There have, of course, been more recent legislative develop­
ments affecting the private rented sector - the introduction
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of 'assured' tenancies and 'shorthold' tenancies in 1980, 
and their subsequent development in 1988 - without the
establishment of committees of inquiry. However, none of 
these provisions have significantly adversely affected the 
interests of existing tenants, and in the anti-harrassment 
provisions there was clearly a recognition of mistakes 
having been made in the past, and evidence of an attempt to 
build a consensus with the Opposition. Ironically, the 
'solution' - 'assured' tenancies [albeit perhaps in a 
somewhat modified form], might well have been introduced a 
quarter of a century earlier if a committee of inquiry had 
been appointed prior to the 1957 Rent Act.
Sufficient evidence has been advanced, it is claimed, to 
justify the prediction that circumstances could be identi­
fied in which governments might be inclined to appoint com­
mittees of inquiry. And, explanations have been advanced
for inquiries not being established where the contrary might 
have been expected. In addition, situations have been
found where, because of changing circumstances, benefits 
which might have been anticipated to flow from the estab­
lishment of an inquiry became less significant, or other of 
the listed benefits emerged.
Arguably, judged from the viewpoint of those establishing 
them, of the five pre-legislative inquiries examined, only 
one, that by the Cullingworth Sub-committee into sub-stan­
dard housing in Scotland, could be considered to have been a 
'success'. The Ridley Committee failed to reach a full
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consensus on rent regulation and to provide a method of
implementing 'fair' rents. Milner Holland failed to pro­
duce the anticipated evidence on inefficient use of public 
sector housing in London. Francis failed to provide a
consensus recommendation for extending security of tenure to
the furnished rented sector. And, Denington failed to
reach a consensus on compulsory improvement of owner occu­
pied property. With changing circumstances, of course, 
Crossman was able to make effective use of the Milner Hol­
land Report, although this was pure serendipity, while on 
the other hand, with the Conservative Government's change of 
policy on housing improvement, subsequent to the publication 
of the Denington Report, compulsory implementation was 
removed from the agenda. The Cullingworth [Housing Manage­
ment] Sub-committee Report on housing allocation, different 
from the rest in the sense that it was primarily concerned 
with policy implementation, while satisfactorily addressing 
the objectives, with some of its comments, created grounds 
for embarrassment.
Although the circumstances surrounding the abolition of the 
two statutory housing advisory committees - CHAC and SHAC - 
have been examined, it has not been the objective of this 
exercise to explore the reasons for the general decline in 
utilisation of committees of inquiry by government which has 
occurred over the last fifteen years or so. Clearly such 
developments as increased dependence on private sector 
provision, and on market determined prices, standards, 
preferences, and priorities; the adoption by central gov-
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eminent of a more confrontational approach in its relation­
ship with local authorities; and, perceived shortcomings of 
committees of inquiry - being time consuming, and unrepre­
sentative in their membership [the province of the 
'great and the good'] have all contributed.8 But, the- 
striking feature about such committees on analysing the 
foregoing evidence on their application with regard to 
housing policy, is the unpredictability of their output and 
of the situation prevailing when a report has been produced.
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II - The Environment Committee and the Committee on Scottish 
Affairs
Judged in terms of their perceptible impact on housing 
policy neither the Environment Committee nor the Scottish 
Affairs Committee have shown much success, and on the basis 
of the review of its inquiry into Improvement Policy, have 
both been less effective in this regard than their 'mutual 
predecessor' - the Environment Committee - certainly when 
one considers the change the latter achieved in the criteria 
for identifying housing action areas. Of course, as the 
Expenditure Committee demonstrated, just to measure success, 
or the lack of it, on the number of recommendations accepted 
or rejected by government may be over simplistic, and the 
influence may be achieved by more oblique means. And, for 
that matter, recommendations [or observations] can be con­
cerned with details at one extreme to broad policy issues at 
the other, and the principal recommendations of both the 
Environment Committee and the Scottish Affairs Committee 
have been in the latter category. Further, even where a 
committee may be identified as having had an influence on 
policy other factors may have influenced the decision as 
well.
One important distinction to bear in mind when comparing the 
performance of the two 'departmental' Committees with the 
Expenditure Committee is, that as pointed out earlier, the 
latter was dealing with a pre-legislative situation. 
Governments are clearly more likely to be susceptible to
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pressure from a pre-legislative committee, particularly, 
where as here, support could be built round concern for 
inequalities in resource allocation, and leverage exerted by 
exploiting the 'Scottish differences'.
In any event, influence on policy apart, the role of select 
committees being considered is the examination of policy. 
During the inquiry process ministers may be subjected to a 
level of questioning not possible on the floor of the House, 
and civil servants may be required to expound on policies 
and explain the reasons behind policies. The knowledge 
that a policy is potentially subject to scrutiny may mean 
that, even although a decision is not changed, the factors 
involved in a decision will be more closely examined. How 
effective have the Committees been in examining policy and 
what factors are likely to influence effectiveness? Before 
exploring this point it is probably appropriate to consider 
what criteria might best be applied in selecting issues for 
examination in the first place and to assess against these 
criteria how relevant were the issues adopted for investiga­
tion by the two Committees.
Earlier it was suggested that consensus may be considered a 
primary objective in select committee reports in that com­
mittees which produce such reports are likely to be regarded 
as most formidable. On these grounds contentious issues 
should be avoided, this being a particularly significant 
consideration in the case of the Scottish Committee for the 
reasons explained in Chapter II. But this observation
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could also be applied to the Environment Committee. The 
Council House Sales inquiry was a case in point. While the 
Committee eventually managed to produce an agreed report it 
was only after considerable controversy within the Committee 
and the production of the agreed version appears to have 
resulted, to at least some extent, from the personal rela­
tionship between the leading members on both sides, Bruce 
Douglas-Mann and Nicholas Scott. However, if potential for 
consensus is to be the primary criterion for selection of 
topics then some policy issues may go unexamined - which 
seems an undesirable situation. In any event it can be 
argued that inquiries need not be regarded as unsuccessful 
if difficulty is experienced in reaching consensus or, for 
that matter, consensus is not achieved. Government back­
benchers while they may not be prepared to challenge the 
main thrust of policies, may be prepared to support criti­
cism of government departments and/or ministers as was 
evident in the cases of the inquiries into Council House 
Sales, and into the Private Rented Sector.
This is not to suggest that consensus reports may not bring 
advantages but perhaps, that consensus should be regarded as 
a bonus rather than as a primary criterion. Of course the 
fact that an issue is likely to be contentious may create 
difficulties in having it selected for investigation. 
There is obviously a considerable degree of bargaining in 
the selection of topics and Government backbenchers may be 
reluctant to embark on an investigation in this category, or 
only subject to considerable qualifications on the topics to
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be discussed. This appears to have been what occurred in 
the case of the Scottish Committees1s investigation into 
Housing Capital Allocation.
The foregoing consideration apart, Committees are limited in 
the number of issues that they can investigate, and a fairly 
obvious criterion is that issues should in general be sig­
nificant. I think it can be accepted that the housing 
issues investigated by the Committees qualify in this re­
gard. It may of course be that issues are important with­
out having received much recognition but are put on the 
political agenda as a result of committee investigation, the 
issue of dampness in housing is a good example.
Apart from the scrutiny process select committees perform 
other roles and bring other advantages and in considering 
the criteria for selecting issues for investigation these 
should be borne in mind. In the first place they can be 
regarded as a particularly effective mechanism for gathering 
and discussing information and bringing topics to light. 
This was demonstrated in the case of the investigations into 
the Privately Rented Sector, and into Dampness in Housing. 
The latter investigation in particular brought a wide range 
of issues into discussion. The inquiry into Housing Capi­
tal Allocation, while the evidence taken was limited and the 
inquisitorial style weak, did cast some light on how the 
system operates.
Three of the inquiries examined, particularly the one into
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Dampness in Housing, taking as it did, evidence not only 
from departments, quangos, and local authorities, but also 
from a fairly wide range of tenants' organisations and 'non 
established' pressure groups demonstrated a further advant­
age of the system - its capacity for widening the policy 
community. There have been suggestions that at many com­
mittee hearings organisations giving evidence are those 
which have already established other channels of access to 
the policy making system and that the select committee 
system only provides them with a further opportunity. In 
the case of the dampness inquiry this criticism would be 
difficult to sustain.
It may be concluded, that on the basis of the criteria 
identified - significance, putting issues on the policy 
agenda, increasing information, providing opportunity for 
discussion, raising topics, and widening the policy commun­
ity - the housing issues selected by the two Committees, 
have been reasonably appropriate for investigation.
Regarding the information emerging from the Committees' 
activities, the question arises as to how effectively it 
will be disseminated, both within Parliament and without. 
As far as Parliament is concerned there has been criticism 
that reports have gone largely unpublicised principally 
because the Government except in a minority of mainly uncon- 
troversial issues has failed to grant adequate time for 
debates on issues raised. When reports have been debated 
it has generally been a considerable time after their publi­
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cation and/or the time allocated has been on Fridays. 
"This is a major shortfall in the support which the Govern­
ment promised [and has generally given] to the select com­
mittee system" .9
As far as the dissemination of information outwith Parlia­
ment is concerned this falls into two categories - informa­
tion to the general public and information to specialist 
bodies. As far as the former is concerned this will depend 
on the interest shown by the media. As mentioned in Chap­
ter II, the Scottish Committee [and the Welsh] appear to 
have been more successful in this direction than the other 
Select Committees. In general specialist bodies have shown 
a close interest in the Committees' activities and have 
reported developments in their journals.
Reverting to the question of the effectiveness of scrutiny 
it appears, on the limited evidence available from the 
examination of its two investigations, that the Environment 
Committee has been fairly successful in this regard and 
certainly more so than the Scottish Committee. A number of 
factors can be identified which seem likely to influence the 
effectiveness of committees in scrutinising policy:- 
information available; resources utilised; specialisa­
tion/knowledge; and, the attitude of members. Each of 
these factors will be examined in turn.
The information available to committee members, apart from 
that of their constituency experiences, will stem from two
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principal sources - that given by outside witnesses, and 
that given by departmental representatives. The potential 
for gathering information from outside witnesses is consid­
erable as was demonstrated in most of the investigations 
examined. The level of information coming from depart­
mental ministers will of course be influenced by other 
factors mentioned but will also depend on the willingness of 
departmental representatives to disclose information. The 
Environment Committee met with some difficulties in this 
connection, particularly with regard to an investigation 
into the Department's capital expenditure on housing, a 
point alluded to in Chapter II. However, this can largely 
be put down to the combative style of the Secretary of 
State, Michael Heseltine, and regarded as a transitory 
problem.
The resources utilised by the Environment Committee in terms 
of specialist advisors were consistently more substantial 
than those utilised by the Scottish Committee. This was 
particularly apparent in the case of the investigation into 
Dampness in Housing where the latter engaged only one part- 
time specialist advisor, a technologist. One got the
impression that the quality of the questioning in that 
inquiry could have been improved if an additional advisor 
had been available to brief members on administrative and 
legal issues arising. In general briefing is likely to be 
more significant to members of the Scottish Committee be­
cause they lack the opportunity to specialise and, as a 
group, they are likely to lack the background knowledge of
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Environment Committee members who, to a considerable extent, 
appear to have been selected because of experience in local 
government and other relevant areas. There may at the same 
time, be a case for establishing a permanent research base 
for the Environment Committee, a resource which perhaps 
could be tapped to at least some extent by the Scottish 
Committee.
Conservative members of the Environment Committee appear in 
general to have been more willing to take the Department and 
ministers to task than have their Scottish counterparts. 
This was illustrated by the different attitudes adopted in 
the inquiries into Council House Sales, and into the Private 
Rented Sector, on the one hand, and the inquiry into Housing 
Capital Allocation on the other. This may be in part 
because Scottish backbenchers tend to be more "front bench 
orientated" .10
In assessing the effectiveness of the Committees in examin­
ing policy one has also to consider the breadth of issues 
which have so far been investigated. Neither Committee 
has, for example, examined policy towards the owner occupied 
sector, apart from its connection with council house sales, 
nor the activities of housing associations. Also so far
unexamined are the Housing Corporation and Scottish Homes.
Is there a case for the two Committees carrying out joint 
inquiries? The inquiry into council house sales could 
clearly appropriately have been expanded to embrace Scot­
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land, and while Scotland does not have the concentrations of 
privately rented housing which exists in England, 
particularly in London, the legislation relating to the 
privately rented sector is broadly the same and there would 
not appear to be any great problem in including Scotland in 
the other Environment Committee inquiry.
The conduct of joint inquiries would bring a number of 
advantages to the Scottish Committee. First - it would 
allow a wider range of issues to be covered by the Scottish 
Committee without increasing the load on members, particu­
larly significant for the Conservatives. This considera­
tion would not only apply to investigating housing policy 
but also contribute, albeit marginally, to addressing the 
wider problem of coping with the broad range of issues 
covered by the Scottish Office. Second - by diluting the 
Scottish membership it might increase the possibility of 
consensus and enable the Scottish Committee to investigate 
what might otherwise be viewed as 'no go' areas. It is 
difficult, for example, to perceive of the Scottish Commit­
tee tackling the question of council house sales. Third - 
it would create the opportunity to compare and contrast 
policies being pursued by the DoE and the Scottish Office. 
The question of the resistance of the SDD to a national 
house condition survey - an issue which arose during the 
dampness inquiry - is a good example. Fourth - it might 
allow the selection of Scottish representatives who had a 
specialist knowledge in the field, and by widening their 
horizons, give them the opportunity to import knowledge and
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experience into Scottish inquiries. Fifth - it would
enable the Scottish Committee to utilise the larger re­
sources available to the Environment Committee.
What benefits if any might accrue to the Environment Commit­
tee from such a development? Bruce and Evans have pointed 
to the relatively few reports produced by the Environment 
Committee in the period to October 1982, to the higher 
turnover of its membership, and the low attendance at meet­
ings, and suggested that "this indicates that it has fallen 
into the trap of going for long 'Royal Commission' type in­
quiries. The reports on Council House Sales, and the 
Private Rented Housing Sector [illustrating] this tendency - 
- the Committee has become so bogged down in long inquir­
ies that it has lost its momentum and political sex 
appeal".11 This phenomenon may also help to explain why 
the Environment Committee has not carried out a further 
housing related inquiry in the last ten years. [Although 
one suspects that other experiences - the contrived consen­
sus on council house sales and, for Labour members, the 
Party's subsequent volte face on the issue; and the percep­
tion that until the question of subsidies is resolved some 
areas of housing policy are unlikely to make much progress - 
may also have acted as a deterrent.] If joint inquiries 
were adopted on occasion, this might allow a two track 
approach with more time consuming inquiries being conducted 
by both Committees in parallel with shorter inquiries on 
other topics.
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Of course, there might well be resistance to the establish­
ment of joint inquiries. The idea would be unattractive to 
Scottish Office ministers and officials, not only because of 
the potential for increasing the effectiveness of the in­
quiries in general, but in particular, because of the scope 
mentioned earlier, which it would give Scottish members to 
compare Scottish and English policies and practices. At 
the same time, the possibility of English members question­
ing differences between policies and practices, and as has 
been seen, a tendency to do so was very evident during the 
Expenditure Committee's inquiry into housing improvement 
policy, would be no more welcome - not only to the Scottish 
Office, but also to the DoE. Indeed, this latter eventual­
ity, to the extent that it threatened distinct Scottish 
policies and legislation, could well be unattractive to the 
generality of Scottish MPs.
Scottish Committee members might be unhappy about inquiries 
being moved outwith the Scottish political system with a 
possible reduction in visibility of activity. As mentioned 
earlier the Scottish Committee, together with the Welsh, is 
reckoned to have a higher profile with its media than do the 
other select committees.
The attitude of other actors in the Scottish political 
system has also to be considered, particularly that of the 
local authorities. They are used to having easy access to 
decision makers and operating within the relatively small 
Scottish local authority community. They also appear to
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attach considerable importance to the Scottish Committee. 
Operating within the larger British scene they might find 
unattractive. However, provided joint inquiries were
limited to a few issues they would probably be content to go 
along with the arrangement.
Finally, prevailing political circumstances are likely to 
have a major impact on attitudes. To the extent that joint 
inquiries might take pressure off Conservative backbenchers 
it is likely to reduce Labour support for the proposal. At 
the same time the present Conservative Government will 
doubtless be anxious to demonstrate that it can continue to 
operate distinct Scottish parliamentary mechanisms.
Even with the untilisation of joint inquiries there would of 
course be a continuing need for specifically Scottish in­
quiries. Housing capital allocation is an example, where 
the inquiry was dealing with distinctive Scottish machinery 
and policies being pursued by the Scottish Office. The 
absorbtion of the Housing Corporation in Scotland into the 
recently created Scottish Homes also removes any potential 
there might have been for joint inquiries in that area of 
activity.
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